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Abstract: 
This research thesis is prompted by the introduction of the Principal Officials 
Accountability System (POAS), a move which is probably aimed to solve the 
governance crisis and salvage the sagging popularity of the government. While 
political accountability is an under-explored academic issue which deserves more 
attention in the academic community of Hong Kong, the POAS also fundamentally 
alters the constitutional and political context of Hong Kong and directly put the issue 
of political accountability to the forefront. The researcher is also particularly amazed 
by the interesting observation that the government officials and the general public 
seemingly articulated two contrasting version of accountability. Based on these 
observations, this thesis aims to investigate the new constitutional and political 
context after the implementation of the POAS. 
The failure of the POAS in enhancing both the accountability and capacity of the 
government is exemplified by the constitutional as well as political appraisal in this 
thesis. The institutional analysis demonstrates that the POAS is deficient in forging a 
strong accountability relationship between the executive and the general public. 
Besides the traditional institutional analysis, the major contribution of this thesis is to 
enrich the academic discourse of the politics of accountability in Hong Kong by 
additional perspectives. First, by employing the tools of historical institutionalism and 
social constructivism, this paper attempts to craft a better theoretical framework in 
explaining the vicissitudes of Hong Kong politics associated with the POAS reforms. 
It illustrates that the POAS transformed the political interaction related to political 
accountability from an intra-elite struggle to a societal clash between the 
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pro-government coalition and pro-democracy camp. Therefore, apart from the 
inability to deliver accountability, the POAS also ended up bringing ceaseless 
conflicts to the already polarized political dynamics in Hong Kong. 
Second, this thesis tries to supplement the study of politics of political accountability 
by adopting an unprecedented political-actor-oriented approach. By conducting a 
series of interviews with political elites who are mostly involved in the POAS reform, 
the researcher hopes to trace the root of the deficiency of the POAS and the entailing 
politics in their conception towards the concept of accountability. After carefully 
analyzing the materials obtained from these interviews, it is discovered that though 
these elites appreciate the importance of political accountability, there is a huge 
mismatch between what they aspire and their proposal to materialize their aspirations. 
The failure of the accountability system can find its vestiges in the conception of 





























Chapter 1 Politics of Political Accountability in 
Hong Kong — The Research Puzzle and 
Questions 
1.1 Research Puzzle: Different Conception of “Political 
Accountability"? 
The notion of political accountability originates largely from the contemporary 
democratic thoughts, and it is widely depicted as the indispensable quality of good 
governance. The government derives power from the citizens, and the executive 
authority must be accountable for the exercising of such power to the citizens. 
Scrutinizing public policies and decisions on behalf of citizens, a popularly-elected 
legislature is regarded as the main enforcer of political accountability in a 
representative democracy. 
However, such Utopian vision has never been materialized in Hong Kong after 
the handover. Political accountability seems to be deliberately neglected by the 
Government, and the problem was excavated by a series of unprecedented crises in 
public administration during the first term of Tung Chee-hwa as the Chief Executive 
(the CE). A series of mismanagement and intolerable mistakes were revealed. No 
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matter how serious the blunders were, the public found it unable to remove principal 
officials whom the public no longer confided in. This led to the public outcry for 
enhancement of political accountability in governance. 
In the Policy Address 2000, Tung stated that he would consider devising a 
comprehensive system of public accountability, which would include a compatible 
system of appointment for principal officials, a clear statement of their powers and 
responsibilities as well as a clear definition of their role in formulating and 
implementing government policies. 
After a rather long period of deliberation and then hasty preparation, the 
government implemented the Principal Official Accountability System (POAS) in 
July 2002. However, as this thesis will go on elaborate, the new accountability system 
was discredited by a concatenation of blunders and scandals, including Penny Stock 
Fiasco, controversy of Article 23 legislation, Antony Leung's car purchasing scandal, 
and the indecisiveness in tackling with SARS in its first year of execution. The 
defects of the POAS are so glaring that “political accountability" is just reduced to 
mere rhetoric. The system just cannot fulfill the public aspiration for government 
accountability. 
Besides the inability to solve the governance crisis, the officials concerned 
seemed to espouse a different conception of "political accountability" held by the 
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general public. The situation has stroke me suddenly, thanks to two articles in local 
press on the same day. On that single page of Opinion columns, the Secretary for 
Constitutional Affairs Stephen Lam Sui-lung argues that the new accountability 
system operates smoothly and effectively, while another columnist Andy Ho opines 
that the new system fails to deliver political accountability (South China Morning 
Post, 12 October 2002). 
Indeed, during this year, in rare case newspaper commentaries have unanimously 
condemned this political reform as a failure. The public has long demonstrated their 
disapproval of the new system also, as evidenced in major opinion surveys in Hong 
Kong. Nonetheless, the government officials still remained defiant and continuously 
avowed for the merits of this reform. 
The stark contrast between the government's response and public sentiment leads 
to an unresolved puzzle: Why do the CE and the principal officials remain affirmative 
of the merits of the POAS, albeit the disapproval from the general public? Are the CE 
and principal officials holding a conception of ‘‘political accountability" different 
from the public? If so, what is it? 
After briefly explored the relevant literature, to my surprise, I discover that 
indeed no serious empirical study has ever been done on the evolution of political 
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accountability in Hong Kong, let alone its possible relevance to the post-colonial 
political context after the Handover. 
This research is exactly initiated by this desideratum. 
1.2 Research Questions and Design: 
This research thesis attempts to answer three core research questions: 
1. What is the institutional problem that leads to the malfunction of the POAS? 
2. What is the political dynamics that contributed to the failure of the POAS? 
3. What is the conception of "political accountability" held by the political elites 
who are mostly involved in the POAS reform? 
The first question is a static institutional analysis on the POAS. The second one 
attempts to recapture the dynamic aspect of the politics of political accountability as 
made manifest after the introduction of the POAS. The last questions deconstruct the 
elements of “political accountability" as embodied in the minds of key political actors 
in this reform, and tries to link it with the operation of the POAS in Hong Kong. 
These intellectual enquires, as a combination，would lead to the discussion why the 
introduction of the POAS and the new interaction between political actors would 
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bring further political destabilization of the regime instead of stabilization in Hong 
Kong. 
This research is thus descriptive, explanatory and exploratory. It is exploratory 
because it may discover interesting findings which may undergird the more ambitious 
explanatory research: how should political scientists establish the theoretical 
framework in explaining the phenomenon of political instability exhibited in nearly 
every aspect in the post-colonial politics of Hong Kong. 
The empirical foundation of this study mainly comes from two sources. The first 
main stream is government documents, official records and newspaper reports. They 
would be used frequently in the discussion of the first two research questions. 
The empirical materials for the third questions mainly come from a host of 
qualitative interviews with some elites conducted between January and May 2004. 
This part is aimed at eliciting the rich and unique context of political accountability 
held by the elites, and concepts or ideas would by duly grounded in the data. 
It should be noted that it is not the researcher's intention to attribute the failure of 
accountability wholly to institutional issues. Indeed, the researcher acknowledges the 
possibility of leadership problem and personal factors that may be of relevance to the 
discussion. However, given the limited resource and time, the leadership issue will 
not be covered in this thesis. 
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Despite the limited scope allowed for negotiation among political parties, nearly 
every political reform (including the POAS) is primarily a product of executive 
initiative devoid of extensive input from the legislature and public. It is reasonable to 
presume that the context of political accountability is mainly driven by elites in 
Government instead of citizens. Thus, it is sensible to limit the targets among political 
figures who had been deeply involved in the POAS reform. More detailed discussion 
on the methodology could be found in Chapter 7. 
1.3 Significance of the Study: 
Despite these various limitations, it is believed that the research can develop a 
more appropriate and tailor-made conceptual framework to understand the operation 
of political accountability, an important concept in both political science and public 
administration，in Hong Kong. Besides the available institutional analysis of the 
existing political system, this research can provide a new political-actor-oriented 
perspective for studying how the beliefs of the politically influential actors bear any 
relevance to the evolution of political concepts and the political development 
pertaining to it. 
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By providing a meaningful discourse on the operation of “political 
accountability" in Hong Kong, this particular study may shed some lights on future 
research on this under-explored topic. For instance, if the perception of politically 
accountability held by the general public is extracted, we may compare that with this 
study. If the citizens' expectation is different from the Government's understanding, it 
may provide the clues why the legitimacy of the HKSAR Government has no sign of 
resurgence. Another possible development is to study the discreetness in Hong Kong 
political culture and values with that of the colonial rule. The evolution of political 
accountability may be itself a discontinuity, in which certain important governing 
values in colonial era again are not inherited after the resumption of sovereignty. 
On the other hand, the unique situation in Hong Kong may also offer some 
insight to modify the contemporary studies on political accountability, which is 
dominated by democratic theories. 
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Chapter 2 The Concept of Accountability 
一 the Normative and Theoretical Issues 
2.1 Accountability - Ideals and Actualities 
The following two chapters form the literature review of this thesis. They serve 
as a comprehensive overview on the ongoing academic discourse on the topic of 
accountability. 
At the outset, we must acknowledge that the academic discussions on the 
concept of accountability are indeed consisted of wide-ranging elements. Such 
intellectual inquiry span across the field of political philosophy, democratic studies, 
political institution as well as public administration, and these different ramifications 
are also closely intertwined. 
The concept of accountability can both refer to an ideal and an attainable 
actuality - the actual organizational arrangement which aims to materialize the ideal. 
The dual nature of the word often creates confusion and complexity for normal 
readers to comprehend the real connection between these two attributes. The problem 
becomes more apparent if we want to judge if an actual political system falls short of 
the ideal. We need to be extremely conversant with the indispensable part of the ideal 
of accountability, and then devise indicators which can be applied to access the 
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existing political structures and institutions. By this way, the intellectual exploration 
must move from the normative theory to institutional analysis. Therefore, any 
meaningful theoretical overview of the concept of accountability must be a 
combination of both normative and empirical perspectives. These two factors together 
necessitate a wide-ranging and voluminous discussion in the literature review of this 
thesis. 
Moreover, accountability is a rather new concept in the discourse of Hong Kong 
politics. Insufficient effort has been made to elucidate this intricate concept and apply 
the insight from existing literature to study the politics of accountability in Hong 
Kong. Therefore, Chapter 2 and 3 will devote extensive coverage to illustrate the 
theoretical and organizational issues arising from the concept of accountability, so 
that the latter discussion of this thesis can be grounded on some substantial 
intellectual foundation. 
In his famous book Democracy and its Critics and On Democracy, Robert Dahl 
has competently delineated "democracy" into a normative ideal and the empirical 
modalities. He situates democratic theory in a horizontal scale and put the arguments 
about democracy in different places in the scale, with the left extreme explicitly 
philosophical and the right explicitly empirical (Dahl 1989, 7). 
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It is submitted that similar demarcation is also applicable to the concept of 
accountability. This thesis intends to adopt similar differentiation in illustrating the 
normative and organization components of “political accountability". Chapter 2 will 
tackle the theoretical issues arising from this concept, while Chapter 3 touches on 
some structural and organizational issues. 
2.2 Why Political Accountability? 一 the Ideal of Rendering 
Account 
2.2.1 The need of limited government 
Rules and compliance form an important pedestal of politics. In discussing the 
efficacy of a political system, we have already assumed the propriety of a government 
to execute collective actions, and preclude the possibility of anarchy or other 
anarchical vocation. Government rules and citizens obey. The governing and the 
governed are thus engaged in a relationship through the political framework. Put it 
bluntly, in analyzing the relationship between the government and citizens, we are 
indeed ascertaining in what manner the government policies and decisions bind and 
how citizens are bound. 
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Political philosophers have long avowed for the necessity of a government or a 
certain kind of political domination. To illustrate how this thought is derived would 
entail the volume of another research thesis. For the sake of completeness, however, 
several important points should be brought out briefly. 
In his classical work Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes vividly illustrates the insecurity, 
brutality and chaos accompanied with the lack of a central sovereign power, or "state 
of nature". Human instincts induce individuals to act self-interestedly. Without any 
structure of institutionalized authority, people tend to exploit or enslave others to 
maximize their own advantages. Surrendering our freedom to an overwhelming 
political authority is indubitably an uncomfortable experience. However, the 
horizontal kinds of exploitations and manipulations among people are so even more 
abhorrent that render the vertical subjection to a government the best among the 
worse. To Hobbes, human beings are either subject to an absolutism (the state, 
symbolized by the chimerical ‘‘Leviathan，，)，which is dangerous, or cooped up in the 
state of anarchy, which is even worse (Hobbes, 1651). 
The descents of social contract theory have presented a more optimistic picture. 
Instead of adopting Hobbes's assertion that absolutism is inevitable, John Locke 
presents a more encouraging portrait of government. Largely influenced by the 
traditions of natural law, Locke claims that the purpose of the government should only 
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be limited to protecting individual rights, property and security. Since the government 
possesses every means to violate citizens' fundamental rights, the public should be 
provided with ways to guard against infringement from the government. This partly 
led to the aspiration of constitutional and representative government (Locke 1690), 
and in later incantation, separation of power espoused by Baron de Montesquieu 
(1748). 
The nineteenth century marked the rise of capitalism and democracy, while 
communism found its heyday in the earlier twentieth century subsequently. Old 
regimes fell and new regime emerged. However, some form of government continues 
to exist in every territory. One thing is obvious: besides anarchy, which has been 
marginalized in today's political discourses, socialism, which has never come into 
true existence, as well as fundamentalism, which still gains meager support 
worldwide, major ramifications of political philosophy and theory in the last century 
(such as liberalism, pluralism, elitism, communism, communitarianism) are all built 
on one common postulation - the need of a government. There seems to be a broad 
and conventional consensus on the need and desirability of subjection to political 
authority. 
If we admit the propriety of a government to rule us, the next logical question is 
how the government should exercise their political power. No matter how divergent 
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existing political ideologies are, they both share a common vision - the sovereignty of 
the state rests with the people. Government merely serves as the agent. Their power to 
govern is entrusted by the citizens, the ultimate principals. This view draws its major 
theoretical underpinning from the doctrine of popular sovereignty and popular will by 
Rousseau (1762). 
In order to govern, government officials must be bestowed with wide-ranging 
power to rule. The government is entrusted with sweeping power to raise tax, deploy 
human and financial resources of the public vehicles, as well as enact and enforce 
authoritative rules for the society. In case of disobedience, the government may resort 
to coercive power and sanctions to demand obedience. In necessary occasions, the 
government may obtrude into one's privacy and daily life, under the reason (or excuse) 
of “collective interest". In Weber's parlance, government enjoys “the monopoly of the 
legitimate use ofphysical force” (1991). 
Having weathered incalculable disaster brought from authoritarian, despotism as 
well as Fascism, the world has learned a simple lesson from history though — 
concentration of political power is extremely dangerous. The public is particularly 
vulnerable under the shadow of government's wide-ranging power. We do not need 
Lord Acton to remind us that ''power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupt 
absolutely” (Acton, 1842). 
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As we have seen, the quandary of subjecting to political authority lies in the 
difficulty to confer the government extensive power while keep it from going too wild. 
James Madison, founder of the American Constitution, has concisely highlighted such 
dilemma, 
"if men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, 
neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a 
government to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must 
first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control 
itself." (Madison, Federalist no. 51) 
This classical thought has contributed significantly to the later discussion on 
accountability. Empowerment must come in tandem with responsibility and control. 
Once a government is entrusted to govern, certain control measures and mechanism 
must be tagged to political power. In short, "limited government" (Friedrich 1974) is 
what we want always. 
In order to attain a limited government, we need to devise certain controlling 
mechanisms for preventing the abuse of power. First, the mechanism should be able 
to tight the rein on the use of political power. The rulers are estopped from willfully 
manipulating political power to serve its course at the expense of others. The 
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mechanism should be able to prevent rulers from inflicting harm on the general public 
by exercising their political power. Moreover, government officials may also misuse 
their power for pursuing a lesser evil. Lethargy, indolence, or recklessness is all 
devoid of execrable elements. However, if they are not mediated or cured in the 
political system, their outcome may be equally catastrophic. 
Second, the citizens should be, to some extent, capable of impose their will on 
the government in the capacity of its principals. Besides limiting political power, 
government must be forced to govern responsibly and responsively, hence acting in 
the best interest of the citizens. 
Therefore, in order to achieve a kind of desirable mode of government, what we 
need is a type of relationship between the government and citizens that can, on one 
hand, prevent the government from inflicting harm by its overwhelming resource as 
well as monopoly of power, and, on the other hand, induce the public officials to do 
good to the people. 
Given this two-fold ambition, the next crucial question is thus, “how can we 
achieve this goal?" Here, I find it appropriate to turn from traditional political 
philosophy to recent discussion on accountability and representation. 
2.2.2 Concept of Accountability 一 A kind of Political Control 
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We can bridle political power through various kinds of control on the 
government. Accountability, which emphasizes on the need to render account, is only 
a specific kind of political shackles. 
In conventional parlance, accountability means answerability. In short, a person 
is accountable if he has to “give account to some authority for the discharge of one's 
duty or for one's action" (Jones 1992) and “to be responsible for their consequence" 
(Burke 1986). 
2.2.3 Rendering Account - Information, Reasons and 
Sanctions 
If public officials are merely delegates or puppets of the public, the will of the 
ruler and the ruled are virtually the same. Then it would be pointless to discuss 
accountability. Accountability presupposes relational and dialogic relationship 
between the citizens, in the capacity of principals, and the government, in its role as 
public agent. An agent first acquires the capacity to act on behalf of their principal, 
but he needs to be responsible to the principals. 
The essence of accountability lies in the duty to provide accounts and answer 
questions on how the political power is exercised. Schedler divides accountability into 
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several dimensions. The informational dimension of accountability impose public 
officials a duty to inform about their decisions and put forward reliable facts about 
their administration. It stipulates, on one hand, the citizens' right to receive 
information about the governance, and on the other hand, government's obligation to 
release all necessary details. The argumentative dimension implies the government's 
duty to justify the manner by which political power is manipulated. Therefore, besides 
"the right to receive information and the corresponding obligation to release all 
necessary details", accountability also includes "the right to receive an explanation 
and the corresponding duty to justify one's conduct". (Schedler 1999, 15) 
In normal circumstances, answerability operates retrospectively. The officials are 
open to questions and criticism for what they have done in the past. But such 
answerability may operate prospectively also. Citizens are entitled to inquire what the 
government plans to do in the future, so that some wrongful or imprudent acts can be 
noticed at the outset. 
However, the obligation to provide information and reason is only the necessary 
but not sufficient condition to render a government accountable. Answerability alone 
can only guarantee transparency of the government. To institutionalize the proper 
norm of representation and responsiveness among public officials, answerability must 
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be supported by enforceable sanctions, by which the citizens can employ institutional 
means to penalize officials' improper conducts or violation of public duties. 
In order to materialize accountability, there should be at least some guaranteed 
channel for citizens to punish public officials for their wrong and unsatisfactory 
performance. The public formulates their judgment and imposes sanction on officials 
accordingly basing on the account presented by the latter. Punitive instruments can 
are normally available to the citizens, with their actual forms depending on particular 
institutional designs. The typical examples of sanction in a liberal democracy include 
electoral sanctions, impeachment, and legislative vote of no confidence. This forms 
the “accountability mechanism", which is, according to Manin, Przeworski and 
Stokes, “a map from the outcomes of actions (including messages that explain these 
actions) of public officials to sanctions by citizens" (1999，10). This credible potential 
threat, in turn, reminds the officials the need to exercise their political power properly 
and responsively. 
However, in what circumstance should the public officials be punished? To what 
standard should they comply with? Mark Philp approaches this enquiry by 
demarcating accountability into two categories: formal and political. Formal 
accountability “aims to ensure that the public official acts within the formal remit of 
the responsibilities of his/her office”, It concerns whether political power is abused (in 
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case of corruption, embezzlement, fraud, etc) and whether procedural propriety is 
observed (in case of ultra vires or violation of procedural justice). This is to ensure 
that the trust of public office is exercised within the law. Yet, obviously, formal 
accountability does not tackle with problems such as indolence, lethargy, insouciance, 
as well as stupid use of political power, which are difficult to be specified in formal 
terms. (Philp 2001,360) 
On the other hand, political accountability “concerns the answerability of the 
politicians and public officials for their conduct in office. The issue is not whether 
someone acted within their legitimate powers, but whether they exercised those 
powers in ways that the political bodies to whom they are accountable — such as 
Parliament or the electorate — can endorse,, (Philp 2001, 360). It focuses on whether 
the politicians have adhered to the standard widely endorsed by the community. Thus, 
even a particular official has complied with every available rule and procedural 
stipulation, he may still be punished by the mass for his decision that infringes the 
standard or values commonly shared by the public. Put in another way, formal 
accountability subjects the officials to rule of law, while political accountability 
exposes them to both the rule of law and rule of reason. This thesis will mainly deal 
with the latter species of accountability. 
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2.3 Representation and Accountable Government: a Comparative 
Approach 
In order to have a better grasp of the conceptual issues pertaining to the concept 
of "accountability", I find it judicious to further compare accountability with the 
concept of responsibility, responsiveness and mandate-responsiveness. 
Adopting the most commonly used definition, "representation" means acting in 
the best interest of the public (Pitkin 1967). From a conceptual perspective, there are 
indeed several ways we may strive for a representative government. Accountability is 
only one of them - government is selected through elections, but the incumbents are 
subject to regular elections and legislative oversight. Once citizens elect a government, 
though they are free to discuss and criticize in any time, they are not empowered to 
give binding instruction to the government. Its distinctive features are the logic of 
retrospective voting which connects policy outcomes with sanctions. 
Indeed, policy processes can exist in various modes, many of them do not rest 
upon retrospective assessment, electoral sanctions, or even democracy. Since the 
citizens subject themselves to the authority of the government, they can reasonably 
expect the public officials to act in their best interest, i.e. “representative”. If whether 
a government act in the best interest of its citizens is used as the ultimate yardsticks to 
evaluate the performance of a regime, the important questions would be like this: 
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given the variety of choices, which particular mode of political control would induce 
the government officials who are coupled with political power to be representative? 
In their illuminating discussion on representation, Manin, Przeworski and Stokes 
compare the concept of accountability, responsiveness and responsibility. Largely 
originated from a functional approach, they have simplified a policy formulation 
process as several parts: input, output (policies) as well as outcome. Figure 2 shows a 
simplified simulation of policy process that illustrates the connection between these 






Interest & Belief Preference Signal Mandate 今 Policy Outcome 
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Sanctions ^ 
Figure 2 Simplified Policy Process^ 
Every citizen holds his individual set of values, by which he perceives, appraises 
or evaluates the government performance as well as outcomes of the policies pursued. 
1 A modified version of Figure 1.1，in Przeworski A., Stokes S. C. and Manin B.(Ed.), Democracy, 
Accountability, and Representation (Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1999)，1-26, 9. 
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People develop their beliefs about what outcome would be brought by a particular 
policy. Also, different groups possess their interest orientation in a society. These 
elements, as a whole, generate particular preferences towards public policies. Citizens 
would likely prefer the government to adopt policies which can advance their interests, 
adhere to their entrenched values, and is sensible in their belief. 
These preferences are signaled or articulated to the politicians through a variety 
of means. Among these signals, mandate is the specific type being put forward in 
elections. It contains the political manifesto and proposed policies of candidates. 
Citizens vote and elect the candidates by choosing which mandate they prefer. After 
successfully elected, the incumbents adopt policies in their political capacity and these 
policies, eventually, bring intended or unintended outcomes. 
By this model, we can differentiate four types of government: responsible, 
responsive, mandate-responsive and accountable. 
A government is responsible if the leaders pursue agendas which they think 
would be in the best interest of the citizens. The policy directions of a responsible 
government may coincide with the preference of the citizens. However, in case there 
is conflict between the two, a responsible political leader would be prepared to resist 
electoral pressures, and, inevitably in some occasions, risk unpopularity by pursuing 
policies formulated to meet the long-term public interests in his conception (Heywood 
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2002, 318). Undoubtedly, in deciding which courses the government should pursue, 
public officials will and have to think differently from the public. They need to take 
into account various factors, for example, ensuing financial burden, social solidarity 
and security implication, which would transcend narrow and particularistic concern. 
Policy preference expressed by the community may not necessarily coincide with that 
of the public officials. A responsible political leader believes that he/she is in the best 
vantage point in determining what is best for the public. The government should 
implement policies that are most beneficial to its citizens despite widespread 
opposition, and be prepared to withstand public criticism. On the other hand, if the 
citizens are rational, they should realize their limitation in deciding what policies are 
the best for them. They should, thus, remain deferent to political authority and follow 
the course of the government. The idea of responsible government shares the rhetoric 
of elitism, and resembles monarchy and aristocracy proposed by Aristotle (1968) to a 
certain extent. 
A responsive government adopts only policies that are signaled as citizens' 
preferences. Responsiveness predicates that people's preference are articulated and 
communicated to the government. The typical signals include public opinion polls, 
public demonstrations, letter campaigns and other forms of political expression. 
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A mandate-responsive government is similar to a responsive one. The public 
gives their signals by voting for particular platforms during an election, in the hope 
that the elected officials will follow their preferences and adopt the policies 
accordingly in the future. Election thus performs a prospective mission - to put a 
government that would implement platform people prefer in power in the coming 
electoral term. 
A government is accountable when citizens “can discern representative from 
unrepresentative governments and can sanction them appropriately, retaining in office 
those incumbents who perform well and ousting from office those who do not." 
(Manin, Przeworski and Stokes 1999, 10). In other expression, citizens hold a 
government accountable if they can evaluate the performance of the incumbents and 
sanction them accordingly through available accountability mechanism. 
Accountability mechanism is "a map from the outcomes of the actions of public 
officials to sanctions by citizens,, (10). Normally, elections serves as the most 
important accountability machinery, through which termination of tenure - the 
ultimate sanction in a career in politics - can be exercised. Accountability rests upon 
the logic of retrospective assessment instead of prospective empowerment. 
2.4 The Desirability of Accountability - the Tactful Balance 
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As we have discussed in earlier part, the normative basis of imposing rigorous 
control on the government rests upon the notion of popular sovereignty. If the 
government is placed with far-reaching power to infringe upon personal rights and 
freedom, the citizens should be, in other way around, empowered to have a say in 
what is decided on behalf of them. Individuals and organizations which can 
manipulate the government vehicle must be checked and controlled to a certain extent. 
Nonetheless, the perplexing question is, to what extent is public control appropriate? 
Popular political participation is essential in imposing effective control on the 
government. Those who have a legitimate stake in the government should always be 
provided with channels to express their concern and prevent the government's 
discretion from going unfettered. Only by actively articulating their preference or 
participating in the policy formulation process could citizens' preference duly 
reflected in government's decisions. 
If every single citizen is involved in the policy deliberation process and endowed 
with the right to impose their will on the government, the public officials are left with 
no discretion to depart from what is commonly endorsed by the society. Ideally 
speaking, this kind of full public participation can ensure that preference of every 
person is duly reflected during the policy process, i.e. complete responsiveness. 
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We can find the reference from ancient Greece, which laid down the prototypical 
model of direct democracy. Public participation fosters democracy, while full public 
participation bespeaks direct democracy. Direct democracy is the purest form of 
democracy in the sense that every citizens participate equally in the reaching public 
decision. In classical Athenian democracy, citizens (though only limited to adult male 
over 20) actively participated in public affairs. Besides casting their votes, adults 
participated in politics through debate and deliberation on public policies in assembly. 
Each citizen had the opportunities to serve in important posts of the government on a 
rotational basis (Held 1996) and they might sanction individuals in the administration 
or executive for fault or imprudence (Elster 1999). 
However, direct democracy remains a Utopian vision. Such extensive direct 
political participation necessitates a relatively low population. Small-scale political 
systems became incapable to cater the needs of booming population, expanding 
territorial area of a regime and the increasingly diversified and complicated functions 
of government. Direct and equal participation at all levels of government become 
increasingly untenable. Robert Dahl lively illustrates the impossibility of direct 
democracy further by means of simple arithmetic. In a large state with considerable 
people, if each citizen speaks few minutes before making any public decisions, the 
decision would take up few days. That lead to his conclusion of "the law of time and 
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numbers" - "the more citizens a democratic unit contains, the less that citizens can 
participate directly in government decisions and the more that they must delegate 
authority to others." (Dahl 1998，109) 
Even if we assume the Utopian direct democracy can materialize, its realization 
may indeed bring several setbacks. First, it may deepen the existing cleavage and rifts 
among different groups of people. Modem society is never homogenous in nature. 
Since the capitalistic economic order is introduced and entrenched, people are readily 
stratified according to their financial status (Hayek 1960). Ethnic division within a 
state becomes a global phenomenon in the last decade, and would likely exacerbate in 
the future (Huntington 1996). A modicum of citizens' participation can hold citizens 
together, but excessively assertive public participation may deepen the rifts between 
different interest groups, social classes as well as ethnic communities. This lead 
Mansbridge to laments, the more intense public participation is, the deeper would the 
cleft between competing interest groups be. The higher the level of participation is, 
more hostile, acrimonious and antagonistic politics is likely to become. (Mansbridge 
1983) 
Second, a surfeit of political participation may virtually paralyze the government. 
If government officials are obliged to listen to every citizen's claim and opinion, the 
administration may be easily "overloaded" by this unbearable burden. Plamenatz 
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remarks, ''rulers, even democratic rulers, need to be protected from their subjects, 
and citizens even in a democracy need to be able to shut their doors and their ears to 
one another” (Plamenatz 1976, 185). Dunn further adds, "paralyzing rule is not a 
recipe for ensuring that it has a surplus of desired over undesired consequences” 
(Dunn 1999) 
In both theory and reality, a pure form of direct democracy may not be what we 
want. Even Jean-Jacques Rousseau has to admit the naivete in assuming the 
practicality of direct popular participation at all levels (Rousseau 1994, 245-6). 
System of representation, which is acclaimed by James Stuart Mill as “the grand 
discovery of modem times" (Mill 1937), becomes the most viable and dominant form 
of political system in the world nowadays. 
System of representation emphasizes the division of labour between the public 
and professional politicians. The public chooses particular politicians as their 
representative, and the politicians will govern and determine public issues on behalf 
of the citizens. 
Here, we need to ponder another important question: then, how should these 
representatives regard public opinion? Are they merely delegates (who should be 
completely responsive to the views of their principals) or a trustee (who can deviate 
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from public opinion)? Here, we will have to review the classic debate on the 
trustee-delegate dichotomy. 
If we regards public officials as merely delegates of the public, the government 
should be wholly responsive to the public and implement what citizens prefer 
punctiliously. Therefore, they should be devoid of any discretion to make any 
decision that is against the will of the public. A government is virtually a pollster, 
whose only duty is to detect citizens' sentiments and implement relevant policies that 
suit their preference. 
Though respect for public opinion is desirable and important, formulating public 
policies solely with regard to public opinion is completely different and may result in 
many drawbacks. First, there are many limitations for the citizens to make prudent 
public choices. The informational asymmetry between the general public and the 
government officials is a perennial phenomenon in politics. It is impossible for the 
public to be wholly certain about what is going on in the government. There is certain 
information that is just outside the reach of normal citizens. It would also be too 
difficult as well as costly for citizens, who are normally deprived of sufficient 
resource and manpower, to find them. The information left in the grip of the public 
may thus be just superficial, biased and incomplete to render any sensible judgment 
on the real state of affairs. 
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Moreover, rational theorists have long reminded us the human disposition to act 
only according to their self-interest. People are normally myopic. They incline to 
pursue their short-term gain instead of appreciate that possible greater gain can be 
obtained if they opt to suffer temporary detriment instead. By following strictly the 
public preference, sometimes the long-term collective gains are sacrificed. 
Furthermore, public opinion is capricious and unpredictable. Public sentiments 
vacillate all the time. What the citizens prefer at this moment could be drastically 
different in near future. Responsiveness in governance, in most of the time, is 
equivalent to fluctuation in policy. 
Schumpeter also admonishes any citizens' attempt to instruct the government. 
He believes that the task of governing itself is difficult and requires certain 
specialized political skills and intellectual abilities. Only politicians who have been 
properly trained and equipped with relevant skills should shoulder such responsibility. 
Thus, after a government is elected, “(t)he voters outside of parliament must respect 
the division of labour between themselves and the politicians they elect. They must not 
withdraw confidence too easily between elections and they must understand that, once 
they have elected in individuals, political action is his business and not theirs. That 
means that they must refrain from instructing him about what he is to do” 
(Schumpeter 1950, 295). Such rational deference to elites' decision - Schumpeter 
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terms it as "democratic self-control" - is an essential condition for the success of the 
democratic process. It is because only by such self-control could political leaders free 
from excessive interference from the public. 
The lack of discretionary space may also discourage politicians to pursue 
political career. Politicians seek power to materialize their political ideology and 
vision. Dunn reminds us that they would need discretionary space by which they can 
be able to act, and sometimes to act boldly. Ridding public officials the necessary 
discretion in governance would effectively baffle professional politicians, as well as 
deter the fledging newcomers to assume public office (Dunn 1999). Though Rousseau 
espouses the importance of being vigilant to government's action, at the same time he 
urges the citizens to provide sufficient discretionary space in which public officials 
can really act (Rousseau 1946). 
Therefore, as Barnard admirably appreciates, public participation should never 
intend to stop the government from acting boldly. “Participation must not stop them 
from being able to act one way or another within a given discretionary space. 
Otherwise, governments have nothing to be accountable for, and citizens nothing to 
watcW\ The rationale of political participation, as he claims, “is not that everybody 
should have a hand in everything, but that there should be institutionally guarded 
opportunities for raising questions and exercising control”. The criteria to gauge the 
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appropriateness of political control are whether the system can render the government 
"subject to control without being at the same time powerless to act on their own 
initiatives" (Barnard 2001, 142). 
This discretionary space was termed as "distance" by Bernard. Public political 
participation forms the cornerstone of controlled government. However, mechanism 
that poses excessive control on the ruler is often turned to paralyzing shackles. Thus， 
the most desirable form of control on government is the utmost public vigilance in 
combination with distance. Government officials should be somewhat insulated from 
the public pressure, so that they can enjoy a discretionary space to act, and in many 
cases, act contrary to public opinion. 
Similar concern is echoed in the work of Almond and Verba. They think that the 
maintenance of a proper balance between governmental power and governmental 
responsiveness is one of the most important and difficult tasks of a democracy" (1989, 
341). Therefore, they propose that a mixture of subjective and participant attitude, i.e. 
civic culture, as the most desirable political culture for a stable democracy. Citizens 
should be both ''active, yet passive; involved, yet not too involved; influential, yet 
deferential” (343). In short, what we need is a tactful balance between citizens' 
control and political leaders' autonomy to act. 
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Uhr concisely elucidates the differences between checks and empowerment by 
employing the terms “accountability” and “responsibility” - "Accountability 
constrains and fetters official discretion, while responsibility releases discretion. 
Accountability is about compliance with authority, whereas responsibility is about 
empowerment and independence. Accountability is the negative end of the same band 
in which responsibility is at the positive end. If accountability is about minimizing 
misgovernment, responsibility is about maximizing good government. ” (Uhr 1993, 4) 
Of course, we are not proposing here that political leaders should be cocooned in 
the available prerogative and insulated completely from public criticism. However, 
the essence of accountability is that the check on political power should be restricted 
to a reasonable ambit by which the politicians can actually rule. Along this vein, the 
comparative advantage of accountability kicks in. Accountability can thus be 
perceived as a delicate balance between public participation and the government's 
capacity to act. And this balance forms the quintessence of the concept of political 
accountability as a normative ideal. 
2.5 The Limitation of Accountability 一 Informational Barrier 
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Accountability is attractive because of its wide operation (ranging from 
information, justification to sanction) as well as its modesty, by which political 
leaders are left with sufficient rooms to do what is truly best for the public. However, 
if we consider accountability as a means to foster a representative government, it 
suffers from a major limitation. 
In a world of perfect information, citizens would know perfectly what political 
leaders intend to do and the reasons behind. Therefore, it will be senseless to talk 
about accountability. In reality, however, we understand that complete transparency 
on the part of the government is just impossible. Therefore, as Schedler argues, any 
discussion on accountability has already presupposed the opacity of power and 
imperfect information. Since we cannot dig into politicians' head to fathom what they 
are thinking, we ask for their justification instead. As we cannot prophetically predict 
the outcome of every decision, we render retrospective rather than prospective 
assessment (Schedler 1999, 20). Agents of accountability do not intend to supervise 
everything. They want appropriate explanations when necessary only. 
However, accountability engenders a peculiar principal-agent relationship. 
Though the citizens should always be the ultimate principals, ironically, it is the 
agents who decide to which extent would the principals know about their actions. As 
Stokes forcefully contends, citizens can only judge the propriety of a public decision 
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on the basis of what they are enabled to know (Stoke 1999). It is difficult for the 
public to overcome to perpetual problem of informational asymmetry in modem 
politics. Politicians have a plethora of ways to eschew public scrutiny on grounds of 
privilege, confidentiality or even legitimate realms of secrecy. Moreover, it may be 
desirable or even necessary for a government to conceal certain information in many 
occasions, such as intelligence about national defence and details of on-going 
international negotiations. It is equally difficult for citizens to demand specific 
disclosure, because, in a rather comical expression, they just do not know what they 
do not know. Therefore, indeed the public often lacks necessary information to know 
which area they should dig into, let alone to make sound judgments on public 
decisions and impose sanctions on the true culprits. We may have to accept this as the 
necessary price of accountability. However, if the amount of truth placed behind the 
veil is so vast that precludes the public from making any sound judgment, the wholly 
irrational response by the public (though citizens are not aware of the imprudence) 
can be equally disastrous. 
The above discussion has set up the main contours of the on-going normative 
and theoretical discussion on the concept of accountability. Following this vein, we 
turn to the empirical component - how aspiration of accountability is actualized 
through institutional mechanism and practice. 
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Chapter 3 The Concept of Accountability 一 the 
Organizational Issues 
3.1 Structural Components of Accountability 
No matter how grand and admirable the gospels of accountability we have 
preached, there must be suitable and tailor-made implementation machineries to 
actualize those Utopian aspirations. By this way, we turn to the discussion of the 
organizational arrangements and structural issues of accountability. 
As mentioned before, the concept of accountability has been largely tinted with 
democracy and democratic ideals. David Potter, a prominent scholar on 
democratization, has once classified liberal democracy, authoritarians and partial 
democracy in terms of how accountable a regime is. In his definition, liberal 
democracy means “a type of political regime in which binding rules and policy 
decisions are made not by the entire community but by representatives accountable to 
the community." This accountability is secured through competitive and democratic 
elections. Authoritarianism, on the other hand, is characterized by “state leaders 
who direct and regulate society without being accountable to citizens”. There is no 
competitive election as well as freedom of speech, association and opposing existing 
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regime. Partial democracy is “a mixed type of political regime in which the 
accountability of government to citizens is more or less qualified”. Non-elected 
establishments are in the position to restrict the effect of elections, and mediate the 
authority (Potter 1997, 4-5). 
Younis and Mostafa advocate for a conception in which accountability is an 
indispensable ingredient of democracy. They clearly point out that election, an 
important component of democracy, only confers the power to run the country's affair 
on particular persons. Democracy continues “with the enduring obligation of the 
elected to give a satisfactory explanation and justification of their conduct”, i.e. 
accountability (2000, 3). Thus, democratic society depends on accountability and 
transparent governance. 
The contemporary academic discussion on accountability ultimate correlates 
accountability with democracy. However, Chebal (1986) warns us the potential 
danger of such approach. In a rather unconventional approach, he argues that 
accountability mechanism should not be equated with democratic institutions. If we 
adopt the concept of accountability in the broadest sense (i.e. provide explanation for 
the exercise of delegated power and the prospect of being sanctioned according to the 
will of the principals), accountability can exist in many other relationships, the most 
extreme cases being corporatism, cronyism or even nepotism. Similarly, Chebal 
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disagrees with the approach to equate political accountability with liberal democracy, 
which largely depends on the threat of revocation of public mandate as executed by 
regular competitive elections. According to him, accountability may exist between 
“patrons and clients, ethnic leaders and their kin, party bosses and party members, 
bureaucrats and citizens, employers and employees, mullahs and believers, military 
and civilians,, (12). In short, accountability is embodied in the relation between state 
and civil society (12). It is not necessarily achieved by constitutional and institutional 
framework. Any study of accountability thus needs to transcend the confines of 
political systems and be grounded in the broader social fabric of the society. In his 
book, he provides strong evidential support by discovering that political 
accountability in developing countries can be obtained through other forms of 
representation in which formal multi-party elections are just peripheral - an indirect 
refutation of Potter's conception of accountability. 
Munichi also have to admit, at pain, that democratic accountability can be 
hampered by the existence of feudalistic connections with outside groups or people. 
These kinds of informal and extra-organizational linkages may undermine the efficacy 
of the democratic institutions in securing accountability (Munichi 1988, quoted in 
Younis and Mostafa 2000). 
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Once the fact that accountability is not monopolized by democracy becomes 
clear, the logical conclusion is that we must duly differentiate democratic 
accountability from accountability. 
It is submitted that the most important criteria for distinguishing the two are 
competently raised by Smith. He defines democratic accountability as the ideology 
that stipulate the government to be accountable not to a ruler, monarch or particular 
class, but to the people who are sovereign, and the prime source of power. The core 
difference between democratic accountability and other accountability relationship is 
that in the former system, there is institutionalization of accountability within the 
liberal democratic order built on procedural propriety, impartiality, and formal 
regulation, in place with the more ad hoc kind of accountability relationship. 
It is found that the major coverage of academic discussion on accountability has 
been imparted to democratic accountability. Therefore, it is unavoidable and indeed 
necessary to illustrate the relevant issues in this body of literature in detail here. 
3.2 The Formal Organizational Components of Democratic 
Accountability 
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Before delving into more detailed discussion, we must have a firmer grasp of the 
major difficulties, as noticed by studies on developed and developing countries, in the 
institutionalization of democratic accountability. 
Democratic accountability is one of the desirable features of government and 
governance. Putting this ideal into reality necessitates the inception of strong and 
sturdy political institutions. Douglass North, a prominent political scientist, lays down 
the definition of institutions as "the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, 
are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction" (1990, 3). If we 
accept North's proposition that institutions is a structure of incentive and sanctions 
that governs and determines human interaction, and also recognize its applicability in 
political arena, then the most puzzling and important for democratic theorist is, in 
Larry Diamond's phrases, how to institute an appropriate incentive and sanction 
structure, so that the political leaders would be willing to give account, perform 
properly, and to be rewarded by upholding public accountability to the citizens. On 
the other hand, we need to ask how can we establish pertinent sanctioning mechanism 
to pose a credible threat to the government for want of abuse of political power and 
creating detriment to the citizens' interests? (Diamond 1999) 
A large amount of academic discussion has been made on the possible 
impediments to install this specific rule of game. The main difficulties, according to 
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various developmental theorists can be summed up into two threads — first, the 
reluctance for the incumbent governments to subject themselves to self-restraints, and 
second, the proclivity of politicians to withheld information from the mass. 
The first difficulty is vividly illustrated by Schedler (1999b). Since the 
government legitimately monopolizes the coercive power, it possesses the necessary 
means and resource at its disposal to curb any development towards the direction of 
accountability. Unless it is imposed externally or fought for by internal violent 
opposition, the peaceful installation of accountability mechanism must rely on the 
willingness of government officials to subject themselves to self-restraint. Put in other 
way, the prospects of such depend on “whether governments benefit from the 
institutionalization of political accountability" (334). The institutions of 
accountability will inevitably limit the freedom of actions of the political leaders, 
while formal methods are established for the public to raise harsh questions and drag 
the political leaders into embarrassing situations. It is obvious that accountability 
mechanisms bring no short-term benefit at all. It is understandable that government 
officials are therefore disinclined to succumb to accountability. 
The second hindrance emanates from the informational asymmetry between the 
government and the citizens. In order to make accountability work, Ghartey argues 
that the public must gain access to government information, so that the citizens can 
41 
know and judge the actions of the government, “to exercise their civic right and duties 
of participations in the political process" (1987, 48). Nonetheless, the hardship is that, 
as mentioned in previous chapter, the government has every measure to determine 
what the citizens are enabled to know. Without “a regime of freedom of information" 
(Dunn 1999，339), furtive and covert actions by the government could be left outside 
the realm of public surveillance. Thus, John Dunn subsequently points out that, "the 
main weight of democratic accountability has to fall here: on the attempt to maximize 
the degree to which politically consequential conduct by rulers and their subordinates 
is always in the open." (1999, 339) 
3.3 Vertical and Horizontal Accountability 
The concepts of vertical and horizontal accountability are first coined by 
scholars such as Sklar (1987) and O'Donnell (1994). According to Schedler, 
"horizontal accountability" refers to "a relationship between equals", i.e. how the state 
institutions are empowered to check abuses by other agencies and branches of 
government which shares roughly equal power (1999a, 23). The traditional doctrine 
of checks and balances, through compartmentalizing government into executive, 
legislative and judiciary, can be regarded as the archetypal arrangement of horizontal 
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accountability. Of course, other formal institutions such as Ombudsman and Audit 
Committee may be included in this category also. 
It contrasts with "vertical accountability", which emphasizes the "relationship 
between unequals" - “it refers to some powerful "superior" actor holding some less 
powerful "inferior" actor accountable" (Schedler 1999a, 23). The concept does not 
postulate any direction of the flow of accountability. It may operate in a top-down or 
bottom-up manner. In a democratic regime, the study of vertical accountability 
focuses on how the public, mass media and civil associations impose and enforce their 
expectation on the government. The most important means to exercise vertical 
accountability is through fair and periodic democratic elections. 
Democratic theorists go on arguing that vertical and horizontal accountability 
rest upon each other. They are mutually dependent, and each cannot survive alone 
without the support of the other. Schacter, a policy researcher, points out that 
multi-party election by universal suffrage is only a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for democratic accountability to become sturdy. Vertical accountability can 
only be effective if the government is also willing to create and sustain independent 
public institutions or organizations (i.e. agents of horizontal accountability) to oversee 
its action. (Schacter 2001) Whether the government would pay heed to the public 
largely depends on the vigour and extent of these institutionalized surveillance. 
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The other way round, horizontal accountability must be buttressed by strong 
vertical accountability. (Schacter 2001) The public officials will only pay attention to 
the oversight of horizontal accountability agents if they will be duly punished by the 
citizens for failing to do so. Put in another way, the civil society must be equipped 
with necessary means to post a credible threat (such as electoral punishment) to deter 
the government from staying outside the purview of horizontal accountability. 
However, the complementary nature of vertical and horizontal accountability can 
be exhibited in highly restrictive conditions. Schedler points out three necessary 
conditions for vertical and horizontal accountability to operate in tandem. First, voters 
must adopt a mentality of retrospective instead of prospective voting. They should 
cast their votes according mostly to their evaluation of the institutional issues instead 
of policy issues, partisan labels as well as personal charismatic appeals. Second, the 
incumbent party must be neither too dominant to bear no risk of electoral defeat, nor 
too pivotal that it can only act a peripheral role in the political setting. Finally, public 
officials must be in a position to anticipate voters' potential assessments. They must 
believe the ability of voters to pose a credible threat. Of course, the voters must be 
also capable and willing to vote down unaccountable governments by the ballots. 
(1999b, 334-335) 
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3.4 Typology of Accountability 
If we bear in mind the broad conceptualization between vertical and horizontal 
accountability, we are provided with a useful yardsticks to classify the different kinds 
of accountability mechanism in democratic governments all around the world. They 
vary in nature, their entailing procedures, political actors involved, the standard of 
accountability, and the most importantly, the ultimate sanctions imposed. However, 
all of them exhibit the interweaving of horizontal and vertical accountability, which 
thus create a robust network to hold political power in checks. 
In the following part, we will try to summarize the main typology of 
accountability under a democratic system and the mechanisms that are devised to 
materialize them. 
3.4.1 Classical dichotomy of political and administrative 
accountability 
Before moving into the discussion of typology of accountability mechanisms, we 
should have a clear grasp of the classical dichotomy between political and 
administrative accountability first. 
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An accountable government in liberal democracies works in this way: political 
executives of a government are elected by universal suffrage. They are politically 
accountable to the public in a sense that they must be responsive to public opinions 
and preferences. The revocability of the mandate during each periodic election serves 
as the ultimate sanctions on the incumbents. A group of politically neutral 
administrators are subsumed under the leadership of these political executives. They 
are accountable to the political appointees only, and should only devote their 
diligence in implementing the policies formulated by politicians with efficiency and 
meritocracy. In short, bureaucrats owe administrative accountability to political 
executives, who are in turn politically accountable to the public. 
Such division of accountability between politicians and bureaucrats can be found 
in both parliamentary and presidential democratic political systems. Accountability 
under parliamentary supremacy can be epitomized by Dicey, s articulation on 
accountability, which enunciates that ministers should be externally accountable to 
the Parliament while civil servants should be internally accountable to their political 
chiefs. Electoral mandates supported by impartiality and anonymity of the civil 
service are the cornerstone of parliamentary accountability. (Dicey 1959) 
The operation of accountability in a presidential system can be best summarized 
by Redford's expression of "overhead democracy" - “\U\emocratic control should 
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run through a single line from the representatives of the people to all those who 
exercised power in the name of the government. The line ran from the people to their 
representatives in the Presidency and the Congress, and from there to the President 
as chief executive, then to departments, then to bureaus, then to lesser units, and so 
on to the fingertips of administration,, (Redford 1969, 70-71). 
The availability of legislative process and judicial process further holds public 
officials legally accountable. Political executives are constantly subject to legislative 
oversight. Political leaders have duties to explain their conduct before the legislature 
and to answer the questions, including the harsh, critical and unfriendly ones put 
forward by legislative counsellors. These legislative counselors are in turn 
accountable to citizens to the extent dependent on particular electoral arrangements. 
The legislature is also given limited sanctioning capacity. Legislature often possesses 
power to remove ministers whom the public no longer confides in. Courts or 
administrative tribunals are empowered to probe public servants who are alleged to 
breach existing laws or regulations and see their accounts. 
The following figure shows a simplified model of accountability of a democratic 
representative government. 
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Figure 1 Model of Accountability of a Liberal Democracy 
3.4.2 Political Accountability - Vertical Accountability 
Agents 
Jabbra and Dwivedi approach the concept of political accountability from a 
constitutional perspective. They assert that the political leadership has a constitutional 
duty to give account to the parliament (1988). However, Younis and Mostafa remind 
us multiple role of constitutions in ensuring political accountability. Constitutions, at 
the same time, may be manipulated by politicians to consolidate their power and 
protect their political patronage. (2000, 21). 
If we adopt the previous definition on political accountability developed by Mark 
Philp (2001) - the check on political power according to the standard widely endorsed 
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by the entrusting community - in order to force the political leaders to adhere to that 
commonly recognized societal standard, we need to install effective popular 
mechanisms. 
Munishi once proposes three fundamental questions to determine the presence of 
political accountability. Two of the questions are: 1) are the means of making the 
policy-makers aware of what the people want clearly set out? 2) do the people 
themselves have a means of knowing what administrators are doing in the area of 
socio-economic development? (1988，quoted in Younis and Mostafa) From his 
conception, we understand that the actualization of political accountability requires 
the knowledge by the people of the activities of the government. The importance of 
providing knowledge about the governance is echoed in the propositions provided by 
Bealey. He argues that, “without knowledge democracy is flawed. Not only 
participation in institutional decision-making but also popular discussion and 
controversy is hampered when certain information is not know” (1988, 263). Another 
aspect is, of course, the ability for the people to restrain the government and impose 
sanctions to hold it accountable. 
The major popular mechanisms, as summarized by Allan McConnell, include 
elections, political parties, pressure groups and the mass media (1996). (He refers to 
the popular mechanisms in a British parliamentary system. However, in my opinion, 
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its applicability is not hampered by the differences between parliamentary and 
consensus models of democracy). If these mechanisms function properly, they can 
effectively assist the dissemination of information to the public and serve as effective 
means to uphold political accountability. However, as MacPherson warns us, there is 
potential for these popular mechanisms to become antithetical to public accountability 
(MacPherson 1972) 
In the following discussion, I would elaborate on both the facilitating and 
countervailing roles of these popular mechanisms to political accountability one by 
one: 
3.4.2.1 Elections/ Electoral sanctions 
Election forms the cornerstone of classical theories of democracy. Apart from 
choosing particular leaders into political office, it can also confer the necessary 
legitimacy on the ruling regime. Moreover, election is capable of promoting 
accountability also. 
According to Anthony Downs, the doyen of economists who employ economic 
theories to analyze political behaviour, a politician seeking for vote is no difference 
with an entrepreneur seeking maximum profits. Downs claims, politicians "formulate 
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whatever policies they believe will gain the most votes, just as entrepreneurs produce 
whatever products they believe will gain the most profits" (1957, 295). Therefore, 
they need to respond to the wishes of the voters and act in their good interest in order 
to gain political powers. The power vested in the public to "vote the rascals out" is an 
effective weapon to ensure that those candidates in elections must pay at least some if 
not all attention to the preference of voters. 
On the other hand, election is conducive for the citizens to gain an enlightened 
understanding of the public matters, which is an essential precondition of healthy 
accountability. Electoral campaigns provide periodic yet important opportunities for 
the governing as well as minor parties to disseminate information on its achievement 
and announce their future policy platforms. They may be done through the publication 
of manifestoes, press release, distribution of leaflets and blurbs, media interview, 
public debates, and so on. The sudden gush of information being fed to the voters, 
though maybe too ponderous to digest, indeed provides a fertile ground for pluralistic 
dissemination of knowledge about public affairs among the citizens (McConnell 
1996). The information proffered to voters comes from multi-dimensional instead of a 
single official source. They form the basis on which the public can better assess the 
performance of the incumbent government. 
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Though so ideal it may seem, the claim that election can genuinely foster public 
accountability is challenged in the last few decades. Many features of modem 
democratic elections have indeed hindered the people to restraint the government. It is 
an open secret that government may often withhold instead of reveal information in 
order to secure the incumbency. Transparency is obviously not always the recipe to 
electoral victory. Indeed, in many cases political disadvantage can be avoided by 
withholding critical information that might damage one's prospect of electoral success. 
The governing parties will be reluctant to reveal some accurate yet damaging details 
about the government to the public. The emergence of "spin doctors" and public 
relations advisors in many countries has been a worrying sign of diminishing public 
accountability. 
Besides the lack of free flow of information, many aspects of election just cannot 
ensure government accountability. The low turnout rate of election means that the 
government is unchecked by a large number of eligible voters. Low level of political 
participation in the society is widespread in modem democracies. Illiteracy and 
poverty can no longer account for the extensive political apathy as reflected by the 
unsatisfactory voting turnout. 
Normally, as Schumpeter notes, citizens will consider their vote as ineffective to 
change the political settings. Since it is difficult for a single vote to bring any impact 
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to politics, citizens are often reluctant to invest time to leam about politics, let alone 
using their votes to hold the government accountable. The high rate of non-voting is 
indeed a symptom of this sense of powerlessness. (1942) 
In addition to the lack of a sense of political efficacy, the high costs in political 
deliberation also deter the public from using the franchise effectively to hold the 
government accountable. As Anthony Downs forcefully argues, the incentive for 
voters to be interested and well informed about politics is indeed very weak (Downs 
1957). Making an informed decision during election requires indeed huge investment 
of time and effort in digesting various sources of information and deliberating on 
countless issues. He thus subsequently stresses that, “any concept of democracy based 
on an electorate of equally well-informed citizens is irrational". (1957, 236) 
Mancur Olson also reminds us the problem of free riding in large-scale political 
activities. If people in a community share the same interest or goals, they will tend to 
expect others to pay efforts and then enjoy the collective fruit without any 
contribution (1965). This economics-based “logic of collective action” equally applies 
to the utilization of franchise as a tool of upholding public accountability. As 
mentioned before, the successful operation of vertical accountability necessitates 
extensive public participation. However, if the logic of collective action holds, voters 
will expect others to assess the performance of the incumbents and use their vote to 
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reward or sanction accordingly. They would be rationally apathetic and ignorant to 
public affairs. The end result is, inevitably, that the governing party is left unscathed 
even with some policy blunders and bad performance. 
Furthermore, when people cast their votes, they may not aim at holding the 
government to account at all. An empirical study conducted in 1990 shows that the 
performance of the incumbent only accounts for about 10% of the variance of voting 
(in Britain) (Rose and McAllister, 1990). It may be a good indication that voters' 
loyalty can be very intense. 
Recent empirical analysis also points to the same conclusion, though through a 
different steps. Conceptually, election can serve dual purposes: to put people whom 
voters think good in office, or to kick incumbent whom voters think bad out of office. 
These two purposes are somehow in dilemma. The empirical study of Fearon shows 
that actually majority of people conceive election as opportunities to select good 
candidate rather than as sanctions to deter lethargy or unresponsiveness by present 
and future incumbents (1999). Therefore, accountability can only be strived when 
people can discern bad performance from good one, and then select the candidate 
which voters think may bring good governance in the election. Voters can only 
distinguish bad politicians from good ones by observing their performance in office. 
As Fearon points out, thus, “good monitoring induces bad types to act like good ones, 
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so selection becomes difficult but also less important. Band monitoring leads bad 
types to shirk more, which make selection possible, but also makes it a noisy and 
falliable enterprise for voters" (1999, 83). In any event, normally, voters have to 
select one purpose at the expense of other. 
The study by Manin, Przeworski and Stokes revealed that in fact election is far 
from sufficient to insure that the government will act in the best interest of the citizens. 
In order to secure representation and political accountability through public voting, 
there must be some institutions that would enhance the clarity of responsibility, which 
in turn facilitate the voters in rewarding or punishing those who should be deemed 
politically responsible in the election (1999). The most important institutions, or 
"accountability agencies" as they term, are the ones that can provide independent 
information about the government. Some typical examples are an independent board 
to assure transparency of campaign contributions, an independent auditing branch of 
the state, an independent source of statistical information about the state of the 
economy (1999, 50). 
Finally, the governments are often in the position to distance themselves from 
the electorates and their inquiries. The essence of parliamentary system — it should be 
equally applicable to any representative democracy in my opinion - as Miliband 
gaudily indicates, is to provide ‘‘a buffer between government and people" (1982, 39). 
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The spirit of accountability in modem representative democracy is, as covered in the 
previous chapter, not to impose strenuous burden on the governments but to strive for 
a proper balance between political empowerment and control. However, this very 
nature of representation is often manipulated by politicians to ward off legitimate 
public enquiries or accountability measures. The distance between the government 
and the voters, as McConnell notices, is often further widened by a panoply of factors 
such as party system, the whip system and the careerism of politicians. (McConnell 
1996，18) 
3.4.2.2 Other Popular Mechanisms 
Apart from election as the most important popular mechanism, pressure groups 
and mass media also serve as less institutionalized but equally important vertical 
accountability agents: 
3.4.2.2.1 Pressure groups 
The burgeoning of pressure groups in many democracies has facilitated the 
maturation of vertical accountability. Pressure group, defined as an organized 
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association that aims to influence the policies or actions of government by public 
pressure or protests (Heywood 2002), becomes momentous in politics after the 1960s. 
Apart from the various influence pressure groups can exert, they can also somehow 
promote government accountability. 
Grant invents the concepts of insider groups and outsider groups to differentiate 
the status that interest groups possess in relation to the government and the strategies 
they employ to influence government policies (Grant, 1989). The former enjoy 
regular privileged access to the government and are consulted by the government 
frequently in their policy formulation process. The latter, as Grant defines, are groups 
that "either do not wish to become enmeshed in a consultative relationship with 
officials, or are unable to gain recognition." (1989，15). 
For insider groups, due to their privileged status, they can employ their insider 
status to affect policy initiatives and exercise control. Jordan and Richardson, two 
prominent scholars on pressure groups, argue that government can be duly restrained 
by institutionalizing the compromise structure between the government and insider 
groups (Richardson and Jordan 1979). Because ‘‘pressure groups and governments 
have come to recognize that they need each other in order to achieve their respective 
objectives" (Richardson and Jordan 1979), accountability from the government is 
duly fostered by such process. 
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For outsider groups, since they lack the access to policy-making process, they 
have to make their voice public in order to exert indirect influence on the government. 
In any event, as Kingdom points out clearly, in order for pressure groups to hold 
government to account, they must hold something of use to government. (Kingdom, 
1991) 
The ability of pressure groups to ensure public accountability may be hampered 
by several ways though. "Mobilization of bias", a concept coined by Bachrach and 
Baratz (1970), is the first typical example. They argue that, "political systems tend 
consistently to develop a mobilization of bias，a set of values, beliefs, rituals and 
procedures which can be exploited by beneficiaries of the unequal value-allocation to 
defend and promote their preferred position" (1970, 105). They further point out that 
the dominance of the privileged group in the society can prevent the unprivileged 
group from raising issues that may menace their interest and status (1970). 
Moreover, a group of neo-pluralists starting from Lindblom (Lindblom 1977， 
Offe 1984) remind us that the game of politics is never played on a level-playing field. 
The so-called political consensus must be biased towards particular groups. The 
implication is that certain groups are less strategically placed to hold the government 
to give account. Political system may even "prevent demands from becoming political 
issues or even from being made" (Lukes 1974, 38). Some demands may be labeled as 
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anachronistic or illegitimate at the outset. In sum, in a democratic system, pressure 
groups may provide feedback. However, their feedback may be mediated, mobilized 
out from the political system or curbed from existing at the very inception 
(McConnell 1996). 
3.4.2.2.2 Mass Media 
Again, mass media plays a dual role in holding the government to account. 
Though they are not positioned in the formal institutional framework of the 
government, their political clout lies in the ability to disseminate information 
effectively and monitoring public administration by media investigation. Therefore, if 
people can better utilize the mass media and also maintain the freedom of press, 
media's role in promoting accountability can be enormous and resembling that of 
popular accountability. 
Since providing information is an important aspect of government accountability, 
channels must be made available for public officials to proffer information about how 
political power is used. Different from spreading news in a small community, 
governments need to communicate as well as articulate their views or policies to the 
wide electorate. They have to inform the citizens what is happening in the government 
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and to lobby for public support. The government thus has to rely on media as the 
channel to transmit their messages, while the media in turn collect, interpret and 
convey information to the general public. 
Moreover, the mass media is significant in restraining political power. Public 
officials will be more precarious in their behaviour and in exercising their power if 
there exists a probable prospect that their misconduct or abuse of power will be put 
under the spotlight. In order to forge such belief among political leaders, on the other 
hand, the media must be prepared and willing to accomplish the task of a watchdog. 
The scrutinizing power can force the government to explain administrative blunders 
and personal misconducts. The mass media can also perform a de facto sanctioning 
function by raising public concern and triggering public discontent, which in turn 
punish the relevant public officials by undermining their prospect of re-election. 
However, the power of the mass media to restrain the government may be 
impeded by various means. Many apparatuses and measures are at the disposal of the 
government to muzzle the media or to neutralize its impact. Direct censorship, court 
actions and legal regulation on media are the most palpable tools in this regard. More 
importantly, as McConnell quite rightly points out, the media just does not necessarily 
mirror public concerns accurately. He reminds the proponents of media oversight that 
media may “select and edit, dramatizing some and repressing other events according 
6 0 
to their own standard and rules" (Gouldner, quoted in McConnell, 1996:36). In short, 
media may not be an impartial and representative agent to stand for the public to 
monitor the activities of the government. Given its strength and deficiencies, again, 
the mass media is ambivalent in ensuring vertical accountability. Although mass 
media is not a machine at the deployment of the government, their arena to exert 
political influence - including facilitating public accountability - is never unrestricted 
(Eldridge 1993). 
3.4.2.2.3 Political party (The role of political party in horizontal 
accountability mechanism will be discussed in later section) 
Political party is another important vertical accountability agents. Indeed, 
representative democracy and modem democratic practices have to be carried out by 
political parties. Indeed, many scholars suggest that it would be impossible to 
establish a democratic government without political parties (Katz 1980, Blondel 
1990). 
Political parties are important vehicles to aggregate the opinions of the mass and 
channel the energy of the civil society into the political process in an effective way. 
Parties can also act as an important actor in ensuring government accountability. They 
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can assist in extracting information from the government. The party members in the 
legislature in modem representative democracies are normally vested with various 
devices to elicit information from the government (to be discussed in the next section). 
Moreover, minority parties can exercise control by raising issues in matters that are 
mostly related to them. For the sake of legitimacy, the government has to be 
seemingly accountable and answerable to the public concerns articulated by political 
parties (Packenham 1970). 
3.4.3 Political Accountability - Horizontal Accountability 
Agents 
3.4.3.1 Accountability to Legislature 
In terms of horizontal accountability, the most significant agency to secure 
political accountability is surely the legislature. Here, we have to differentiate the 
legislative oversight in a parliamentary and a presidential system. 
3.4.3.2 Presidential and Parliamentary Visions 
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In a presidential system, there is no concept of responsible government, and the 
president does not require the confidence of the assembly to rule (Roskin 1998). The 
presidency, in the capacity of a single-person executive, is wholly detached from the 
birth of the legislature. In case of accountability, as Jones articulates, under the 
prevailing ethos of separatism and dispersal of powers in the executive-legislative 
relationship, a presidential system has substantial individual accountability but limited 
collective accountability (1996). As contrast with the parliamentary system, the 
presidential leadership or presidency is the unit which is constrained by horizontal 
accountability agents. 
On the contrary, the guiding principle of parliamentary accountability is that the 
continuance of office of the ruling cabinet is dependent on the pleasure and 
confidence of the legislature (Marshall 1991). Just as Woodhouse presents, 
"accountability to the legislature (in a parliamentary system) is constitutionally of 
most significance" (1994, 3). 
There are two distinct types of separation of powers in these two models of 
executive-legislative relationship. By a complicated mathematical model, Persson, 
Roland and Tabellini deduces that the design of checks and balances is a crucial factor 
in determining whether political accountability can be strived for. In addition to the 
claim that election must work together with horizontal accountability, they further 
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contend that if the right form of separation of powers is provided, the government will 
be as a whole induced to reveal to citizens the accurate condition of governance and 
this would in turn enable to uphold representation through election. Specifically, they 
point out that the collective accountability of the cabinet in a parliamentary system, 
though indirect, would facilitate the timely removal of any incompetent officials. 
(1997) 
The practice of parliamentary accountability in British ministerial system is 
widely acclaimed as the epitome of horizontal political accountability. Indeed, the 
majority of literature on legislative oversight and its contribution to political 
accountability is based on accountability mechanisms and practices in Britain. It is 
sensible and inevitable to devote significant coverage to the context of British 
ministerial system in terms of operation of accountability. 
3.4.3.3 Political accountability in British Ministerial System 一 the 
importance of Constitutional Conventions 
It must be stressed that the ministerial system in Britain is not derived from their 
unwritten constitution. In fact，political accountability in Britain is solely derived 
from constitutional conventions - the political practices without any legal force. 
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Constitution constructs the framework of executive-legislative relationship, while 
constitutional conventions provide concrete substances into that framework and guide 
the manner how the executive is held accountable. 
A number of prominent public law scholars in Britain such as Dicey (1959), Sir 
Ivor Jennings (1959), Hood Philips (1973), Geoffrey Marshall and Graeme Moodie 
(1971) have indeed devoted significant effort to explore the political aspects of 
constitutional conventions in British politics. Among them, the book Constitutional 
Conventions: the Rules and Forms of Political Accountability by Marshall (1984) is 
the leading work in examining British ministerial system as well as illustrates the 
inter-marriage of law and politics by means of conventions in the context of political 
accountability. 
Marshall and Moodie have provided a useful working definition of constitutional 
convention - “by conventions of the constitution, we mean binding rules of 
constitutional behaviour which are considered to be binding by and upon those who 
operate the Constitution, but which are not enforced by the law courts (although the 
courts may recognize their existence), nor by the presiding officers in the Houses of 
the Parliaments “ (Marshall and Moodie 1971) 
Conventions are created and established by time-honoured behaviour patterns or 
express agreements. They are not obligatory legal rules, but only political practices. 
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Despite the unenforceability in courtroom, it is generally accepted in political 
principles that conventions are binding on the activities of the government officials. 
The reason is that since the establishment with good reason, conventions should be 
regarded as precedents and awarded binding effect (Jennings 1959) 
The ministerial systems in Britain operate in the mode of parliamentary cabinet 
as the executive body, the House of Commons as the legislature (the power of the 
House of Lord is largely restricted). However, no constitutional document or statute 
creates the Cabinet, determines its power in detail as well as who sit in it，and 
describes the relationship between the Cabinet and the House of Commons. The 
principle of accountable government takes form mostly in informal rules that have 
arisen to modify the legal framework of the constitutions. 
The principle of political accountability in British government involves two 
general aspects: the individual responsibility of ministers for their departments and 
their own personal activities, and the collective responsibility of the Cabinet as a 
whole. Both individual ministers and the government collectively must answer to the 
legislature for their actions and resign if the legislature loses confidence in their 
performance. Though not legally binding, the ruling regime would seldom breach an 
entrenched convention at the expense of its political legitimacy. 
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3.4.3.3.1 Individual responsibility 
Classic theory on individual responsibility stipulates that ministers are 
responsible for both their own actions as well as the activities of their officials in 
departments they are in charge. As Herbert Morrison put it precisely, "a minister is 
responsible for every stamp stuck on an envelope" (quoted in Marshall and Moodie 
1971, 84). However, the size and complexity of operations in modem governmental 
departments preclude the possibility of a minister to know all the action of his 
officials. A broad application of culpability is no longer favourable to present public 
administration. Therefore, in Canada and Britain, ministers are not held culpable for 
all the actions of their subordinates now. The scope of responsibility is limited to 
personal unethical misconduct, their blunders or gross negligence in administration as 
well as serious mistakes by his officials which are also construed as their personal 
faults. Conflict of interest, personal enrichment from the post and wrongful disclosure 
of confidential information may all entail culpable resignation also (Marshall 1986). 
Another aspect of individual responsibility is the political practice that members 
of the legislature can direct questions to ministers concerning their administrative 
responsibilities. Such informational answerability operates by the convention that 
during a prescribed Oral Question Period, members of the House of Commons may 
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pose questions of any minister present without giving prior notice of the issue to be 
raised. Though this is no obligation upon any minister to answer any questions, in 
most of the cases response will be made (Marshall 1986). (Mechanism to ensure 
answerability will be discussed in later section) 
According to Woodhouse, however, the effectiveness of individual ministerial 
responsibility in Britain conceivably deteriorates (1994). She ascribes this 
phenomenon to several reasons - the executive becomes too dominant, the reputation 
of the Parliament diminishes, information flow is successfully controlled by the 
executive, the growth of size and complexity of the government which is beyond the 
control of particular minister, the emergence of nationalized industries which has 
blurred the lines of responsibility (to be discussed later), and an enlarged bureaucracy 
which renders ministers difficult if not possible to exercise direct control over. (1994, 
15-23) 
3.4.3.3.2 Collective Responsibility 
The ultimate rationale for collective responsibility is that the Cabinet of ministers 
should direct the affair of the state with a single public voice and retain office only so 
long the majority of the elected representatives of the public have confidence in their 
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abilities. Thus the Cabinet holds collective responsibility to themselves and to the 
legislature. 
It is accepted that ministers of a Cabinet share responsibility to each other in two 
ways - ‘‘they must maintain a public posture of unanimity in support of the policies 
decided upon by the Cabinet (cabinet solidarity), and they must respect the 
confidentiality of the materials reviewed and of discussions held in reaching those 
decisions (cabinet confidentiality). ” (Heard 1991, 62) 
Cabinet solidarity allows frank discussions while the matter is in the stage of 
consideration, and mandates the government to act as a single unit once a decision is 
made. Thus such convention is established that minister must not openly dispute 
decisions and must vote in favour of all government policies (Heard 1991, 50-51). 
Cabinet confidentiality requires ministers to keep secret of the material reviewed 
and arguments within the Cabinet during the discussion. Such confidentiality extends 
to the anonymity of ministers who have opposing views during the debates leading to 
a final decision. It is believed that free and open discussion on sensitive political 
issues within the Cabinet is only possible with this blanket of confidentiality. 
Finally, the collective responsibility to the legislature is achieved by the rule of 
confidence. The Cabinet must resign or call for an election when it loses the 
confidence of the legislature. Thus, the executive is exposed to the threat of removal 
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by the legislature all the time. The confidence rule forms the foundation of an 
accountable government, but it remains entirely in the realm of convention (Heard 
1991,68). 
3.4.3.3.3 Parliamentary Questions, Debates and Standing Committee 
Before mid-19th century, the ministers would have duly fulfilled their major part 
of accountability by answering the questions and participating in the debates in the 
Parliament (Pyper 1996, 49). Although the role of sanction has subsequently emerged 
afterwards, the element of achieving answerability in the model of accountability still 
leaves its vestige in horizontal accountability framework nowadays. 
The Parliament in Britain is still vested with a collection of mechanisms, with 
varying degree of efficacy, to exercise Parliamentary scrutiny over the activities of the 
cabinet. 
The Parliamentary Questions (PQ) is an important method for the members of 
the Parliament (mainly the House of Commons) to elicit information from the 
executive. Ministers can be questioned about nearly every aspect of their departmental 
responsibilities and duties by PQs. According to Franklin and Norton, members of the 
Parliaments do incline to use PQs (especially for written answers) to monitor 
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departmental performance as well as fish for information that would be difficult to be 
solicited elsewhere (1993, 109). 
Because of the wide-ranging topic of which it may address to, PQ is, as Pyper 
suggests, "designed to bring about the accountability of ministers for their role 
responsibilities as policy leaders, departmental managers, departmental ambassadors 
and legislative pilots" (1996, 58). Moreover, since PQs may cover the details of duties 
discharged by civil servants, particular questions may attract ministerial attentions to 
the work done by their departmental staff under their supervision. The civil servants 
need to be answerable to their ministers for their conducts. Thus, PQs may indirectly 
force the ministers, in the capacity of a departmental manager, to entrench the internal 
form of accountability within a department (1996). 
However, the efficacy of PQs in enhancing Parliamentary accountability has also 
been disputed. For example, it is found that there is a recognized list of topics on 
which ministers have always declined to be questioned (Sedgemore 1980, quoted in 
Pyer 1996). Moreover, Pyper suggests ministers indeed can evade answering 
particular questions by claiming that the information requested is unavailable, or can 
only be obtained at an unreasonable cost. He also brings about the issue of the 
extensive coverage of PQs. Because the potential targets for PQs are various, many 
members adopt a scatter-gun approach - asking all sorts of questions, no matter how 
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innocuous or harmless it may be - and thus render PQs increasingly ineffective in 
holding ministers to account (Pyper 1996). 
Parliamentary debate is another important way to foster government 
answerability. The most discemable contribution of parliamentary debates to public 
accountability lies in its function to bring ministers to appear in the legislature and to 
answer for their exercise of political power. 
The function of standing committees is to discuss the wordings of the clauses 
and suggest possible amendments during the legislation process. Because one of the 
main duty of ministers is to implement policy by pushing forward relevant bills and 
legislation, the standing committee can act as an effective medium to check on the 
executive. Although the drafting of bills are mainly done by the civil servants, the 
ministers, as Griffiths notes, "needs to be constantly on the alert and any defects he or 
his policy reveals will be very quickly exploited by his political opponents" (1981, 
130-131). 
However, Griffiths also points out the limitation of these standing committees. 
Because solely the ministers can gain access to particular details of the bills or 
expertise knowledge of the government officials, even the dedicated members of the 
standing committees may find it difficult to exercise effective scrutiny over the 
process. The scrutiny of ministers is thus, as Griffiths points out, “a measure of 
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superficiality based on an inadequacy of information" (1981, 131). Furthermore, 
Norton argues that the oversight by these committees is often time-consuming, or in 
worse case, becomes a continuation of the party battle instead of check on the 
legislative process (1993). 
In Britain, the Parliament may also set up some audit or public accounts 
committee to conduct regular financial auditing. Financial audit reports will be filed 
with the Public Accounts Committee of the House of Commons. Since the officials of 
the Committee can inquire the rationale of particular decisions and request for 
evidence related to financial management, the ministers as well as the civil servants 
can be held accountable to the Committee, and hence the Parliament, for operations 
(in particular financial management) of the government departments. 
3.4.4 Legal Accountability - Horizontal Accountability Agent 
The legal accountability (used interchangeably with "judicial accountability" in 
existing academic literature) also plays a paramount role in securing accountability 
from the public officials. 
The emergence of legal accountability is due to the inadequacy of traditional 
model of accountability to tackle with the increasingly complicated system of public 
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governance in the last century. Various scholars have long noticed the shortcomings 
of the political accountability mechanism. The widespread of the New Public 
Management reform (will be discussed later), which introduces fragmentation and 
devolution in public management, has led to the prevalence of use of legal or 
quasi-legal agreements in public governance. Thus, the nature of public governance 
inevitably gravitates to the legal instead of political end, creating the frequent use of 
legal actions rather than political means to settle disputes concerning public 
administration. Judicial oversight, as Stone notes, have been quickly developed also to 
supplement the deficiency of the traditional framework of political accountability. As 
he says, "developments have been sufficiently distinctive, extensive and important for 
us to describe them as creating a new system of accountability in (Westminster) 
democracies." (Stone 1995, 515) 
Legal accountability is, as normally perceived, exercised by two methods. 
Judicial review is one important option. Administrative decisions and actions are open 
to inspection by the court and can be duly challenged by a judicial review. Political 
decisions can also be quashed after the advent of the Wednesbury unreasonableness 
and natural justice as a ground for judicial review (Bamett 2002). This empowers the 
judges to hold ministers to account for their actions and decisions according to the 
standard of the rule of law. This led Lord Irvine, a prominent judge in Britain, to 
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comment that "the consequences of the ‘democratic deficit', the want of 
parliamentary control over the executive in recent years, has been, to an important 
degree, mitigated by the rigours of judicial review" (1996, 67). 
Public officials are also subject to the legal control of some quasi-legal 
regulatory agencies or some constituted rules and regulations outside their 
departments. The most typical examples are the Ombudsman, Corruption 
Commissions or Audit Commissions. 
3.5 The Impact of New Public Management: 
The impact of the new public management (NPM) to the operation of democratic 
accountability, which was adopted extensively in Britain and the United States 
starting from the eighties, does deserve some space in this literature review. The NPM 
reforms bring various autonomous public agencies into current political settings and 
expand the scope of managerial freedom, financial autonomy, flexibility in personnel 
management and public-private partnership at the same time. 
Decentralization of power, devolution of authority, contracting-out and 
empowering public managers have been the leading maxims of the NPM reforms that 
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have been prevailing in the past two decades. Establishing public agencies run by 
business principles and expanding the freedom and discretion enjoyed by public 
managers are two vital steps to materialize those maxims. 
These autonomous entities are endowed with considerable financial and 
personnel autonomy, and have taken up extensive duties of public service delivery. 
They operate like private corporations with maximum operational autonomy. The 
extensive managerial powers enjoyed by public managers put the effectiveness of 
traditional accountability mechanisms such as question time in legislature and 
administrative tribunal hearing into serious doubt. They are not, straightly speaking, 
government officials and probably stay outside the vista of existing legislative or 
judicial oversight. 
Moreover, the increased managerial autonomy diminishes the transparency of 
public service provision. The "smoke-screen of managerial autonomy" enables the 
incumbent politicians to readily take credit for good performance while blame the 
chief executive for any poor performance of these autonomous agencies. (Rhodes 
1997, 55) Thus, mangerialism poses double challenges to accountability: it reduces 
the vigour of elected representatives to scrutinize the programmes undertaken by 
public agencies, and expand the avenues for politicians to evade responsibility and 
shift the brunt onto the public managers. 
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In the absence of adequate control, the newly acquired autonomy also leaves 
rooms for public servants to utilize the public vehicles for private or partisan gains. 
They enjoy flexibility in deploying human resources as well as greater financial 
autonomy in using public funds. These conditions are extremely conducive corruption 
and fraud, or less sever, nepotism and political patronage. It has been pointed out that 
fraud and abuse of public power have been plaguing the public sectors in OECD 
countries such as Britain, Australia, New Zealand, US and Canada (Gregory 1999). 
Decentralized and relaxed budgeting control also poses a challenge to financial 
accountability (Haque 2000). 
The increasing prevalence of contracting-out and public-private partnership is no 
less detrimental to public accountability. The closer partnership or alliance with 
private firms, the more the transparency of public-private transactions is reduced. 
Thus, the improper use of public resources for private interest is more difficult to be 
put under spotlight. Also, the duties between the government and private sectors may 
not be clearly meted in contractual agreement. As Peter (1993) points out, the 
flourishing of public-private partnership diminishes public accountability because 
common citizens ''may simply not be able to determine whether government or its 
contractors is responsible for the particular service, and officials who want to may 
[just] be able to evade responsibility” (Peter 383). 
77 
Flexible personnel management and empowerment of the front-line workers 
within the bureaucracy are another major principles propounded in the NPM reforms. 
The breakdown of politics/administration dichotomy and the dwindling political 
neutrality of bureaucrats also leave their imprints on public accountability. 
The increasing complexity of the public service and the rigidity of meritocratic 
procedures and rules in classical bureaucracy become impediments for the 
government to respond to hasty political, economic and social changes. Therefore, a 
major objective of reinventing government project is to instill flexibility in civil 
service systems and transform various managerial controls into managerial 
empowerment. Moreover, there is a growing public consensus that civil servants 
(including the middle- or lower-rank ones) should bear a portion of personal and 
political responsibility for their administration. 
Therefore, the traditional typology of political and administrative accountability 
can no longer cater the intricacy of modem governance environment. The separation 
of administration from policy is also difficult to continue in a new institutional 
structure that is permeated with business values and debureaucratization ideologies. 
The emergence of professional accountability is indeed an interesting 
development. There is a widespread acknowledgement that the traditional notion of 
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political and administrative accountability can no longer serve as the sole model of 
accountability (Barberis 1998, 452). 
The emergence of professional responsibility is exactly prompted by the 
recognition that traditional set of public accountability has its limitations. The 
operation of professional accountability is completely at odd with traditional 
administrative accountability because it does not entail any external force. 
Professionals will be held accountable even in “an unsupervised context" by the drive 
of internalized norms and ethics instead of monitoring, and by one's own sense of 
professional guilt or malfeasance instead of potential threat of sanction (Romzek and 
Dubnick 1987) 
The emergence of internal and professional accountability necessarily leads to 
the expansion of personal responsibility of civil servants (Mulgan 2000). These 
notions are at loggerheads with classical bureaucracy, in which bureaucrats are merely 
technocrats and should be devoid of political responsibility. Civil servants now have 
to assume certain political responsibility originally shouldered by politicians. The 
abating distinction between policymaking and implementation precisely reveals that 
administration inevitably involves political consideration and discretionary judgment, 
which transcend the confines of effectiveness and efficiency. Politicization of civil 
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service means that civil servants now have to play a more proactive role in 
formulating, explaining and defending public policies. 
However, as Harmon (1995) argues, such development necessarily places the 
civil servants into contradictory expectations of accountability, which he calls 
"paradox of accountability" - “if public servants are accountable solely for the 
effective achievement of purposes mandated by political authority, then as mere 
instruments of that authority they bear no personal responsibility as moral agents for 
the products of their actions. I f , on the other hand, public servants actively participate 
in determining public purposes, their accountability is compromised and political 
authority is undermined. ” (Harmon 185). 
It will create a two-fold pathology: “atrophy of personal responsibility" and 
"atrophy of political authority". The former means, if we deny public servants the role 
of policy formulation, they can also deny personal responsibility for the consequences 
of the administration. If they are solely accountable for the achievement of policies 
formulated by politicians, they will fail to acknowledge the moral consequences of 
their actions. Conversely, the latter means, by granting public servants the 
responsibility to formulate public policies, it is likely that they will only be 
answerable to themselves, thus undermining political authority and public 
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accountability. "Professional accountability" is turned into mere euphemism for 
bureaucrats to manipulate the political processes (Harmon 186-187). 
This leads us to the query that, whether responsibility for decision-making can be 
delegated while the accountability for decisions taken is retained. If the delegation of 
authority is genuine, logically, accountability must go with it. However, these 
officials are not democratically elected and public-mandated. Such "accountability 
gap" (Barberis 1998, 461) and such inroad to democratic principles remain a 
perennial dilemma in redesigning modem public governance. Resolving this 
necessitates a clear delineation and apportionment of responsibility and accountability 
between civil servants and their political seniors. As Giddings (1995) competently 
summarizes, "the crux of the matter lies in the ability accurately to delimit the scope 
of the authority to be delegated and the clarity and robustness of the limits so 
determined, (223). 
3.6 Accountability in Today's Democratic Governance 一 a 
Convoluted Model 
As we have seen, because of the advent of several matters, traditional mode of 
democratic accountability mechanism is increasingly defunct, if not obsolete. The 
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mechanism of democratic accountability nowadays actually exists in a more 
complicated circuit. Apart from citizens' participation through periodic elections, a 
range of auxiliary precautions and alternative forms of accountability also come into 
the picture. Such a pluralistic perspective is widely supported because there is a 
widespread acknowledgement that the traditional notion of political accountability 
can no longer serve as the sole constitutional touchstone of accountability. The 
concurrent operation of different types of accountability can remedy the shortcoming 
of others. The final product is thus a convoluted mechanism of accountability with 
overlapping modalities. (Flinders 2001) 
The interminable discussion above on democratic accountability mechanism 
serves to point out one single lesson. In fulfilling the aspiration of accountability, we 
have to move from the normative or theoretical orientation to the more organizational 
arrangement. By this vein the accumulated wisdom on political institutions by 
political scientists comes in. 
Overall, institution does matter in democratic accountability. The whole project 
of designing accountability institutions requires a careful matching of appropriate 
institutional structures to the differing types of issues and skills involved (DeLeon 
1998). 
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3.7 The Relevance to Hong Kong 
After going through the long academic voyage, it is time to summarize the 
lessons and see how they can be relevant to the intellectual enquiry of the politics of 
accountability in Hong Kong. 
Because of the dominance of democratic theory in the discussion of political 
accountability, we are left with no option but to turn recourse to democratic 
institutions and practices in framing the theoretical framework for empirical research 
on such issue. 
To put democratic accountability in the simplest form, it consists of election and 
legislature as the most significant vertical and horizontal accountability agents 
respectively. The government is accountable directly to the citizens through election, 
or indirectly accountable to the public through the legislature as a medium. A typical 
principal-agent model can be employed to illustrate the relationship between these 
institutions (see the following diagram). 
Executive branch: Legislature: Citizens: 
Head of the State ^ medium of ^ the ultimate principals 
and Cabinet accountability of accountability 
广 Legislative Oversight: 
f vote of no-confidence, j 
N. questions time, etc 
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Political Accountability in a Democratic Polity: a Principal-Agent Model 
If we adopt the framework of democratic accountability as the yardstick in 
assessing the quality of political accountability in every regime, indubitably, before 
the introduction of the POAS, Hong Kong has fallen short of accountability before the 
introduction of the POAS in most, if not all, of the given criteria. The introduction of 
the Principal Official Accountability System cannot rectify any of the following 
deformities also: 
xfndemocratic^^N. 
\election of CE J 
Executive branch: Legislative Council: Citizens: • ~ • 
CE and unrepresentative the ultimate princpals 
principal officials legislature of accountability? 
PRC 
CNo mechanism to remove Dual accountability 
principal officials by the LegCo J under the Basic Law 
\ ^ f 
Political Accountability in HK: Deviation from Democratic Model 
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However, we should appreciate the beauty of the argument raised by Chebal 
which may free us from the shackle of democratic theories in the analysis of operation 
of accountability. If we distill the concern of democratic institutions from our analysis 
and purely regard accountability as a proper balance between responsibility and 
empowerment, there is indeed a possibility that accountability may survive without 
democratic institutions. Hong Kong is at best a partial democracy (Kuan and Lau 
1995). Following this vein, the important intellectual empirical query is whether 
accountability can survive without democracy in Hong Kong. 
If we bear this point in mind, the interminable normative and empirical 
discussion on the concept of accountability thus has led us to the following position -
if we accept the normative propriety of a government to be accountable to the whole 
community instead of particular sector (for example, by exercising cronyism, 
nepotism, corporatism, favouritism), following the theoretical framework laid down 
by the discussion above, the intellectually interesting and significant question 
concerning political accountability in Hong Kong (and will be dealt with in this 
empirical research) is how the particular political framework in Hong Kong 
manages or fails to strive for the necessary balance between discretion and 
control, between administrative rationality and popular participation in political 
and public policy process. It is indeed the major challenge that is encountered by 
85 
political systems worldwide, including those democratic ones, and will be utilized as 
the ultimate criteria of assessment in the latter discussion. 
This dilemma is particular intricate in Hong Kong because, as a matter of fact, 
any political accountability relationship between the government and the public would 
be built without the foundation of traditional democratic institutions as covered in the 
literature review. Yet, the literature on principal-agent model in contemporary 
democratic systems would lend great help in the overall organizational analysis. 
Moreover, given the peculiar political setting of Hong Kong and the fledgling 
status of the so-called accountability system, how political elites in Hong Kong 
articulate their roles of representation and conception of accountability (accountable 
to who, accountable for what, etc) would be of great influence to the formation and 
institutionalization of the norms of accountability. It is such an important area which 
deserves in-depth and detailed intellectual exploration. 
By highlighting this desideratum we now turn to the institutional analysis of the 
new accountability system and the entailing politics. 
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Chapter 4 The Principal Officials Accountability 
System 一 a Departure from the Colonial 
Legacy 
Changing a system is never easy. It is particularly the case for a reform as 
fundamental as the Principal Officials Accountability System (the POAS). On 1 July 
2002, the HKSAR government implemented the POAS, a new system whose goals 
are to enhance both the quality of public governance and accountability of the 
government. The POAS can be regarded as the first significant departure from the 
colonial political system. It implicitly casts aside the civil service-led political 
arrangement, which was inherited from the colonial governance, and addressed 
squarely to the problem of lack of governing capital enjoyed by the HKSAR 
government. 
The following half of this thesis intends to analyze the politics of political 
accountability in Hong Kong after the introduction of the POAS from constitutional 
(Chapter 5), political (Chapter 6) and conception level (Chapter 7). Since the POAS 
plays an integral part in both the initiation and materialization of this research tbesis, I 
find it necessary to provide some background information, basic structures as well as 
87 
the entailing political implications of the POAS reform to the readers before our 
academic enquiry. 
4.1 Pre-POAS political situation of Hong Kong 
One of the pressing issues for the Mainland Government before the Handover of 
Hong Kong was to construct the constitutional and institutional framework for the 
post-colonial era. Besides the need to live up the promise in the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration to deliver democracy and secure liberty in Hong Kong, the China 
government needed to cope with the equally daunting but conflicting task to preserve 
the prosperity and status quo of Hong Kong, as well as to contain the pace of 
democratization in Hong Kong to an acceptable extent to China. What they came up 
with, eventually, was an executive-led political structure with essentially the same 
features of that of the colonial government. 
The overall arrangement of the post-colonial political system was largely a 
depoliticization process. It perceptibly introduces an anti-partisan executive 
arrangement, rejects party politics, and prohibits the Chief Executive from any 
affiliation with political party. Without the political support in the legislature, the 
government continues to rely on the bureaucracy to maintain effective governance. 
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The civil servants were bestowed with strong autonomous power to initiate and 
implement public policies. The senior officials assumed both political and 
administrative duties and act concurrently as political appointees and civil servants. 
On the other hand, the power of the legislature is strongly contained constitutionally 
by various disempowering provisions in the Basic Law, and politically by the 
fragmentary nature of the electoral schemes and divided electorates. The influence of 
elections was restricted significantly, and citizens cannot express their preference and 
shape policy direction through electoral votes, let alone influence the formation of 
government (Kuan 1999). 
Such scheme of “re-bureaucratization of politics" (Cheung 1997), however, did 
not secure any executive dominance for the HKSAR government at all. Moreover, the 
role of the Chief Executive has been further paralyzed internally by bureaucratic 
hindrance and externally by the increasingly vibrant civil society and vigilant mass 
media. The government lacked the backup of strong democratic mandate (and 
procedural legitimacy) as well as the mobilization of any political party. In sum, 
without the necessary political and social foundations, executive-led political 
arrangement only exists in constitutional sense. 
Furthermore, the government also exhibited a lack of accountability to the public 
in a series of administrative blunders. Although the civil service assumed a dominant 
89 
and partially political role in the public governance of Hong Kong, they were 
unwilling to accept any political responsibility for these strings of mishaps. The 
justification of so-called "political neutrality" had given senior civil servants leeway 
to escape from public demand for accountability. The public was thus incessantly 
enraged by the fact that no one ever assumed public responsibility for those policy 
and administrative failures. The only available means to ensure responsibility is the 
internal disciplinary action within the civil service, but senior bureaucrats (in the 
capacity of de facto ministers) would never owe a direct responsibility to the public. 
Even though the legislative was situated within the political structure, LegCo 
members were in no position to call for accountability from the civil service also. 
Therefore, after a concatenation of blunders, increasing demand for the senior 
officials to shoulder public responsibility ensued. 
The urge for superiority over the bureaucracy from the ExCo and the public call 
for greater accountability from the bureaucrats together formed the impetus for the 
development of the accountability system. As seen, the political situation at that time 
forced the government to deal with two things - to invigorate the executive-led 
arrangement as well as to respond to the public pressure for accountability. (These 
two points will be further dealt with in Chapter 6) 
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In the Policy Address in 2000, the Chief Executive Tung started to address the 
issue of accountability. He acknowledged that senior officials should be accountable 
for the outcome and failure of public policies under his or her portfolio. He stated that 
he would consider devising a comprehensive system of public accountability, 
including a compatible system of appointment for principal officials, a clear statement 
of their powers and responsibilities and a clear definition of their role in formulating 
and implementing government policies (Tung 2000, paragraph 109 - 113). The 
formation of a new “accountability system" was further put on agenda in the Policy 
Address 2001, the last policy address under Tung's first term. In his policy pledge, he 
promised to formulate feasible proposals of the new system (Tung 2001, paragraph 
130 - 140). In running for his second term, Tung also stated clearly that he intended 
to put the new system into practice immediately by July 2002, when he would start his 
second term of office. Therefore, on 17 April 2002, Tung appeared before the LegCo 
and presented and explained the details of the proposed POAS. Quite surprising to 
everyone, the LegCo was forced to sanction the proposed system just within two 
months. However, eventually, the proposal successfully went through the legislature, 
and the new POAS was implemented on 1 July 2002, exactly the first day when Tung 
started his second term as the CE. 
91 
4.2 The POAS Reform 一 the Details and its Implications 
The gist of the whole POAS reform can be found in the Legislative Council 
Paper: Accountability System for Principal Officials (LegCo Paper), presented by 
Tung in the LegCo meeting on 17 April 2002. The LegCo Paper states that the whole 
POAS reform was guided by three principles: the new accountability system must be 
consistent with the Basic Law; the stability and integrity of the civil service must be 
maintained; and finally, a permanent, meritocratic and politically neutral civil service 
must be maintained (Paragraph 8, LegCo Paper). The introduction of the whole 
accountability system was merely achieved through amending a single statute, the 
Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance (Cap 1). Even the Basic Law and other 
important legislation were not touched upon. 
However, one should not underestimate the impact of this single resolution. The 
whole accountability system has indeed brought several significant and far-reaching 
impacts to Hong Kong, so fundamental that the mode of public governance, 
arrangement of political power as well as the executive-legislative relationship have 
all been drastically altered. 
Here, we will briefly examine the major features which are accompanying the 
whole reform before proceeding to the next chapter. 
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4.2.1 Ministerization of Bureaucratic Governance, 
Politicization of Administrative Governance 
The most important change brought by the POAS was the end of the bureaucratic 
governance in Hong Kong. The positions of senior policy makers under the new 
accountability system will be taken up by the new layer of political appointees instead 
of civil servants. There will now be a total of fourteen principal officials under the 
POAS (three Secretaries of Department and eleven Directors of Bureaus), who would 
be employed on contractual terms rather than on civil service terms. The functions 
and power of the senior civil servants were formally succeeded by these new political 
appointees. In short, rule by senior bureaucrats needed to give way to rule by full-time 
politicians. 
The POAS reform further widens the pool of talents for the CE to select to work 
with. Indeed, it is legitimate for the CE to select elites from business and private 
sectors to fill position of principal officials before the introduction of POAS. Elsie 
Leung, Antony Leung and Dr Yeoh Eng-kiong were the examples. However, under 
the legacy of bureaucratic rule after the Handover, this had remained an uncommon 
practice. The situation reaches a turning point after the implementation of the POAS. 
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Since the ruling cabinet of the HKSAR government is no longer filled up by civil 
servants, it is more justifiable for the CE to pick people from whatever background, 
ranging from the civil service to the private sectors. He is bestowed with much greater 
flexibility in filling the government positions according to expertise of candidates and 
whether it matches with particular portfolios in different departments. Hong Kong 
fails to nurture many political talents to fill up the political position (Lau 2002). While 
elites from business and social sectors were reluctant to give up their own career to 
pursue a political career, it was expected that the new positions would end up be filled 
by senior civil servants upon resignation. Eventually, three former department 
secretaries assumed the new political appointments, six bureau heads came from the 
senior civil service, and five were co-opted from the private sectors. 
Article 48(5) of the Basic Law provides that only the CE has the constitutional 
power to nominate and remove principal officials, subject to the sanction of Central 
People's Government. The POAS keeps such stipulation intact. Under the new system, 
the principal officials will be directly responsible and accountable to the CE. They 
would be accountable “for the success or failure of matters falling within the 
portfolios assigned to them by the CE", and "would accept total responsibility and 
they may have to step down for serious failures relating to their portfolios" (Paragraph 
2(c), LegCo Paper). These failures would include both serious failures in policy 
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outcome, calamity in policy administration as well as grave personal misconduct 
(Paragraph 2(c), LegCo Paper). That means, political appointees would now assume 
political responsibility for policies under their portfolios, and would be prepared, at 
the worst case, to be removed for policy blunders or personal misconduct. That is to 
say, principal officials would need to step down like "ministers" in other jurisdictions. 
(However, when and how would a principal official need to step down? The POAS 
reform was still unclear about this. This point will be covered in Chapter 5) 
The new duties assumed by the principal officials also point to the direction of 
ministerialization. The POAS reform proposes a rather comprehensive scheme of 
responsibilities for the new professional politicians, with the important ones quoted in 
follows: 
• gauge public opinion and take societal interest into account in serving the 
community"; 
• set policy objectives and goals, and develop, formulate and shape policies; 
• secure the support of the community and LegCo for their policy and 
legislative ；initiatives as well as proposals relating to fees and charges and public 
expenditure; 
• attend full sessions of LegCo to initiate bills or motions, respond to motions and 
answer questions from LegCo members; 
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• oversee the delivery of services by the executive departments under their purview 
and ensure the effective implementation and successful outcome of policies; 
• to accept total responsibility for policy outcome and the delivery of services by the 
relevant executive departments. (Paragraph 13, LegCo Paper) 
It would be the first time for top officials in Hong Kong to be formally and 
constitutionally designated to the political task of lobbying and selling policy. 
4.2.2 Preservation of Civil Service Neutrality 
Another main objective of the POAS is to maintain the political neutrality of the 
civil service, and confine their work within the technocratic domain. Therefore, 
together with the creation of the layer of political appointees, another new layer of 
permanent secretaries at the rank of D8 was also formed. They will work with the 
respective secretaries of bureaux and departments under the new system. 
The system of appointment, posting, promotion and disciplinary were not 
changed by the POAS. The civil service will now, however, be loyal both to the CE 
and to the newly-created political appointees. As the CE reiterated, the civil servants 
will remain meritocratic and politically neutral. As it was stated clearly, the 
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bureaucrats would continue to make advices, including candid or honest ones, on 
policy options in their best capacities. However, once decisions have been made by 
their superiors, “civil servants will support the decisions without question regardless 
of their own personal convictions, and will fully and faithfully implement decisions" 
(Paragraph 23, LegCo Paper). 
Besides advising the principal officials on public policies, the permanent 
secretaries would also steer and supervise the daily functioning of the respective 
departments, liaise with other relevant departments or units, and ensure the smooth 
and timely effective implementation of the policies decided by the government, 
monitor the needs and voices of the community, and ensure the effective delivery of 
the public service to the citizens (Paragraph 20，LegCo Paper). 
According to the official paper, apart from the normal duties bore by civil 
servants, they would now have to ‘‘assist the principal officials in formulating, 
explaining and defending policies, securing support of the public and the LegCo and 
answering LegCo questions, moving bills and taking part in motion debates in plenary 
sessions of LegCo" (paragraph 20(a), LegCo Paper). That means, under the 
framework of the POAS, the permanent secretaries could also be instructed to defend 
government policies. 
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One point to note is that the Secretary for the Civil Service will now be 
incorporated also as a political appointee eventually. As a "representative" from the 
civil service, the appointed person should have a good understanding of the system 
and operation of the civil service and would ensure that the interests and concerns of 
the bureaucracy will be fully represented and considered during the government 
policy formulation process. (Paragraph 19, LegCo Paper). On the other hand, however, 
the Secretary for the Civil Service should also be held accountable to the CE for his 
policy portfolios, which are mainly related to management of the civil service as well 
as policies about civil servants. As the only exception, after the term of his term of 
office, the Secretary for the Civil Service would be entitled to rejoin the bureaucracy. 
4.2.3 Restructuring of the Executive Council 
The final significant feature of the accountability system is the restructuring and 
transformation of the Executive Council (ExCo). Originally, the role of the ExCo was 
only confined to advisory level without any material influence in decision-making. It 
was mainly comprised of business elites or renowned figures from social or 
professional sectors, and they only served the office on a part-time basis. Three 
members were members of political parties, but they joined the ExCo in their personal 
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capacities. Member of the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong 
(DAB) Tarn Yiu-chung even needed to resign from the duty of Vice Chairman when 
he joined the ExCo in 1997. 
However, such situation was fundamentally changed by the POAS. For the first 
time in Hong Kong politics are all the politically appointed principal officials 
appointed to the ExCo. Such move was allowed by the Basic Law as Article 55 states 
that the CE and appoint principal officials, LegCo members and public figures to the 
ExCo. It was no longer dominated by part-time members as well as senior civil 
servants. ExCo is now transformed from a purely advisory body into some sort ruling 
cabinet, which is filled by politicians who share the same political platform, values 
and visions in governance with that held by the CE. 
Another important feature was the cooptation of two leaders of political parties 
into the ExCo. Five other members were also appointed to the ExCo with no portfolio 
duties, among them were the Chairman of the Liberal Party (LP) James Tien Pei-chun 
and the Chairman of the DAB Tsang Yok-shing. Such appointments initiated a new 
practice that people from political parties could now serve in the ExCo in the capacity 
of such party affiliation. As the same before, both of them would now be bound by the 
principle of collective responsibility, including the obligation to vote in line with the 
ExCo. 
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Though not formally proclaimed, such move virtually introduced a kind of 
coalition politics in the executive-legislative relationship, which was an 
unprecedented development in Hong Kong politics. LP, DAB and various 
independent pro-government legislators from the functional constituencies now 
formed the majority voting bloc in the legislature, whose allegiance was sustained by 
the power sharing with the executive, though only to a limited extent. Pro-government 
parties can now exert their influence in government policy both within the fragmented 
legislature as well as the newly revamped ExCo. On the other hand, the 
pro-democracy entente within the legislature, which is dominated by the Democratic 
Party and the Frontier, were practically marginalized by the new political arrangement. 
The government would only have to secure the support of the pro-govemment camp 
to push policy bills through. 
By illustrating the salient characteristics of the new accountability system, we would 
now proceed to the institutional analysis of the POAS as well as the comprehensive 
appraisal of the entailing politics of political accountability arising from this reform. 
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Chapter 5 Structural Deficit of the POAS 
The following three chapters would together present a critical review of the 
POAS and its entailing political interactions. The analysis will be divided into three 
levels: constitutional, political and conception aspects. This Chapter solely deals with 
the constitutional and organizational issues that arose from the systemic restructuring 
of the POAS. Chapter 6 assesses the new political power structure and interaction 
resulting from the POAS, while Chapter 7 summarizes the discovery from a host of 
interviews which indicates the perception towards political accountability held by 
some political elites who are mostly involved in this reform. Chapter 8 integrates 
these different aspects and positions the politics of political accountability into the 
overall political development as well as public aspiration for the democratization in 
Hong Kong. 
It is normally assumed that political actors act accordingly to their ideology or 
values, interact with each others within the given political setting, and then produce 
particular political institution. However, it is the author's intention to present the 
analysis of POAS in a reverse order, so that reader can grasp the politics of political 
accountability in Hong Kong from a macroscopic structural purview to microscopic 
attributes embodied in the conception of political elites. 
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5.1 The POAS: from Accountability Deficit to Structural Deficit 
The government has long been criticized for its lack of accountability to the 
public. One of the alleged aims of introducing the POAS is to enhance the 
accountability of the government. However, this Chapter argues that the POAS 
provides inadequate institutional foundation and guarantee in striving for an 
acceptable standard of accountability which may withstand the vigilance from the 
legislature, mass media and the civil society. 
However, due to the limitation in coverage，this chapter is not meant to be a 
comprehensive assessment of the POAS by every aspects raised in Chapter 3. It 
would mainly focus on the formal institutional structure. The aspect of legal 
accountability and quasi-legal regulatory agencies is a much more debated area that I 
have no intention of entering into in this thesis. 
5.2 Institutional logic of the POAS 一 Centralization of 
Policy-making Power 
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If we examine the institutional logic of the POAS reform at the outset, it is quite 
apparent that the design of this so-called "accountability system" does not square with 
any contemporary notion of accountability in democratic theories or political 
discourse. It is at best a reform to recall the political power vested in the bureaucracy 
as well as to allow the CE to select his own team of political appointees to work with. 
Removing the strong bureaucratic encumbrance in the leadership of CE and 
strengthening the executive-led constitutional arrangement are the guiding principles 
of the whole reform. 
In their work Democratic Governance, March and Olsen reminds us the 
importance of suitable institutional basis in delivering accountability to the citizens. 
Accountability must be buttressed first by a regime of free information as well as 
mechanism to demand accounts, and second by the means to impose sanctions for 
mishaps or personal misconduct (March and Olsen, 1995). John Uhr, another scholar 
in public administration, also suggests equivalent propositions (Uhr 1998). If we 
adopt such criteria in assessing the POAS reform, it is glaringly clear that inadequate 
organizational device, let alone democratic institutions, was installed to put this 
reform also in the direction of accountability enhancement. In a nutshell, the 
institutional link “from the outcomes of the actions of public officials to sanctions by 
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citizens" (Manin, Przeworski and Stokes 1999, 10) is still found wanting, and the 
"structural deficit" of the POAS can be illustrated briefly in the following sections. 
5.3 Lack of vertical sanctioning mechanism 
The most conspicuous deficiency of the POAS was the inability for the public 
and the legislature to impose direct sanctions on both the CE and the principal 
officials. Since the POAS reform was partly instigated by the public outcry for 
accountability deficit in governance, it would be reasonable to expect that the new 
accountability system should be framed in the direction of empowering the public to 
punish the political appointees for their failures in public policies or personal 
misconduct. However, the whole reform does not even slightly touch on this issue. 
After all, all the policy-making powers are now concentrated in the CE and the small 
team of ministers, while no effective sanction mechanism is provided. 
5.3.1 Election of the CE 
Moreover, the CE is still institutionally divorced from the public pressure for 
greater accountability as well as faster democratization. It has been widely questioned 
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that, given the undemocratic nature of the whole political system, whether the CE 
would really be truly accountable to the citizens without some fundamental 
democratic reform (Lo 2001, Cheung 2003). The CE is only elected by an 
800-member Election Committee, which is conspicuously unrepresentative given that 
there are now 3.5 million eligible voters in Hong Kong. However, from the 
perspective of vertical accountability, since the Election Committee is the only entity 
which “elects” the CE, the CE is only vertically accountable to the Committee within 
the HKSAR political setting. While public participation is virtually excluded from the 
process of selecting the CE, the infinitesimal representation of such small electorate 
renders the electoral means in Hong Kong insufficient to hold the CE accountable. 
The lack of a recall system by which the Election Committee can remove an 
unsatisfactory CE further aggravates this institutional deficit. 
Worst still, the Election Committee was largely dominated by business people 
and staunch patriotic supporters handpicked by the Mainland government. In this vein, 
the tilt towards the interests of the patriotic and business tycoon in public policies 
seems to be an inevitable trend. It is even more worrying to notice that links between 
the business tycoons and the government, both covert and overt ones, becomes much 
stronger after the handover. As Lo Shiu-hing observes, the influential capitalists 
(mainly property developers) try hard to dominate the post-colonial apparatus by their 
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overwhelming economic power and pressure the government in order to fully 
safeguard the wellbeing of the property market (Lo 2002). The interest of the public 
was often placed in a lower priority, and representation to the mass was further 
undermined. By appointing both the leader of LP and DAB, the POAS further 
institutionalizes such power setting, and accentuate the tint of nepotism and cronyism 
in politics of Hong Kong. 
5.3.2 Dual Accountability 
The issue of dual accountability further complicates the accountability 
relationship in Hong Kong. The internal network of vertical accountability in Hong 
Kong would be potentially deformed by the presence of the meta-institutional China 
factor. Political accountability is not merely an internal political arrangement. It 
would also be restricted or influenced by factors which are outside the confines of the 
autonomy granted to the HKSAR. 
According to Article 43 of the Basic Law，the CE "shall be accountable to the 
Central People's Government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in 
accordance with the provisions of this law (the Basic Law)". Thus, under the 
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framework of "One Country, Two Systems", the CE would have to be accountable to 
two principals simultaneously constitutionally. 
The vertical accountability relation between the Mainland government and the 
CE is drastically different from that between CE and the general public. First, 
although a high degree of autonomy has been granted to the HKSAR, the Basic Law 
reserves many exit doors and formal mechanism for the Mainland government to 
intervene in case the CE deviates from its preferences on the affairs of Hong Kong. 
The most important tool is the dormant power vested in the SCNPC to interpret the 
specific provisions in the Basic Law (Article 158，Basic Law). It is in complete 
contrast to the public of Hong Kong which has no direct means to pose some credible 
threat to the CE. 
Second, under the unitary system of China, the power of the CE was derived 
from the Central People's Government. The elected CE would also need to be 
authorized by the Beijing government first before assuming the office. It is a clear 
hierarchical relationship under the overall political framework of the Mainland. The 
element of empowering is absent in the accountability relationship between the CE 
and the citizens in Hong Kong. 
Dual accountability is itself a conceptual paradox which cannot be reconciled 
easily, and it has defied the working rationale of a principal-agent model. The interest 
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and preference of both principals (Mainland Government and Hong Kong) will 
seldom coincide and may from time to time conflict with each other. In refraining the 
whole structure of accountability, it is indeed necessary to introduce some 
constitutional guidance or even some arbitrating mechanism in tackling the potential 
conflicts. It would also be a critical step in resolving the inherent contradiction in the 
model of “One Country, Two Systems" (Li 1999). 
However, disappointingly, the POAS does not provide any tool to deal with the 
issue of dual accountability. The responsibility to balance the interest of the Mainland 
China and local community of Hong Kong was thus solely shouldered by the CE and 
the principal officials. Without the institutional guidance to resolve the conflict, the 
success of such task would mainly hinge on the political acumen and finesse of the 
CE. It is even more worrying to notice that Tung appears to be so eager to maintain a 
harmonious relationship with the Mainland Government and put the China's 
preference in the highest priority, sometimes even at the expense of his popularity. 
Public accountability to the public was therefore undermined. 
If the election of the CE and problem of dual accountability is taken together, the 
result is likely that (as it turns out to be) the CE has to largely pander to the business 
interest in their socio-economic policies on one hand, and take heed to the wishes and 
instructions of the Central Government in the controversial political issues on the 
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other. Therefore, the CE is unable to forge a close relationship with the civil society, 
let alone a vertical accountability relationship with the general public in Hong Kong. 
5.3.3 Appointment of the Principal Officials 
In the level of principal officials, the government has made it absolutely clear 
that they owe no direct responsibility to the public as well as the legislature. They 
would now be “directly responsible to the Chief Executive" (Paragraph 2(f), LegCo 
Paper). Under the POAS setting, it is now the CE who has the sole power to appoint 
or remove political appointees, subject to the approval of the Mainland Government. 
Therefore, the CE's satisfaction with the performance of the ministers and the policy 
outcome become the ultimate criteria for maintenance of ministerial office. 
Public participation thus plays a minimal part in both ministerial appointment 
and removal. In the absence of some form of control on the appointment, public 
preference on the candidate of particular positions can never be channeled 
institutionally to the CE. It is also rather clear that the CE is not expected to either put 
forward the list of proposed principal officials before the Election Committee or to 
seek the endorsement or approval of the list from the legislature. The LegCo is in no 
position to offer any censure on the formation of the cabinet at the outset. 
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The case is equally true in removing a minister who lost the confidence of the 
citizens. Only the CE is constitutionally empowered to remove any principal officials 
with unsatisfactory performance or grave misconduct. However, as mentioned above, 
the CE himself is not democratically selected by popular election, the public call for 
the resignation of particular senior officials is just immaterial for the CE to seek 
victory in re-election or sustain his political career. 
Moreover, Tung made it clear that passing of a vote of no-confidence towards 
particular principal officials, which will normally result in ministerial resignations in 
most parliamentary systems，would not automatically dislodge the unpopular officials 
from office. Such vote would only be a reference for him to decide whether to 
terminate the appointment (South China Morning Post, 2 July 2002). Therefore, as 
Rowena Kwok opines, such arrangement would foster the CE's inclination to 
disregard public or legislative pressures regarding whether to oust or defend an 
unpopular principal officials (Kwok 2003). It is far from a proper framework of public 
accountability. Although the creation of a cabinet is commonly believed to build a 
firewall which can insulate the public pressure or criticism directed towards the CE, 
ironically, every decision to protect a minister would now have a direct bearing on the 
CE's popularity and legitimacy. 
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5.4 Horizontal Accountability and the Lack of Constitutional 
Convention 
In order to analyze the horizontal accountability mechanism of the POAS, we 
must first have the knowledge on what kind of executive-legislative relationship is 
postulated by the drafters of the Basic Law. 
At the outset, one may argue that the scope of horizontal accountability of the 
principal officials has been explicitly prescribed by Article 59 and 64 of the Basic 
Law. Article 59 states that the Government of the HKSAR is the executive authorities, 
which are composed of CE, designated principal officials and appointed advisors. 
Article 64 provides that the Government should be accountable to the LegCo. 
Ironically, the latter part of this clause limits the scope of accountability, by which the 
Government is only bound to implement laws passed by LegCo, present regular 
policy address, answer questions raised by members of the Council, and obtain 
approval from the Council for taxation and public expenditure. Strictly speaking, 
principal officials are not required to be political accountable for their decisions or 
faults under the Basic Law. A literal approach would arrive at a conclusion that 
ministerial responsibility is neither assumed nor guaranteed in our constitutional 
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documents. This corresponds with the executive-led political design, in which the 
checks from the legislature should be minimized. 
However, one must study carefully the formal power arrangement between the 
executive and legislature framed by the Basic Law before giving any conclusive 
answer. Although the importance of strong executive branch has always been 
espoused, Article 49, 50 and 52 indeed bestow on the LegCo the final controlling 
power over the executive. 
Article 49 and 50 of the Basic Law confers dominating power on the CE over the 
legislature. Article 49 empowers the CE to return a bill passed by the LegCo if he 
considers that the bill is not compatible with the overall interest of Hong Kong. In 
case the LegCo passes the same bill by a two-thirds majority and the CE still refuses 
to sign it, Article 50 authorizes the CE to dissolve the LegCo. The power to dissolve 
the legislature also applies in situation where the LegCo refuses to pass a budget or 
any other important bill introduced by the government. 
However, the CE can only exercise such dissolving power once during his office. 
Meanwhile, if the same bill in dispute still gets two-third majority of the 
newly-elected second LegCo, or the second LegCo keeps refuse to pass the budget or 
important bills in dispute, Article 52 stipulates that the CE must resign. The rationale 
behind such arrangement is that the legislature should have the final command over 
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the executive, so that extreme type of executive hegemony can be duly avoided. The 
available power to urge for the resignation of the CE empowers the legislature to pose 
credible threat in case the government tries to put forward unfavourable public 
policies. Another noteworthy implication is that the policy-making power of the 
government is ultimately dependent on the confidence of the legislature. 
As we have seen, the semi-presidential arrangement of the Basic Law actually 
posits a kind of check and balance in the post-colonial executive-legislative 
relationship. The constitutional sanctioning power of the legislature - through calling 
for the CE to resignation of the CE — is itself a strong horizontal accountability 
mechanism. Its potential impact should not be underestimated. 
However, the ability to impose sanction and uphold accountability of the 
legislature is politically mediated by other constitutional designs of the Basic Law. 
The LegCo in Hong Kong is fragmented institutionally, thanks to the divided 
electorate, the dominance of sectoral and functional interests, immature party politics 
as well as the electoral scheme of proportional representation (Kuan 1999). Producing 
concerted effort to provide a strong check on the executive power would be an uphill 
political task under such arrangement. 
Both the CE and the principal officials are not constitutionally linked with the 
LegCo as in some parliamentary systems. As it is so difficult to invoke the operation 
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of Article 52, in most cases the government cannot be brought down by the legislature 
even in case of heightening unpopularity, while their lack of party affiliation, and 
hence party discipline, also removes one important source of control in contemporary 
parliamentary democracies. The power of the LegCo to check the executive is also 
severely restrained. The harsh separate voting mechanism in Annex II and the 
requirement of written consent from the CE in Article 74 as a whole dilute the power 
of LegCo to hold the Executive Authorities accountable by means of private bills. 
In this vein, while the formal constitutional structures is insufficient to deliver 
accountability, given the tremendous difficulty in initiating fundamental political 
reform, it is indeed necessary for the government to develop appropriate constitutional 
conventions so as to fill up the void within the context of ministerial responsibility 
and actualize the spirit embodied in Article 52. As mentioned in Chapter 3, ministerial 
responsibility in parliamentary democracies is largely resulted from the evolution of 
legally non-binding constitutional conventions, set by precedents and continuous 
practice. Such responsibility can be divided into individual and collective components 
(Marshall 1986). (Since the focus of the POAS reform is to attribute fault to particular 
senior officials instead of share it to the whole cabinet, the issue of collective 
responsibility is only of minimal relevance here. Thus, only the issue of individual 
ministerial responsibility would be studied below.) 
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The evolution of constitutional convention is mainly driven by the political 
interaction among different actors, and this issue will be dealt with in the next Chapter. 
Institutionally, though, the proposal of the POAS indeed specifically touches upon the 
issue of executive-legislative relationship. However, if we carefully read the Code for 
the Principal Officials, it will be revealed that the POAS does not add anything new to 
enrich the concept of ministerial responsibility and accountability in Hong Kong. The 
new specifications provided by the Code are just confined to some formality issues 
instead of fundamentally outline the context of ministerial responsibility to the 
legislature. 
Besides repeating the wordings of Article 62 and 64, the additional specifications 
in the Code in relation to the responsibility to the Legislative Council are only to 
"represent the Government and to transact business at meetings of the LegCo and as 
necessary its committees, subcommittees and panels" (Paragraph 2.9, Code for 
Principal Officials), "ensure that they would be available to attend meetings of the 
LegCo when matters relating to their respective portfolios are discussed" (Paragraph 
2.10), and to “give accurate and truthful information to the LegCo and correct any 
error at the earliest opportunities" (Paragraph 2.11). By no means has the Code or the 
Basic Law provided any institutional framework for individual responsibility as well 
as guidance in dealing with situation in which issues of public accountability arise. 
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5.5 Risk of Politicizations of the Civil Service 
Furthermore, the boundary between political and administrative accountability 
has still remained blurred within the POAS framework. The scope of accountability 
between the principal officials and the bureaucracy has to be first delineated clearly so 
as to form the institutional basis to hold ministers accountable as well as preserve 
political neutrality of the civil service. 
Again, the Basic Law does not provide much assistance in this regard. Article 64 
only specifies “the Executive Authorities" as a whole to be accountable to the 
legislature, but how this accountability should be meted out among the political 
appointees and the civil service remains a conundrum in public administration in 
Hong Kong. 
The government document of the POAS does sketch rough outlines of the duties 
of the permanent secretaries. Their pivotal roles are enlisted in the Paragraph 20 of the 
LegCo Paper as follows: 
• to assist the principal officials in formulating, explaining and defending policies, securing 
support of the public and LegCo and answering LegCo, moving bills and taking parts in 
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motion debates in plenary sessions of LegCo ... explain and defend policies in public 
including at meetings of LegCo panels and committees 
• to steer and coordinate with the executive departments falling within the respective 
portfolios of the principal officials, and liaise with other departments in implementing 
particular policies 
• to assist the principal officials in acquiring and deploying resource for the policies 
implementation 
• to monitor the needs and aspiration of the community 
• to uphold the reliability and professional standards in service provision 
• to ensure proper use of financial resources within the bureau (Paragraph 20(a) — (f), LegCo 
Paper) 
While the list lays down the conventional duties of the administrative head of 
departments, the inherent problem of this arrangement is that permanent secretaries 
are now required to defend government policy before the LegCo and the public 
(Paragraph 20(a)，LegCo Paper). Although it is still a controversial debate on whether 
political and administrative responsibility can be so easily demarcated, such 
stipulation surely defies the logic of a reform whose guiding principles include the 
upholding of political neutrality of the civil service. 
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It is indeed reasonable to impose a responsibility for the civil servants appear 
before the legislature, but their duties should normally be confined to information 
provision or response to factual inquiries instead of providing justification for 
government bills or policies. The duty to justify government decisions should be 
borne by politicians. However, for now, the permanent secretaries may not be able to 
enjoy the anonymity which should be protected by the principle of political neutrality. 
Instead of coining a clear delineation between political and administrative 
accountability, the line between the two remained blurred after the operation of POAS. 
The civil servants, at least among the layer of permanent secretaries, are now highly 
susceptible to politicization in controversial issues. (As a matter of fact, during the 
debacle of Article 23 and Harbour Fest, the senior civil servants had, voluntarily or 
reluctantly, shouldered the duties to explain policies and lobby for support from the 
legislature.) 
In such case, the public would find it difficult to seek accountability as the 
politicians can shift the brunt readily to the civil service, while the permanent 
secretaries can protect themselves by the claim of political neutrality, even though 
they are conducting political tasks and mission actually. This problem will become 
manifest in issues of accountability related to department faults, blunders in public 
agencies as well as political tasks shouldered by the permanent secretaries. 
118 
Moreover, such arrangement raised the suspicion that political neutrality of the 
civil service would be ultimately compromised and the advice provided by the senior 
bureaucrats will become increasingly partisan in nature. Although Joseph Wong 
Wing-ping, by then the Secretary for the Civil Service, responded that the civil 
service will not be filled by "yes-man" due to the POAS reform (MingPao, 18 April 
2002), there is no corresponding measures to guarantee that the civil service will not 
be so politicized gradually. 
5.6 Lack of Informational Accountability 
Finally, no institutional effort was made in the POAS reform to establish "a 
regime of freedom of information", a quality which is emphatically specified by Dunn 
as indispensable to democratic accountability (Dunn 1999). The essence of such is to 
“maximize the degree to which politically consequential conduct by rulers and their 
subordinates is always in the open" (Dunn 1999, 339). As said in Chapter 2, without 
such free flow of information, citizens cannot know what is actually going on in the 
government, let alone make an informed judgment and provide meaningful oversight. 
Transparency of the government is the prerequisite of public accountability. 
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Indeed, government transparency is an even more fundamental constituent of 
accountability than the sanctioning mechanism. Government normally monopolizes 
the revelation of information, while unfavourable information is expected to bring 
punishment and undesirable political consequence against the government. Therefore, 
officials are inclined to block selectively from the public some information which 
may be detrimental to the reputation or normal operation of the government. Spinning 
or maneouver of public opinion can also work under the opacity of government 
actions. Therefore, informational accountability is also an important aspect that a 
proper organizational design of an accountability system should cover. 
Rowena Kwok argues that the local discourse of accountability in Hong Kong 
has been concentrating exclusively on ministerial resignation and sanction imposition, 
while the importance of information accountability has been seriously neglected 
(Kwok 2003). The new accountability system provides insufficient statutory 
guarantee for the executive to be as open and transparent as possible in public 
administration. 
Actually, the freedom to seek, receive and impart information was 
constitutionally guaranteed by the Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, a international convention which is incorporated in Hong Kong 
through Article 39 of the Basic Law of Hong Kong through Article as well as the 
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Hong Kong Bill of Rights. However, as Kwok notices, there was so far no attempt to 
materialize such guarantee by specific statutory effort. The government did not show 
any intention to institute some kind of freedom of information laws, while the 
officials were also reluctant to do so for protecting the privilege of government 
secrecy (Kwok 2003). 
Right now, the legislature can order specific documents or call for the presence 
of particular government officials for enquiry under the Legislative Council (Powers 
and Privileges) Ordinance (Cap 382). However, the CE can block the admission of 
government document or record if such materials are related to security of Hong 
Kong or the responsibilities of the Central People's Government according to section 
14. Moreover, the CE is entitled to bar public officials to testify by the vague concept 
of "security and vital public interests" as said in Article 48 of the Basic Law. 
The POAS has done nothing in the aspect of explanatory accountability at all. It 
does not further empower the public as well as the legislature to demand information 
from the government. Informational openness can still only be secured by the tussle 
between legislature and the CE as well as the dedication of the mass media instead of 
institutional guarantee. It is still put at the mercy of the government officials. 
Moreover, as Cheung points out, also there was no effort in improving the 
quality of exchanges between the executive and the legislature so that some kind of 
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deliberative accountability can be facilitated. The POAS provides nothing new in 
enhancing the competence of the LegCo in scrutinizing the government. 
5.7 Conclusions 
After going through the whole institutional analysis, the salient structural defects 
of this new accountability have been made quite apparent. Adopting the language of 
principal-agent model (Moe 1990a), the POAS framework provides insufficient 
structural incentive to induce the CE and the principal officials to enter into a genuine 
accountability relationship with the general public as well as the legislature. It 
portends a kind of weak accountability relationship, at least in the organizational 
sense. 
The POAS reform can be regarded as a success in the objective to shift the 
political power from the administrative class to the Chief Executive and his close 
advisors. The POAS concentrates the policy-making power on the hand of the team of 
ministers, while the CE has now also monopolized the authority to handpick the 
senior officials in Hong Kong. No doubt it has somehow cleared the barricades for 
effective governance. 
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However, if we also adopt the evaluation criteria of whether the reform enhance 
the public accountability of the government, the close analysis in this chapter enables 
us to leam that solely “ministerizing，’ the layer of senior officials alone may not 
actually help, for such concentration of political power is actually working against the 
direction of accountability enhancement. The POAS is far from enough to solve the 
governance crisis and relent the public pressure for accountability. 
Indubitably, the result of the POAS reform is to strengthen the personal rule. It 
has significantly empowered the CE and the principal officials without the 
introduction of corresponding measures of check and balance. Since the civil service 
is now subsumed under the new layer of political leadership, the traditional control of 
meritocracy and technocratic professionalism would very likely be eroded. The public 
and the legislature are not given any institutional means to exert influence on 
ministerial appointment or impose sanctions on principal officials at fault. In the 
absence of full democracy, election also cannot become an effective sanctioning 
means on the CE and the senior officials as in contemporary democratic regimes. 
Thus, the POAS has provided every institutional incentive for the government to 
weaken if not sever the link of accountability to the public and the legislature. The 
problem of representation and dual accountability add further troubles to the already 
problematic arrangement. 
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Without sufficient institutional control, the quality of governance now hinges 
more on the political leadership, charismas and competence of the political leaders, 
while public accountability can only be attained by the voluntary and benevolent 
initiation of the CE instead of institutional guarantee. The situation is further 
exacerbated by the reluctance of the CE to entrench true accountability practice As 
shown in his speech, Tung incessantly showed his non-committal attitude by 
regarding public sentiments and legislative preference as the principal criteria in 
hiring and firing principal officials (MingPao 2 July 2002, South China Morning Post 
2 July 2002) 
Moreover, the accountability system provides insufficient institutional guidance 
in dealing with the potential crises of accountability. The Basic Law and the Code for 
the Principal Officials manage to provide cliched description of ministerial 
responsibility, and the vague guidelines cannot offer additional assistance or 
requirements apart from those which have been practiced in Hong Kong for long. The 
problem of unclear delineation of political and administrative accountability has not 
been effectively solved also in this reform. 
It is quite clear that the government did not try hard to fill in the context of 
“political accountability" or devise any institutional means to actualize it. Such 
structural deficit does not bode well for the smooth functioning of the POAS. For now, 
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Tung perceive accountability as the direct ministerial responsibility to him, while the 
democrats, which is comparatively mandated by the public, argue that such a 
responsibility should be owed to the people or representative institutions, i.e. LegCo. 
In order to hold the government accountable, the civil society and the legislature 
(limited to pro-democracy camp) are left with no institutional choice but to rely on 
political interaction and struggles. With the pressure for more accountability lingering 
on, the institutional deficit of the POAS to delivery genuine accountability would only 
result in the proliferation of political confrontation and altercation. The situation was 
further exacerbated by the forging of the governing coalition, which lacked sufficient 
social foundation and was devoid of representation. The likely victims are, 
unquestionably, social cohesion and political harmony. 
Apparently, within the peculiar political setting in Hong Kong, ministerialization 
alone would produce further problems instead of remedy the existing ones. The POAS 
can neither enhance political accountability nor protect political neutrality of the 
bureaucracy. Burden comes with power. The CE may now build a team of political 
appointees as his firewall to assuage political pressure, but he now has to assume the 
ultimate blame formally if everything under his leadership goes wrong. He is in strong 
position to protect unpopular principal officials, but the accumulated public discontent 
will be diverted directly to him. The implication of the institutional deficit of the 
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POAS is rather simple: ministerialization must come with more fundamental 
institutional reform in Hong Kong. 
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Chapter 6 Path Dependence and the Politics of 
* 
Political Accountability in Hong Kong 
This Chapter would take a twist in the analytical perspective. It would pick up 
the tools of political science instead of that of public administration and constitutional 
study in approaching the politics of accountability after the introduction of the POAS. 
Adopting the analytic tools largely from historical institutionalism and social 
constructivism, Chapter 6 tries to provide a better theoretical account of the 
vicissitudes of Hong Kong politics after the handover, and in particular, the failure of 
the POAS reforms. 
It illustrates that the politics of political accountability is transformed from an 
intra-elite conflict between the ExCo and the civil servants, to a societal struggle 
between the ExCo and pro-government coalition on one side, and the marginalized 
democrats coupled with public sentiments on the other. Provided the peculiar political 
circumstances in Hong Kong and the nature of political responsibility, the POAS 
reform is bound to create interminable conflicts in a greater scale, broader scope and 
graver severity. 
" Part of this chapter is extracted from the conference paper for the Annual General Meting, Hong 
Kong Political Science Association on 8 May 2004. 
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6.1 Historical Institutionalism and Social Constructivism 一 
Reciprocal Relationship between Structure and Agency 
This chapter focuses primarily on the politics over the evolution of political 
accountability as a normative institution. Here, institution is defined as “collections of 
interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate actions in terms of relations 
between roles and situations. The process involves determining what the situation is, 
what role is being fulfilled, and what obligation of that role in that situation is." 
(March and Olsen 1989, 21) 
Institution is resistant to change (North 1990). Political institution is a 
particularly resistant species (Pierson 2000). Once a political institution comes into 
existence, evolving from the point of “critical juncture" (Collier & Collier 1991), the 
political interactions that exist in the beginning moment of institutional formation 
have the capacity to set the institutional evolution into a particular developmental 
pathway. (Skocpol 1992). The intellectually interesting enquiries in analyzing 
institutional inception as well as change are thus, first, what lead to the “critical 
juncture", and second, in what way the trajectories of future institutional evolution is 
constrained? 
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The impetus for institutional change is provided by the interaction of political 
actors within the institutional setting. The institutional context provides the 
"definition of interests and objectives" (Zysman 1994，244), or, in a broader sense, 
some "culturally shared understandings and meanings" (Ferejoin 1991，285) as 
guidelines of interaction between actors. Difference of goals and interest may appear 
between different political players, but their preferences are likely limited by the 
institutional setting. 
However, it should be reminded that historical institutionalism does not negate 
the role of agency. Indeed, the recent theoretical development of historical 
institutionalism pays comparable weight to the power of agency in path-forming and 
-shaping process. Its proponents assert that political actors have their roles to play in 
the institutional evolution. Though their choices and strategies are somehow 
structured by the pre-existing context, political actors can intentionally shift the 
direction of path by their decisions and tactics. Moreover, the outcome of interaction 
between players will be fed back to the structural setting and trigger the institutional 
evolution along the developmental pathway. Overall, the study of institutional change 
is to "trace reciprocal and dynamic causal relations between institutional choices and 
institutional effects" and observe the "feedback over time, between day-to-day 
politics and institutional choices" (Jupille and Caporaso, 1999, 438). The structural 
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and agency factors become complimentary and largely mutually dependent in today's 
academic discourse in order to enhance the explanatory power of historical 
institutionalism. None of them is not privileged over another in tackling political 
development. (Scharpf 1997) 
Political interaction is also significant in the formulation of social norms. Here, I 
turn my recourse to the theory of social constructivism in outlining the politics of 
accountability. According to classical social constructivist, the advent of norms is 
derived from the dialogic interaction between actors in the particular context. The 
roles of each person preset their conception on particular matters, and power relations 
determine the final appearance of the norms and institutions. Such subjective 
conception is transformed into objective norms after habitualization of such practices 
and the emergence of wide acceptance of such norms. (Berger and Luckmann, 1967) 
These theoretical tools together provide a very good starting point in 
understanding the transitional politics in Hong Kong and the dynamics surrounding 
the POAS reform. Any proper understanding of the genesis of the POAS and the 
ensuing political dynamics necessitates an appraisal of the overall political context in 
which the system is bred and the interactions are structured. In this vein, a study of the 
political context of Hong Kong that provides the endogenous background for the 
politics of accountability is called for. 
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6.2 Endogenous Context for the POAS: Path of Hong Kong 
Politics 
The post-handover constitutional framework of Hong Kong is solely crafted by 
the interaction and negotiation between the British and Mainland governments (Kuan 
1991). The stakes and compromises raised in the Sino-British Joint Declaration were 
embodied in the Basic Law. The voices and concerns of the Hong Kong people were 
largely excluded. It is reasonable to comment that the Basic Law is largely a product 
derived from short-term concerns and political expediency instead of any commitment 
to entrench a long-enduring political system which can function congruously with the 
social and political context in the post-handover Hong Kong. 
The mistrust and suspicion of the Chinese government during the Sino-British 
negotiation left their vestige in today's Hong Kong politics. The defensive mentality 
of the Central Government after the Tiannamen Incident had guided the latter 
progress of the Basic Law drafting and led to many subsequent changes. The HKSAR 
political system is somehow transplanted from the colonial system. It retains 
capacious measures of authoritarianism element. Public political participation is 
largely restrained, while popular elections become insignificant in forming the 
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government or affecting the policy directions of the government. The development of 
party politics is halted, while the politically neutral CE is supported by the loyalty and 
meritocracy of the civil service. 
Meanwhile, after the blueprint for democratization was put into practice by the 
Basic Law, Hong Kong is heading for the direction of full democracy in the coming 
decades. The popular election of CE and the Legislative Council is guaranteed in the 
Basic Law, though, according to Annexes II and III its introduction will be contingent 
on the "actual situation" of Hong Kong, an ambiguous and loosely defined concept 
which is subject to various interpretation. However, after successive experience of 
direct elections before and after the handover, the electoral accountability mechanism 
in Hong Kong becomes fledgling and will continue to develop. In short, Hong Kong 
is marching towards the direction of democratic accountability and controlled 
government. The urge for democracy and political participation is destined to be a 
formative force of Hong Kong politics. 
Such awkward blend of authoritarian and democratic components within the 
same political system did not bode well for the political stability of Hong Kong after 
the handover. As Yash Ghai indicates, democratic mobilization of politics is unlikely 
to be shunned off, while the stability of the administration is very doubtful. The 
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"internal contradiction" of political system would undoubtedly bring political 
struggles which are beyond the capacity of the HKSAR government to solve. (1999) 
The coexistence of authoritarian and democratic components does not 
necessarily produce political stability, as experience of transitional politics in other 
countries shows. However, the Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa, as a political novice, 
had to face a series of extraordinarily daunting tasks right after the handover. As 
convincingly summarized by Lau, they are the 
"institution-building and re-setting of the political rules of the game in the wake of Hong 
Kong's transformation from a British colony to a Special Administration Region of China, 
re-building the social contract in the SAR in a context of de-industralization, diminishing 
economic security and declining public confidence in the untrammeled capitalist system, 
re-positioning between Hong Kong and the mainland after the end of the colonial rule in 
accordance with the principle of "one country two systems", restoring public respect for and 
trust in political and social authorities which have been in secular decline, enhancing public 
confidence in the government amidst rising public skepticism of the political abilities of the 
civil servants, mastering a political system where multiple institutional and political actors 
coexist and vie for influence and coping with a political situation where mass politics has 
raised its head." (Lau 2002, 21) 
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The internal reconfiguration of political order already seems to be an 
insurmountable challenge to the Chief Executive who is deprived of party affiliation 
as well as stable political support. The China factor and the intricacy in formulating 
the unprecedented "one country two systems" model further complicated the 
situation. 
The political framework did not function as it was intended originally. As Ian 
Scott forcefully argues, the post-handover political system is a disarticulated one in a 
sense that different institutions and actors pursue their own agendas and fight for the 
political dominance (2001). The following quotation from Scott is particularly telling: 
"The Executive Council was unable to transform itself into a body that could exert political 
control over the civil service. The bureaucracy attempted to reassert its former predominance. 
The Legislative Council sought to retain and enhance the means by which it held the civil 
service accountable. And civil society in Hong Kong, far from being cowed into passive 
acquiescence, maintained its vibrancy... As a result, the interactions between the institutions 
which made up the system were either weakened or continued to be fractious" (Scott 2001， 
36-37) 
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In short, Hong Kong is still in search of a stable political order that is widely 
accepted. The political order is still in the state of flux, and it is subject to major 
adjustments. This has provided the structural foundation, or, in the parlance of 
historical institutionalists, the "endogenous context" (Thelen & Steinmo’ 1992) that 
provides the historical dynamics for the emergence and, alas, calamity of the POAS. 
6.3 POAS: Two Phases of Institutional Evolution 
6.3.1 Phase 1 - Birth of the POAS: Intra-elite Struggle for 
Dominance 
6.3.1.1 The Legacy of Bureaucratic Government 
Though the focus of this chapter is on the failure of the POAS, the researcher 
finds it necessary to illustrate the inception of the POAS and put it in the theoretical 
framework mentioned above. 
The bureaucratic dominance in public administration, which is an important 
product of the Sino-British colonial era, contributed significantly to the genesis of the 
POAS. For more than a century, the power of policy formulation was monopolized by 
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senior civil servants under the leadership of the governor appointed by the British 
Government. Hong Kong was dubbed “an administrative no-party state" (Harris 1978, 
53), in which politicians and party politics had no role to play during the colonial era. 
In devising the political framework of post-handover Hong Kong, China's 
wariness of democratization and the conservatism shared by influential business 
tycoons toward the possible upsurge of welfarism led to a restricted version of 
democracy in the Basic Law (So 2000). Party politics is largely restricted. In order to 
provide the foundation of an executive-led political setting spearheaded by a Chief 
Executive who will not be popularly mandated, China had to turn recourse to 
elsewhere. Given the need to maintain the status quo on one hand, and the reluctance 
to gravitate too much towards the business sectors on the other, sustaining the 
civil-service-led system thus became a viable and appealing option to the Beijing 
government. 
As stipulated by the Basic Law, the major holders of political and administrative 
power after the handover would be the Chief Executive and the bureaucracy. (Art 48, 
62，Basic Law) The Legislative Council, advisory bodies as well as pressure groups 
can only play a peripheral role in policy formulation and government formation. 
(Kuan 1999). However, since the Chief Executive lacks the support of a popular 
mandate and political party, as Cheung points out, he unavoidably has to rely 
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exclusively on the civil servants for policy advice and thus particularly vulnerable to 
the bureaucratic capture. (Cheung 1997). 
The Chris Patten's political reform increased the pace of democratization in 
Hong Kong and enhanced the element of public participation in the legislature. While 
senior government officials was given more extensive discretion in areas under their 
portfolio, the emergence of popularly elected councilors in the LegCo posed 
unprecedented political pressure on the bureaucracy as a whole. These together 
culminated into an inevitable politicization of the principal officials. They had to 
transform themselves into de facto politicians in order to cope with the rise of mass 
politics and vigilance by the democrats. 
Concurrently with Patten's democratization and decolonization project, we saw a 
gradual adoption to the norms of public accountability on the part of the civil service, 
albeit through administrative but not political means. Starting from the nineties, the 
administration has underwent a series of reform in order to maintain the legitimacy of 
the civil-service rule before an increasingly vibrant and politically active civil society. 
The introduction of customer-oriented culture in the delivery of public service as well 
as the pledge of prompt response to citizens' demand can be duly regarded as a de 
facto formulation of the civil service towards the goal of responsiveness and 
responsibility. Though the issue of accountability was never put to agenda in the 
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colonial administration, the administrative reform towards a responsible government 
must be taken into account as the advent of accountability practice in Hong Kong. 
The reform also fundamentally heightened the expectation on the quality and 
accountability of the civil service. 
The Civil Service Reform in 1999 was also a significant step towards public 
accountability. The vision of cultivating a proactive, accountable and responsible 
culture within the bureaucracy is specifically stated in the reform blueprint (Civil 
Service Bureau 1999). It is argued that the call for stronger sense of responsibility, the 
nurturing of a performance-based and service-oriented management culture as well as 
the enhancement of quality of service further extended the colonial practice, 
strengthened the public expectation for public accountability and partially structured 
the policy options which are available to the Chief Executive. 
6.3.1.2 Internal Tension: “Presidential，，Leadership vs Meritocracy 
The Handover can be duly regarded as an external shock to the path of political 
accountability development in Hong Kong. The problem of bureaucratic rule would 
not be brought to the forefront while the struggle between political leadership and 
civil service would not become pressing so quickly but for the new constitutional 
setting brought by the Handover and the Basic Law. 
138 
Right after the Handover, we witnessed the intra-executive struggle between the 
civil servants on one hand, and Executive Council, comprising Tung and his close 
advisors, on the other. 
The civil service assumed an indispensable position in Tung's governance. 
Cheung observes that there were two competing paradigms for the so-called 
"executive-led" system within the government. The civil servants favoured a 
bureaucrat-led system, while Tung and his supporters wanted to lead a more 
presidential style of executive, so that political leadership of the Chief Executive can 
replace the bureaucracy as the dominant force in public governance (Cheung 2002). 
Civic Exchange, a local policy think-tank, notes that Tung and his close advisors 
prefer a style of executive government that resembles the operation of a private 
corporation. (Civic Exchange, 2002) Public officials, whose careers were largely built 
on traditional values such as incrementalism and meritocracy, apparently did not share 
such governing scruples. 
Tung had a hard time with the civil service during his first term of office. 
Deepening rift could be easily discerned between the ExCo and the bureaucracy led 
by the Chief Secretary for Administration Anson Chan Fong On-shan after the 
handover. Reports that senior civil servants privately complained about the ignorance 
to civic service of the Chief Executive and his advisors abounded. The bureaucrats 
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often regarded the general interest of society as their dominant concern. They 
regarded the duty to give honest advices on public policies as their top priority, even 
if the opinions may contravene with the personal preference of the executive. The 
close advisors of Tung, however, viewed these as signs of disrespect and 
obstructionist proclivity. They often openly blamed the bureaucracy for hindering the 
Chief Executive to exercise effective leadership, and even use this to account for 
Tung's disappointing performance (Interview with Cheng Yiu-tong, March 2004). 
Nevertheless, bureaucratic dominance was rather secure because of the control 
of information in policy formulation enjoyed by the civil servants as well as the lack 
of countervailing forces in society (such as political parties, academic institutions and 
research foundations) (Kuan, 1999). The virtually monopolized access to critical 
information in policy formulation and instruments of implementation has put the 
bureaucracy in a much advantageous position over the Tung and his allies (Lau 2002). 
Tung was losing his leading edge, let alone control, over the administrative vehicle of 
the HKSAR government. At the same time, the ExCo failed to act as a body which 
could exert control over the civil service in a quasi-ministerial setting. The ExCo 
members were left with the roles of prominent but powerless advisers (Scott 2001). 
6.3.1.3 The Erosion of Performance Legitimacy of the Civil Service 
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The civil service, however, was plagued by a series of policy blunders. In 1997， 
the Avian Flu outbreak unleashed a wave of public panic. The government reacted 
slowly and the subsequent massacre of poultry was handled sloppily. In 1998, after its 
ceremonious opening, the operation of the new Hong Kong International Airport 
ended in cataclysmic chaos. Due to various technical problems, flights were delayed 
and countless cargos of fresh goods went perished. Anson Chan eventually apologized 
for the chaos before the LegCo. In 2000，defective pilings were found in several 
public housing blocks under the management of the Housing Authority. The 
government announced that these substandard buildings would be demolished. The 
scandal resulted in the prosecution of several housing officials and the call for 
resignation of relevant personnel. Public trust on the civil service waned. Skepticism 
on the quality of public governance soared. Yearning for more public accountability 
grew. Since public officials were somehow insulated from public pressure by the 
guise of political neutrality, most public discontent was directed to Tung himself. 
6.3.1.4 The POAS: Reassertion of Executive Dominance 
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It was an open secret that there were covert disagreements between Tung and his 
deputy Anson Chan. The conflicts became more and more noticeable, and eventually 
culminated into the voluntary resignation by Chan in 2001. However, her departure 
did not materially remove the impediments for Tung to truly carry out his leadership. 
With a strong bureaucratic force holding both political and administrative power, 
Tung Chee-hwa undoubtedly lacked the necessary political clout to govern. The 
“critical juncture" was finally reached when Tung needed to overcome this 
bureaucratic hindrance and reassert the executive dominance. While the civil service 
also encountered an efficiency crisis and accountability deficit, the intra-elite 
dynamics finally produced a consensus among the political elites that reforming the 
existing the government framework was inevitable (Cheung 2002). 
One official objective of the POAS is to enhance the accountability of the 
government. However, it is no secret that, behind the rubric of accountability 
provided by the HKSAR government, the POAS reform is also aimed at usurping the 
political and policy formulating power vested in the bureaucracy. By forming a 
cabinet filled by political appointees, the executive is able to retrieve policy 
formulation power and contains the influence of the civil servants within the confines 
of administrative arena. The Chief Executive can now handpick close working 
partners who really share similar governing ideologies. Several principal officials 
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admit that the lack of a ruling cabinet which can assist the political work of the CE is 
one major reason for introducing the POAS. 
In a nutshell, the genesis of the POAS resulted from the intra-elite struggle 
between the bureaucracy and the ExCo. The historical legacy of the bureaucratic 
government as well as the start of accountability practice through administrative 
means provided the structural context for the struggle, while the political actors 
played a part in shaping the subsequent institutional inception of the POAS according 
to the incongruity between the urge for asserting strong personal leadership and the 
principles of meritocracy and bureaucratic dominance. The POAS reform was 
initiated by the reassertion of executive dominance. 
6.3.2 Phase 2 一 Vicissitudes under the POAS: Societal 
Struggle for Norms of Accountability 
The intra-elite struggle for dominance was supposed to be terminated by the 
POAS reform. However, the end of this internal tussle is only the omen of a greater 
and graver political turbulence. It is submitted that the POAS has indeed provided the 
avenue for the political actors and society to contest over the norms of accountability, 
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i.e. the relationship between the government and the general public as a whole. The 
stage has been set for an internal struggle escalating to a societal level. 
According to the Legislative Council Paper prepared by the Constitutional 
Affairs Bureau, under the POAS, principal officials will now “be accountable to the 
Chief Executive for the success or failure of matters falling within their respective 
portfolios. They will accept total responsibility and in an extreme case, they may have 
to step down for serious failures relating to their respective portfolios. These include 
serious failures in policy outcome and serious mishaps in the implementation of the 
relevant policies. They may also have to step down for grave personal misconduct or 
if they cease to be eligible under the Basic Law. (Constitutional Affairs Bureau 2002, 
paragraph 12) It is postulated that principal officials are now duty bound to shoulder 
political responsibility for their performance and policy portfolios. 
6.3.2.1 The Nature of "Political Responsibility" 
The government has provided the sketch of answerability and political 
accountability under the POAS. The problem, however, lies in its application. It is 
submitted that, because of the nature of ‘‘political responsibility" and "political 
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accountability", any specific formulation of criteria in deciding when accountability 
mechanism should be evoked is highly unsatisfactory, if not impossible. 
John Dunn points out that successful operation of political accountability 
requires the existence of some reasonably clear norms which can help define the 
ambit of political responsibility bore by the public officials (Dunn 1999). 
If we perceive political accountability as an institution, the norms of 
accountability should be divided into two dimensions - first, the scope of 
responsibility and answerability of the agents, and second, the situation in which 
accountability mechanism should be evoked and particular sanctions should be 
imposed by the principals. 
For the first part, as widely believed, the ambit of political responsibility is 
largely contingent and dependent on the standard widely endorsed by the community 
at a particular time. The illustrations of various scholars lend support to this 
proposition. 
March and Olsen, the doyens of new institutionalism, employ the concept of 
“logic of appropriateness" (1984) to analyze accountability in democratic governance. 
They argue that the operation of accountability is based on the logic of consequence 
and logic of appropriateness, and the latter means that the behaviours and decisions of 
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public officials are assessed on “its consistency with cultural and political norms and 
rules." (1995, 154). 
Woodhouse once illustrated that the context of individual ministerial 
responsibility is always determined by political factors in addition to constitutional 
aspects (1994). Political interaction between actors within the constitutional 
framework is crucial in determining the scope of political responsibility and 
accountability. 
For the second part, as shown in the experience of British and Canadian 
ministerial system, practices of political accountability is indeed ever-evolving, and 
its details are always defined by the development of indicative precedents. It should 
be noted that accountability practices in both places come from unwritten 
constitutional conventions. (Marshall 1986, Heard 1999) 
As Mark Philp states, political accountability “concerns the answerability of the 
politicians and public officials for their conduct in office. The issue is not whether 
someone acted within their legitimate powers, but whether they exercised those 
powers in ways that the political bodies to whom they are accountable — such as 
Parliament or the electorate - can endorse” (2001, 360). Therefore, we can see 
whether accountability should be evoked depends on the political judgment of the 
public and the legislature. 
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In short, given its inherent nature, it is rather apparent that the operation of 
political responsibility and accountability is bound to be fraught with contestation. 
6.3.2.2 The Lack of Institutional Guidance in Hong Kong 
In Hong Kong, the concept of “political accountability" is glaringly absent from 
any official record or document of the government (Poon 2001). The POAS is indeed 
an avenue for this concept to come into play in the platform of Hong Kong politics. 
However, as Cheung Chor-yung (2003) rightly points out, the POAS “is highly 
inadequate in terms of providing political and institutional guidance for enhancing 
ministerial accountability, and there is a lack of developed constitutional conventions 
to assist policy makers, politicians and the public to deal with issues related to 
ministerial responsibility" (263). 
Obviously the government did not pay effort in devising contingency plan for 
crisis concerning political accountability. Both the Code for Principal Officials and 
the Basic Law provision provide no clues, not even the roughest guide to fill the void 
of the concept “political accountability" in Hong Kong. Accountability exists in 
rhetoric without any real substance. The Basic Law and written regulations do not 
provide any structural guidance to the players in scenarios of political blunders and 
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scandals, while no precedent is of any assistance. Therefore, the POAS reform put the 
political actors in Hong Kong into a context in which the future rule of game is 
determined by evolution and their interactions. Adopting the social constructivism 
approach, the norms of accountability will thus be largely shaped by interactions 
between political actors. 
6.3.2.3 The Structural Divide of Mass and Elitist Politics 
In Hong Kong, the co-existence of elitist and mass politics persists after the 
handover. The business and industrial elites tried hard to protect their stakes in the 
political systems (for instance, weighted representation in the legislature and the 
privileged position in the election of CE) under the ethos of "prosperity and stability". 
They maintain their power base in the functional representation in the legislature, 
which merely acts as a substitute of the elite appointment system in the past. 
Politicians from mass politics, on the other hand, need to adopt populist policies to 
salvage electoral votes in the geographical constituency election to ensure their access 
to the legislature. Such division is a historical product from the Sino-British 
negotiation, and such pattern is likely to persist unless the system reaches a point at 
which sufficient force appear to overcome the institutional inertia. The division of 
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elitist and mass politics inevitably cultivates different conceptions on political 
accountability among political actors in Hong Kong and has shaped the dynamics of 
the conflict over "political accountability" after the inception of the POAS. 
Before the handover, an "unholy alliance", which consisted of the government, 
the business elites and the patriotic force, emerged in tackling the surge of the 
populist alliance of politicians which represented the middle class and the grass-roots 
population (So 2000). Such power-sharing setting was further institutionalized by the 
POAS through the appointment of James Tien Pei-chun and Jasper Tsang Yok-shing, 
the chairman of the Liberal Party and the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of 
Hong Kong respectively. Such move heralded the beginning of adversarial coalition 
politics in Hong Kong, while the democrats in the legislature were virtually 
marginalized as a minority force. 
Politics is the result of disagreement over goals and disparities in power. Political 
institutions often have the ability to entrench or amplify such power disparities 
(Knight 1992). It is submitted that, because of such path dependence, the POAS 
necessarily sharpens the conflicts between the government and pro-government elites 
on one hand, and the institutionally marginalized democrats on the other hand. Due to 
the rather amorphous nature of the concept of “political responsibility", the new 
system entitles different political actors to articulate their conception of political 
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accountability in order to win a strategically advantageous position to indeed shape 
the rules of accountability. Thus, after a year of operation, we witness the perpetual 
struggle of two distinct and irreconcilable articulations of “logics of appropriateness" 
in the political arena of Hong Kong. The dysfunctional political system proffers no 
solution to resolve the conflicts, while the adversarial coalition politics introduced by 
the POAS intensifies rather than relents the antagonism. 
6.3.2.4 The Societal Tension: Efficiency vs Populist Vision of 
Accountability 
The stakes of the government and the pro-govemment elites on the whole POAS 
reforms lie in the enhancement of efficiency of public governance and the minimal 
change to the political system. The government needed to maintain the unity of the 
governing cabinet, so that the executive can work better, public officials will not be 
severely hampered, while potential business and industrial elites will not be scared off 
to pursue political career in the future (Interview with Doris Ho and Lau Siu-kai, 
March 2004). The pro-govemment elites in the LegCo also need to contain the 
upsurge of the democrats in the assembly to avoid their vested interest from being 
deterred. Therefore, they inclined to articulate a softer version of "political 
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accountability" in which enhancement of government efficiency and protection of 
systematic integrity are the dominant ethos. 
Furthermore, the CE has to, on one hand, pander to the business interest in their 
socio-economic policies, and, on the other hand, need to pay heed to the wishes and 
instructions of the Central Government in the controversial political issues. Thus, the 
CE is disinclined to stray from the concerns of stability (business sector) and 
defensive mechanism (the Central Government) in developing his version of “political 
accountability". This conflict of dual representation and accountability left the CE 
with little room to compromise with the democrats. 
Whereas, the democrats tried to assert a populist form of “political 
accountability" on the government. Indubitably, the POAS has heightened public 
expectation and widened the gap between what people demands and what the 
government can really deliver in terms of political accountability. The government is 
incessantly confronted with the challenges by an increasingly vibrant society. The 
democrats tried hard to shape the discourse of public opinion in fighting for a harsher 
form of accountability standard. The mistrust towards the government and the need of 
more rigorous answerability to the public (via the legislature) can be perceived as 
their guiding ethos. 
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Although the democrats were deprived of political clout within the legislature, 
the escalating anti-government sentiment after the introduction of the POAS provided 
them with the golden opportunities to manipulate the social sanctions at their disposal， 
shaped the discourse of public opinion, and eventually transformed public grievance 
into support for imposing a higher standard of accountability on the government. 
In this regard, this paper attempts to use three political incidents that happened in 
the first year of operation of the POAS to highlight various visage of conceptual 
incongruity of accountability between two camps as well as the political struggle of 
the two distinct “logics of appropriateness". 
6.4 Illustration: Three Political Incidents 
6.4.1 Penny Stocks Incident: the Debate on the Extent of 
Vicarious Responsibility 
6.4.1.1 The Incident 
Nobody, possibly including the democrats, would expect the first litmus test to 
the POAS would emerge just three weeks after its inauguration. The Penny Stocks 
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Incident (or Penny Stock Fiasco), which stormed the financial market in late July 
2002 as well as political auditorium in subsequent weeks, provided a very good 
starting point for analyzing the politics of accountability under the POAS. The 
situation is particularly intriguing as the leading actor of the farce, the 
newly-appointed Secretary for the Financial Services and Treasury (SFST) Frederick 
Ma, comes from the business sector instead of civil service. 
The Incident came out of the blue. It was instigated by a consultation paper 
prepared by the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing (the HKEx). On 25 July 2002, 
the HKEx issued the Consultation Paper on Proposed Amendments to the Listing 
Rules Relating to Initial Listing and Continuing Listing Criteria and Cancellation of 
Listing Procedures (the Consultation Paper) for public consultation. The Consultation 
Paper provided a host of suggestions on market reform. One of the proposals was to 
cope with the problems associated with the so-called “penny stocks”. The HKEx 
proposed that shares of listed companies that are traded below fifty cents for thirty 
consecutive days should be consolidated, failing which, after possible appeal 
procedures, de-listing may ensue. 
The implication of such proposal was far-reaching. With half of the shares in the 
market falling into such category, this reform, if implemented, would manage to 
transform a sizeable of trading stocks into wastepaper. To make things worse, the 
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Consultation Paper did not provide any exit mechanism for small shareholders to 
trade the penny stocks at hand in case they were de-listed. Given that penny stock 
market were always volatile and no protective measure was put forward, the 
announcement of the Consultation Paper sparked a wave of panic selling of penny 
stocks by the small shareholders the next day. The stock market thus dropped 
precipitously. On 26 July 2002, 577 out of 761 stocks listed on the Main Board 
recorded a loss, with the leading victim witnessing a price freefall of 88%. 66 stocks 
recorded a decline of 20% or more, and a total amount of HK$ 10.91 billion 
vapourized from the stock pool in just one single day. 
Two days after such a massive plummet in stock market, the HKEx, together 
with its supervisory body the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC), decided to 
withdraw the proposal concerning the regulation of penny stocks. However, havoc 
had been wreaked. It was time to trace which parties should be held responsible for 
the whole fiasco. 
6.4.1.2 Vicarious Responsibility 
The Penny Stocks Incident raised a profusion of issues in stock market regulation, 
public governance as well as the three-tier structure regulatory structure between the 
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government, the SFC and the HKEx. However, one key issue pertaining to the inquiry 
of political accountability has yet to be resolved - to what extent should the SFST and 
the Financial Secretary, who are politically appointed to implement overall financial 
policies, should be vicariously responsible for the alleged faults committed by 
departments under their supervision? 
In order to facilitate the discussion, it is desirable to review some previous 
discussion of vicarious responsibility. It should be reminded that classical doctrine of 
ministerial responsibility in Britain and Canada stipulates that a political appointee 
should be entirely responsible for all departmental faults committed by the civil 
servants under its leadership, no matter he has prior knowledge or not. The classical 
adage, “a minister is responsible for every stamp stuck on an envelop" vividly 
illustrates the principle. Nonetheless, modem public governance renders such austere 
version of vicarious responsibility highly undesirable, if not untenable. The 
complexity and extensive ramification of government structures make it impossible 
for ministers to be accessible to all information about his departments. The prevalence 
of contracting out, outsourcing of public service and devolution of government 
authorities to public managers also trigger the mushrooming of new public agents and 
blur the division of responsibility between the government and these new autonomous 
entities. The extent of vicarious responsibility is still a controversial issue. Normally, 
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it is believed that vicarious responsibility，unless falling into the gravest type, should 
not entail ministerial resignation (Woodhouse 1994). In the end, it depends on the 
actual delineation of powers between politicians and administrators - civil servants, 
autonomous entities, public organizations or quangos - particular institutional settings 
as well as the political judgment of the society and critical actors involved in 
particular systems. 
The Penny Stocks Incident is a case in point. Strictly speaking, the HKEx and the 
SFC are not similar to departments under the Bureau of Financial Services and 
Treasury. Although they are situated within the hierarchical framework under the 
Bureau (and hence the supervision of FS)，they possess certain extent of autonomy in 
formulating policies with respect to market regulation. How should the scope of 
individual ministerial responsibility be defined and which fault should be ascribed to 
Frederick Ma, as well as Antony Leung, remained a contentious issue to be 
determined after the fiasco. 
6.4.1.3 The Cleavage in the Legislature 
It was reasonable for the public to be furious about the sloppy management of 
the consultation as well as the insensitiveness to market response by particular 
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officials, including the SFST and FS. Besides their strong reproach, various 
organizations and unions of stockbrokers also planned to launch campaigns to seek 
the explanation and apology from relevant personnel involved, with the Chief 
Executive of the HKEx Kwong Ki-chi and the Chairman of the SFC Andrew Sheng as 
the leading candidates. 
The government made the first public response before the media three days after 
the Incident. Ma, Kwong and Sheng unanimously claimed that the Incident was 
caused only because of the public misunderstanding of the proposal in the 
Consultation Paper. They denied any fault on the part of the government, and did not 
intend to offer any apology for the fiasco. Surely, the stock broking sector was far 
from satisfied with such reply. 
In the realm of political accountability, the government adopted similar 
protective attitude. The next day after such public response, Antony Leung openly 
defended Ma by emphasizing the fact that the HKEx did not try their best effort in 
informing the Bureau of Financial Services and Treasury the proposal and its 
implications. On another occasion, Ma conceded that the manner by which the 
proposal was announced was problematic. However, he did not participate in its 
formulation and was only informed of the Consultation Paper the day before its 
announcement. (MingPao, 30 July 2002) 
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The democrats wasted no time to leap at this opportunity, ride on the public rage 
and assert political pressure on Ma and Leung. In a special meeting of the LegCo 
Panel on Financial Services on 31 July 2002, the cleavage between the pro-democracy 
and pro-government camps became so manifest for the first time. We saw the 
interesting dissection of lawmakers, with the democrats tried to put the blame on the 
two political appointees involved, and the pro-government ones defended the ruling 
cabinet by shifting the blameworthiness on the HKEx and the SFC. 
More important to our enquiry is that the two sides articulated significantly 
different visions of vicarious responsibility. For the democrats, they espoused a kind 
of vicarious responsibility which is similar to the traditional doctrine. This could be 
reflected by some indicative comments and questions raised by particular members in 
the prolonged meeting. Chairman of the Democratic Party (by then) Martin Lee 
Chu-ming criticized both FS and SFST for their incompetence in supervising the 
HKEx and SFC. He argued further that even Ma stated that he was not informed about 
the proposal to de-list penny stock, such lack of knowledge is not sufficient ground to 
leave him exonerated from political responsibility. Chan Wai-yip also admonished 
Ma, questioning whether Ma and Leung should remain in office. 
The democrats also managed to capitalize on the disappointing performance 
from Ma in the meeting. Being a political novice, Ma demonstrated his inexperience 
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in dealing with the potentially flustering scrutiny by the legislature. Encountering a 
torrent of harsh questions from the democrats, he admitted that the SFC had sent a 
summary table of the Consultation Paper to him on 17 July 2002, some days before 
the fiasco. However, he failed to notice when he needed to rush out for dinner 
appointment and then his short departure to England. He further added that papers and 
files in his office “were piling up like a mountain" and he "could not possibly have 
read every document". (Enquiry Report, para 9.20 and 9.21) Such slip of tongue was 
extremely damaging to the public perception on his competence as a minister. Such 
quotation succeeded in gaining large coverage of report, as well as satire, in the media. 
The democrats continued to criticize Ma by this new piece of information. The case 
that Ma should be held indirectly responsible for the fiasco was clearly established. 
The pro-government LegCo members apparently did not agree with such 
stringent version of ministerial responsibility. During the meeting, James Tien 
challenged the democrats for infusing economic issue with politics. Tsang Yok-shing 
praised that Ma had acted promptly, and argued that because the Consultation Paper 
did not need to be approved by the government, SFST should not bear any 
responsibility in this matter. Chan Kam-lam even criticized the democrats for arguing 
the wrong issue in the meeting. They just need to discuss on the Consultation Paper 
and the proposal but not the POAS. (MingPao, 1 August 2002) 
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6.4 .1 .4 Inquiry Panel and the Report 
The democrats subsequently urged for establishing an independent investigation 
panel to examine the Incident. Tung indirectly denied this demand by authorizing the 
FS to set up a two-member inquiry panel, comprised of Robert Kotewall and Gordon 
C K Kwong, to probe into the fiasco. The panel submitted the Report of the Panel of 
Inquiry on the Penny Stocks Incident (the Report) in mid September. I find it 
necessary here to briefly remark on the conclusions of the Report and its inference on 
political accountability. 
As the Report states clearly, the inquiry should not be taken as a fault finding 
exercise. (Paragraph 31，Executive Summary of the Report) The Report thus mainly 
remained in the technocratic level and devoted most of its part in resolving the 
administrative issues pertaining to the Incident. Oddly, however, two chapters of the 
Report are particularly allotted to the discussion on political accountability. A fair 
assessment would tell that the Report serves to create further muddle instead of 
clarification on the concept of vicarious responsibility. 
In Chapter 6, the Report attempts to outline a clearer picture on the content of 
ministerial responsibility, and in particular, their responsibility over executive 
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departments. The panel members think that one of the main duties of the principal 
officials is to "oversee the delivery of services by the executive departments under his 
purview and to ensure the effective implementation and successful outcome of 
policies." (Paragraph 6.10, the Report) Nonetheless, for the Penny Stocks Incident, 
the case was not that black-and-white. The Report came to a decision that, under the 
three-tiered regulatory structure, neither the HKEx nor the SFC should be regarded as 
“executive departments" under the purview of the SFST in conventional sense. 
(Paragraph 6.12, the Report) However, at the same time, it is difficult to assert that the 
work of both institutions fall outside the policy portfolio of the SFST. As said in the 
Report, the Secretaries of Bureau should be “accountable for matters falling within 
their policy portfolio and in extreme cases, they are responsible for all aspects of their 
portfolios. (Paragraph 6.11(c), the Report). 
The panel members try to resolve this dilemma by creating a tailor-made 
typology of political responsibility under the POAS in Chapter 12. Though they 
acknowledged their lack of sophistication and expertise in this aspect, the members 
suggest four broad categories of responsibilities that would be legitimately expected 
to the FS and SFST, namely policy, executive, systemic and personnel responsibilities. 
(Paragraph 12.16, the Report) Moreover, the FS has at least a political duty to “find 
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out what happened, and, if necessary, to consider questions of blame and 
responsibility. (Paragraph 12.21, the Report) 
Originating from such somehow arbitrary typology, the Report exonerates both 
the FS and the SFST from political responsibility for the whole Incident. Leung was 
clearly misinformed and should not be held responsible for the Incident, as well as for 
his wrong statement that the HKEx did not notify the Bureau of the Consultation 
Paper before its announcement. (Paragraph 12.22, 12.24, the Report) Despite his 
sub-par performance before the LegCo Panel meeting, it was judged that Ma had not 
failed in the discharge of his ministerial responsibilities also. The Report reiterates his 
hectic schedule, the lack of geographical connection with his Bureau staff, and the 
fact that Ma was still acclimatizing to the new working culture and logistics of the 
government as the mitigating factors. (Paragraph 12.27，the Report). 
The inquiry was supposed to be fact-finding exercise and limited to 
administrative issues. It was inappropriate for the Panel to make judgment on these 
constitutional and political questions, which necessitates the input from the 
Government, LegCo and the public as well (Cheung 2003). Moreover, the Report 
argues that the content of “political responsibility" largely depends on “a territory's 
history, politics, constitution, constitutional conventions, political sophistication and 
the system of government" (Paragraph 12.13, the Report). Following from such 
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rationale, the judgment made by the Panel, which was neither a part of the 
government nor local politics, would not be authoritative in any sense. It would be 
self-contradictory for the Panel to make judgment with authority to exculpate the 
ministers involved from potential liabilities. Needless to say, similarly, it was 
improper for the government to regard the remarks as authoritative. 
The typology of political responsibility is equally problematic. At the outset, as 
Cheung points out, such categorization is far from complete. With respect to the 
Penny Stock Incident, it clearly misses out the responsibilities of oversight and the 
vicarious responsibility for departmental faults which are under his purview (Cheung 
2003). The most troubling feature, I submit, that the typology show sufficient regard 
to the actual political situation of Hong Kong when the POAS is implemented. As a 
newly designed system, one of the official aims of introducing the POAS is to 
enhance the overall accountability of public governance. One of the perennial 
problems of public governance in the pre-POAS era was the reluctance for senior 
officials to shoulder political responsibility for department faults within their 
administrative vista. Many crises of public accountability prior to the introduction of 
POAS were also related to the operation of non-government departments and the 
failure to provide effective monitoring on the part of the government. Thus, in 
determining the scope of ministerial responsibility under the new accountability 
163 
system, it would be rather peculiar or even insensible for the panel members to omit 
this crucial aspect. The Report does not spend a word on the issue of vicarious 
liability, and it even neglects the fact that Ma may have to bear a individual 
ministerial responsibility to oversee both the HKEx and the SFC. (Paragraph 12.27, 
the Report) Overall, the Report makes a contentious political judgment which should 
not be made by the Panel, and ignore the issue of vicarious responsibility of which the 
Panel should clarify. 
Although the Report candidly relieved both Ma and Leung of potential political 
responsibilities, the pubic was surely not contented with their evasive attitudes in 
handling the incident and public enquiry. The matter ended with Ma's apologetic bow 
before the mass media, possibly driven by escalating public pressure instead of any 
formal reprimand. 
The Penny Stocks Fiasco highlighted the conceptual difference of accountability 
between the two camps in Hong Kong politics. Such incongruity created the first 
headlong struggle for accountability in the local political setting. A clearer delineation 
between political and administrative responsibility was still found wanting. 
6.4.2 Car Buying Scandal: the Fight on the Severity of 
Persona丨 Misconduct 
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The Car Buying Scandal (or the Lexigate Incident), which erupted right after the 
announcement of the Financial Budget, presented the government with an arduous 
task to tackle. As one local newspaper vividly portrays, the incident posed a ‘‘key 
earlier test" for the merit of the POAS (South China Morning Post, 9 March 2003). It 
forced the government to face squarely a question which has been evaded for long: 
how severe a personal misconduct would necessitate a ministerial resignation? 
6.4.2.1 The Incident 
The incident assaulted the government all of a sudden. Once again, the mass 
media showed its power of being a public ferret. The new Financial Budget, which 
was announced in early March, stipulated a steep rise in the vehicle registration taxes. 
The price of luxury vehicles would inflate significantly if such measure was ratified. 
A few days later, a local mass-market newspaper revealed a piece of shocking news 
that set the scene of the subsequent upheaval. On 9 March 2003, Apple Daily 
reports that the Financial Secretary Antony Leung Kam-chung (by then) had bought a 
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new luxurious car] for $790,000 in late January. The price of the car would rise to 
$840,000 due to the increase in registration tax. 
Though it was commonly believed that such $50,000 advantage would only be 
an innocuous amount to Leung, people questioned why Antony Leung, who was 
himself an experienced and successful banker before joining the government as the 
finance chief, would be so insensitive to the potential conflict of interest as well as 
possible public perception arising from this purchase. Such revelation established the 
prima facie case for tax avoidance purpose in such earlier purchase. Antony Leung 
was suspected to have manipulated insider information about the government 
financial policies, which would be inaccessible to him but for his public duties, for his 
personal benefits. 
On the next day, reporters flocked to Leung's mansion for an explanation from 
the finance chief. He openly admitted that he should avoid such purchase, but tried to 
divert the impending diatribe by emphasizing that the car was needed to cope with the 
need of his newborn daughter. As a proof of good faith, he also donated the doubled 
amount of such discrepancy (i.e. $100,000) to charitable organization. 
Nonetheless, such initial response enraged instead of pacifying the public. 
Leung's popularity rating sagged precipitously, as shown in various public surveys. 
Since the model of the car is Lexus 430’ the whole incident was also dubbed "Lexigate Incident" 
accordingly. 
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On the other hand, we see a clearly discemable cleavage among the Legislative 
Councillors in their reactions towards the whole event. The pro-democracy camp had 
been, as usual, extremely critical towards the whole drama. They urged for an 
immediate investigation on the incident, and some democrats even commented that 
such a purchase was an apparent breach of the Code for Principal Officials. Emily 
Lau, the convener of the Frontier argued that the government should form an 
independent investigation commission. Yeung Sum, the chairman of the Democratic 
Party, filed a letter to the Constitutional Affair Panel to call upon Leung's appearance 
before the LegCo. The seed for political polarization had been sowed at the outset. 
On the next day after Leung made his explanation, Tung openly criticized his 
financial chief, claiming such car purchase as "inappropriate" and "negligent". 
However, he decided not to punish Leung as he thought that sanction was utterly 
unnecessary. Such mild response further incensed the democrats. They admonished 
the government for its lack of commitment to uphold accountability, a promise clearly 
made together with the implementation of the POAS. 
At this moment, the pro-government camp performed the role of staunch 
defender of both Tung and Leung. James Tien Pei-chun, Chairman of the pro-business 
Liberal Party, claimed that the whole incident had nothing related to dishonesty or 
personal integrity. It was just a pure case of negligence. Cheng Yiu-tong, another 
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member of the revamped Executive Council, also supported Leung by the reason that 
he had offered satisfactory explanation on the whole event. He regarded Leung as 
only careless, and carelessness did not deserve resignation (MingPao, 12 March 
2003). 
The pro-government politicians were joined by a host of prominent mainland 
officials and Beijing advisors such as Gao Siren and Tsang Hin-chi. The remark of 
Tsang is particularly telling. "Hong Kong people should not spend too much time on 
such petty issues. Our urgent task is to revitalize our economy" (South China Morning 
Post, 11 March 2003). It somehow showed that the pro-government ally values the 
imperative to bolster the economy over the quest for political accountability. 
The democrats took a step further by calling upon Leung's appearance before the 
Panel of Constitutional Affairs for four matters - 1. chronology of the whole events; 2. 
the reason why he did not report the purchase; 3. whether the matter is related to his 
personal integrity; and 4. if there is any breach of the Code for Principal Officials 
(MingPao, 12 March 2003). Independent councilor Chan Wai-yip, meanwhile, 
launched a signatory campaign urging the resignation of Leung. A police official, who 
was once investigated for similar alleged receipt of private interest, also lodged a 
formal complaint to the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). 
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Pro-democracy coalition and the civil society has somehow manipulated almost all 
the available manoeuvers at their disposal in the quest for public accountability. 
The whole incident took another twist after the Chief Executive publicized an 
open letter in response to the earlier letter of resignation filed by Leung on 15 March 
2003. It was reported that Leung had made the decision to resign on the day right after 
the controversial purchase was revealed. However, Tung refused to sanction the 
resignation. In his open letter, despite admonishing Leung for his “gross negligence" 
and the conspicuous breach of the Code for Principal Officials under the POAS, Tung 
concluded that Leung had no intention to evade tax because of his decision to leave 
the previous high-paying position in bank to join the government. Moreover, Tung 
regarded Leung's earlier offer to resign as an “honourable act" and came to the 
conclusion that Leung's mistakes warranted a formal criticism but not resignation. In 
the letter, Tung particularly emphasized that Leung should devote his best endeavour 
in the economic transformation process, as well as the lobby for support for the 
pending budgetary proposal. At the request of Tung, Leung made a public apology 
but decided to withdraw his request for resignation. 
Again, we witnessed the fact that pro-democracy and pro-government councilors 
actually espoused two distinct visions of accountability. Expectedly, the open letter 
attracted another wave of criticism from the pro-democracy camp. Besides criticizing 
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Tung's formal criticism as being too late, Democratic Party chairman Yeung Sum 
also criticized Tung as too protective. Lee Cheuk-yan from Frontier said it was wrong 
for Tung to praise Leung as honourable, and argued that he should have accepted 
Leung's offer of resignation. Independent councilor Chan Wai-yip argued that 
despites Tung's request to remain office, Leung should have insisted to resign in 
fulfilling his apology and remorse to the public. (South China Morning Post, 16 
March 2003; MingPao, 16 March 2003) Audrey Eu, independent LegCo member and 
a senior counsel, summarized the attack from the pro-democracy camp succinctly: 
"Willingness to assume public office should not be a consideration in this matter. It is 
the severity of the alleged conduct and the integrity of the particular officials that 
matter." (Apple Daily, 16 March 2003) Obviously, the democrats did not regard 
Tung's formal criticism as proportionate sanction for Leung's misconduct. They 
would probably not be satisfied with something less than ministerial resignation. 
On the contrary, again, the pro-government elites thought that the matter should 
rest and the government should move on. They were contented with Leung's 
apologetic attitude as well as his explanation for such suspicious purchase. Yip 
Kwok-him of the DAB even criticized the democrats for urging Leung to step down. 
He argued that there should be some balanced views in society which are not as 
radical as to call for Leung's resignation. (Apple Daily, 16 March 2003) There is a 
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huge difference in the proportionality of sanction in the conception between two 
camps. The existing political institutions and power configuration failed to provide 
any channel to mend the rift. 
6.4.2.2 The Turning Point 
The drama reached its climax when Leung appeared before the Panel of 
Constitutional Affairs for the public enquiry. On the day before his appearance, a 
piece of shocking (if not devastating) news was leaked to the mass media. It was 
reported that, in the Executive Council meeting on 5 March 2003, two ministers, the 
Secretary for Health, Welfare and Food Dr. Yeoh Eng-kiong and the Secretary for 
Constitutional Affairs Stephen Lam Sui-lung, had indeed immediately declared their 
car purchases after Leung announced his plan to increase vehicle tax. However, Mr 
Leung was reported to have remained silent, without declaring his car purchase in 
similar fashion. 
In consequence, the struggle for accountability was moved to another battlefield. 
Such rumour, if true, would establish a prima facie case against Leung for deliberately 
concealing the luxury car purchase. Strong enquiry was put forward before Leung. He 
must now explain such peculiar behaviour was due to carelessness instead of 
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dishonesty. The matter further festered after the government confirmed, probably 
reluctantly, that Dr. Yeoh did make an unequivocal declaration during the meeting. 
Leung's integrity was now placed in serious doubt. The crisis loomed large. The 
sparkles now set out a political furore that could no longer be easily smothered. 
During the first appearance before the LegCo to account for the matter, Leung 
conceded that he failed to declare the purchase on numerous occasions, including the 
meeting in which Dr Yeoh reportedly declared an interest in the new vehicle tax 
policy. However, he remained defiant that it was only a negligent mistake made under 
pressure. He asserted that his love for his wife and new daughter had “made him 
blind" and hence, to make such a serious mistake. (South China Morning Post, 18 
March 2003) 
Besides its impact to the so-called notion of cabinet confidentiality, this startling 
revelation and Leung's subsequent response further magnified the attitudinal and 
political cleavage between the two camps of lawmakers in the LegCo. The new 
fault-line is along the issue of informational accountability. Pro-democracy camp 
unreservedly criticized the “closed-door，，nature of the whole inquiry by the CE, and 
they urged for setting up a formal and independent panel to probe into the matter. 
Emily Lau Wai-hing even claimed that, without a proper investigation of the matter, 
such internal inquiry is disrespect to the rule of law. Moreover, they demanded that 
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the government should reveal the details of the Exco session held on 5 March 2003. 
They even suspected that there may be attempts to hide the scandal. 
Encountering squarely a barrage of questions and demands from the democrats, 
the government refused to both requests. The Secretary for Constitutional affairs 
Stephen Lam Sui-lung replied that the government did not intend to hold further 
investigation because Tung had already made careful scrutiny of the whole matter 
according to the code of conduct under the POAS. Moreover, due to the principle of 
confidentiality, he declined the demand to reveal any record of that ExCo session 
except Leung's part. 
Lam's response was partly supported by the pro-government coalition. Although 
the proposal of disclosing details of the Exco meeting gained considerable support 
from the Liberal Party, the pro-government elites thought that it was unnecessary to 
set up an investigation panel. Chan Kam-Lam from the DAB even criticized the 
democrats for their ulterior purpose to sweep Leung out of office. He said that the 
whole matter should be put to an end. Hui Cheung-ching from the Hong Kong 
Progressive Alliance also argued that we should move on and focus on the new 
Financial Budget. (MingPao, 18 March 2003) Independent councilor Eric Li 
Ka-cheung shared the same philosophy. He said that because of the dire economic 
situation, they should adopt a lenient attitude towards the whole matter. (MingPao, 19 
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March 2003) As expected, the motion to set up the panel was flatly defeated by the 
pro-government majority in the LegCo. In April, another attempt by the democrats to 
set up a Select Committee, by invoking the Legislative Council (Power and 
Prerogative) Ordinance, was also voted down. It shows the drastic difference in 
conception on what should be the appropriate rigour of answerability between the two 
camps. 
6.4.2.3 The Vote of No-confidence 
Margaret Ng Hoi-yee, the councillor from the legal sector, tabled a motion of 
vote of no-confidence against Leung, the third one after the Handover. The motion 
was once again blocked as, under the separate voting mechanism, it failed to secure a 
majority among the groups of functional constituencies and Election Committee, 
which were occupied mostly by pro-government councillors. However, the 3-hour 
debate indeed manifested the irreconcilable division between efficiency and populist 
vision of accountability between the two camps again. 
The democrats now called for Leung's resignation in no ambiguous term. After a 
series of piecemeal revelation of truth, they asserted that the credibility of the 
financial chief was severely derogated. The public no longer confided in Leung's 
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integrity that he will not abuse the information available to him as the FS. The 
incident also damaged the legitimacy of the government, they claimed. Harsh 
comments were put forward before Leung. Lee Cheuk-yan said that "in terms of 
credibility, he (Leung) is a negative asset owner". Cheung Man-kwong argued that 
integrity is something that cannot be compromised. Leung must go in this case. They 
also paid no heed to the government's concern about the difficulty to find a 
replacement. Audrey Eu argued that we should be able to find a replacement. If Leung 
remained in office, it would mark a very bad example that public officials do not need 
to be cautious in handling affairs about their integrity. (Apple Daily, 8 May 2003) 
In parallel with the democrats' attack, pro-government lawmakers used a host of 
reason to defend Leung. The major rationale is the urgency to tackle with SARS. 
They argued that we should concentrate our effort and energy to deal with the 
contagious SARS instead of this incident. The vote of no-confidence would just 
worsen the political instability that was plaguing Hong Kong. Secondly, they stated 
that if such critical attitude was adopted against every public official, incentives 
would further diminished for people to join the cabinet, which is already devoid of 
sufficient political talents. Thirdly, they claimed that the matter is just a matter of 
negligence, and should not be raised to a level of dishonesty. They even took 
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seriously Leung's pledge to learn the lesson and serve the HK community with more 
dedication. 
Eventually, Leung's office was sustained, albeit only for a longer while. Clearly, 
the public discontent failed to be channeled to the political institutions. 
6.4.3 Sloppy Handling of SARS: the Delineation of Political 
and Administrative Responsibility between Principal 
Officials and Civil Servants 
6.4.3.1 The Incident 
Just as the government was floundering amid public pressure in the Car Buying 
Scandal, the more detrimental threat, in both medical and political sense, was yet to 
come. Atypical pneumonia, or commonly dubbed Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS), launched its unstoppable onslaught on the healthcare system and 
social order of Hong Kong in the spring 2003. It was believed that the epidemic first 
appeared in Guangzhou, insidiously treaded into Hong Kong, and eventually 
culminated into a global outbreak. 
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While SARS has caused inconceivable damage worldwide, Hong Kong and 
China have borne most of the brunt. We suffered from the most widespread infection 
and the heaviest mortality. In Hong Kong, it was particularly disheartening to leam 
about the death of several medical staff who got infected when performing their duties. 
The SARS ravaged Hong Kong, infecting 1755 people and creating a death toll of 300. 
The damage to the economy of Hong Kong was particularly enormous, with tourism 
and hotel industry being the leading victims. The revival of our economy was 
effectively brought to a juddering halt. Besides, the international image of Hong Kong 
was severely blemished and we were virtually quarantined by the international 
community. 
Natural disasters often entail political consequences in modem politics. The case 
holds true in Hong Kong. Although it was widely accepted that SARS was a kind of 
new epidemic which was able to frustrate all the available curative and preventive 
measures, this mere fact could not help the government dodge the public dubiety 
about their ability in handling the whole crisis. Compared with decisiveness in 
neigbour Asian countries which were also hit by SARS, the sloppiness and ineptness 
of HKSAR government in containing the outbreak were just made too noticeable. 
Despites the calamity of SARS could partly be ascribed to the inherent 
institutional problems of the public medical service, for example, the over-investment 
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of resource on curative over preventive measures, bulky bureaucratic structures and 
poor coordination among different departments, it was rather difficult for particular 
public officials to evade the ultimate question of political accountability for the whole 
incident. There were many actions or non-action in which the issue of political 
responsibility arose. They will be discussed briefly in the following. 
6.4.3.2 Administrative and Political Blunders 
The glaring blunder of the government was its poor judgment of the whole 
outbreak. At the outset, it seemed that the government only realized the seriousness of 
the SARS outbreak belatedly. And it was being accused for playing down the 
seriousness of the plague, possibly in order to protect the reputation of the Mainland, 
when it showed signs of contagion in both places. 
It was believed that the government had deliberately withheld information about 
SARS from the public. For example, in February, in responding the public worry 
about the unknown disease in Mainland, the Secretary for Health, Welfare and Food 
Yeoh Eng-kiong openly claimed that "there is no need for people to panic". He even 
questioned whether there was "any outbreak at all" in Guangdong (South China 
Morning Post, 12 February 2003). Later report revealed that the HKSAR government 
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should have been informed about the dire situation of SARS in China as early as in 
late January. 
Doctors and nurses started to fall prey to SARS in early March, and the number 
of infection started to climb. The medical professors also discovered signs of 
contagion from hospitals to the community by that time. Yet, Yeoh remained defiant 
before the public that, “as far as we know from all the reports that we have, this is still 
not an outbreak" (South China Morning Post, 18 March 2003). In the evening of the 
same day, however, Dean of Medical School of the Chinese University of Hong Kong 
Professor Sydney Chung Sheung-chee warned the public, in tears, that the disease 
probably spread to the community. Such remark was in a complete contrast to what 
was said by Yeoh. Chung even disclosed before the media that the figures of infection 
announced by the government were only limited to medical workers. The infected 
people of the community were left out from the statistics indeed. Subsequent 
development of the disease proved that Chung's warning was wholly justified. Yeoh 
had underestimated the severity of the crisis. His remark was just completely wrong. 
Two possible reasons may explain why Yeoh, who was himself a renowned 
doctor in the medical profession, would make such an unprofessional judgment. First, 
it may be due to the urge to avoid panic, so the government had to conceal any 
information which may trigger public paranoid. The second reason was that he 
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genuinely made a mistake about the severity of SARS. Either way, both situations 
would point to the issue of political accountability - the former about informational 
accountability to the citizens, the latter about his competence as a political appointee 
whose major duty is to manage public medical services. 
The government was also slow, if not reluctant, to disclose the latest 
development about the epidemic. The mass media thus played an important role 
during the outbreak. The mass media tried their utmost to find out crucial information 
about SARS and kept the public informed of the latest development of SARS, so that 
people could adopt relevant precautionary measures. The government originally 
refused to disclose the information of the buildings where cases of SARS was found. 
Four citizens thus used their spare time after work to establish a website to enlist the 
residential buildings where SARS patients live in and forewarned people who live 
nearby. 
The over-complacency, conservative attitude, together with an over-confidence 
on the medical system, may have accounted for why the government was outpaced by 
the development of the plague. The response of the government was intolerably slow 
as compared to other countries. It took the government weeks to realize the 
emergency of the situation and announce a series of corresponding actions. The 
hospitals were bereft of sufficient protective gears for frontline medical staff. The 
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government only considered the use of quarantine measures on 26 March 2003，a 
month after SARS had already appeared and spread for a month. The quarantine 
measures for the Amoy Garden, a site which accounted for nearly half of the total 
infection as well as death by SARS, only came when nearly half of the residents had 
fled. On the Fools' Day, a teenager in Hong Kong fabricated a rumour that Hong 
Kong was declared an infected port, and it successfully triggered a panic buying. The 
government was only able to dispel the rumour in the evening. The measure of body 
temperature check on departing passengers also came as late in mid-April. 
While the civil society showed its vibrancy in tackling with the seemingly 
insurmountable challenges, the inability for the government to take charge of the 
situation was so utterly exposed. Hong Kong suffered from unbearable costs from the 
outbreak. Even SARS receded in the summer, public grievance and fury lingered. The 
public accused the government for complacency, incompetence as well secrecy, 
which together had worsened the harm of SARS. Political parties and public 
organizations started to urge for the government to bear responsibility for its poor 
performance in crisis management, as well as a string of wrong decisions or 
non-action in this incident of life-and-death. 
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6.4.3.3 Post-SARS quest for accountability before the July 1 
Demonstration 
The post-SARS quest for accountability was again a political struggle between 
the governing coalition and the democrats, fueled by public sentiments. After SARS 
showed the sign of relenting, the government again faced a torrent of public pressure 
for upholding accountability. The pressure mounted on major officials which were 
involved in the overall campaign against SARS, namely Dr Yeoh, Director of Health 
(by then) Dr Margaret Chan Fung Fu-chun, Hospital Authority Chairman Dr Leong 
Che-hung and Chief executive William Ho Shiu-wei. There were even calls for Yeoh 
and Chan to assume the responsibility and resign. 
However, the government remained defensive before the calls for accountability 
from the public. Permeating the government's post-SARS responses and strategies 
was once again the strong tint of obsession with efficiency or stability. Providing 
accounts or sanctioning under-performing officials were never the focus or 
consideration of the government as SARS dissipated. It refused to identify a single 
scapegoat for the unsatisfactory performance, and resolutely shunned off the urge for 
Yeoh or Chan to step down. They regarded preventing the next outbreak as more 
imperative than the pursuit for accountability. Such priority of missions was made 
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particularly obvious when Tung repeatedly emphasized his wish to retain the integrity 
of the team of medical services after the ravage of SARS. 
It was further echoed by Yeoh's dismissal of calls for his resignation. He said 
that under the POAS, his performance was constantly assessed by the CE. "People 
died of Sars. We are all sad and we feel the responsibility. But if the chief executive 
finds me at fault, there are procedures in place whereby he can ask me to resign or 
decide on other punishment. It is the chief executive's decision, not mine" (South 
China Morning Post, 29 May 2003). He also reiterated the importance for him to stay 
in the office, assimilating the lessons learned and contributing his experience in the 
next stage of campaign against SARS. (MingPao, 30 May 2003) 
In order to pacify the pressure for accountability from the disgruntled medical 
sector and the public, the CE decided to appoint a SARS Expert Committee at the end 
of May 2003. The Committee, to be chaired by Yeoh originally, comprised of eleven 
experts from the medical and public health sectors from both Hong Kong and foreign 
countries. The missions of the Committee were to conduct reviews on the work of the 
Government in the management and control of the outbreak, examine the capabilities 
and structures of the healthcare system in Hong Kong, and to identify lessons to be 
leamt, as well as make recommendations to improve the system for any future 
outbreaks. (SARS Expert Committee Summary Report, p.l) In short, it was a 
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professional and institutional review instead of a political enquiry. In Tung's word, 
“the team's aim was not to point fingers. It was more important to leam from 
experience and be better prepared for a similar crisis in future." (South China 
Morning Post, 29 May 2003) 
The democrats and the frontline medical staff were of course enraged by the 
response from the government. They slammed the decision to appoint Yeoh, who was 
himself heavily involved in the decision-making in tackling SARS, to head the 
investigation of the medical system as condoning a brassy case of conflict of interest. 
It was worried that evidence of administrative or political faults on the part of the 
government would be filtered and never be excavated before the public (The doubt 
that “Dr Yeoh is investigating Dr Yeoh"). A few democrats also argued that solely 
appointing medical experts, who may be fixated with the healthcare perspective, may 
not be helpful to the overall fact-finding missions or improvement in public 
administration (MingPao, 29 May 2003). 
Chairman of the Democratic Party Yeung Sum thus tabled a motion to set up 
another investigation committee which was independent from the SARS Expert 
Committee in the House Committee on 30 May 2003. It triggered another 
confrontation along the line of accountability within the legislature. 
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The DAB and the LP, two major parties in the pro-government coalition, did not 
show support for such motion. Chairman of the DAB Tsang Yok-shing thought that it 
was a bad timing to set up another investigation. The legislature should let Yeoh and 
SARS Experts Committee to look into the outbreak first, rather than to hinder their 
work by setting up an unnecessary investigation committee (MingPao, 29 May 2003). 
Moreover, medical workers and policymakers might be disinclined to provide 
information for fear of subsequent reprisals if such committee was established. This 
would hinder the fact-finding mission of the Experts Committee. (South China 
Morning Post, 31 May 2003) Though LP Chairman James Tien Pei-chun agreed that 
Yeoh should not head the review committee, he also believed that LegCo members 
lack expertise knowledge in healthcare, and should not be in the position to probe into 
the matter. If the government had already appointed Yeoh as the Chairman, it was 
better to confine his role as facilitator of investigation. (South China Morning Post，31 
May 2003) 
On the other hand, the democrats showed another example for manipulating the 
public grievance to lobby for support for accountability measures. During the motion 
debate, DP member Fred Li Wah-ming recited a letter which was written collectively 
by a group of residents of Amoy Gardens. It strongly criticized the appointment of 
Yeoh as the chairman of the SARS Experts Committee, and urged for another 
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independent investigation. Basing on such letter, Li went further to argue that the 
LegCo should support the motion in order to “give justice to the victims and those 
who lost their loved ones during the outbreak". (South China Morning Post, 31 May 
2003) Michael Mak Kwok-fung, legislator for the health services constituency, 
followed similar rhetoric. “The pro-government groups should vote by conscience, 
and give justice to the more than 200 people who died of SARS.” (MingPao, 31 May 
2003) Margaret Ng Ngoi-yee also based her argument on the need to uphold justice, 
claiming that such a serious incident deserved an independent, open and thorough 
investigation. (South China Morning Post, 31 May 2003) 
It is particularly interesting to leam the stance of Lo Wing-lok, the legislator for 
the medical sector. Being a periphery figure of the pro-government Breakfast Group, 
he is frequently criticized by medical groups for being too conservative and protective 
towards the government policies. However, Lo assumed an active role in pressuring 
the government for a more rigorous SARS investigation. The motion from Yeung 
Sum indeed came after Lo proposed the establishment of a select committee in the 
House Committee in the capacity of the chairman of the Health Services Panel. It was 
wholly understandable as the medical profession suffered the most painful cost and 
grievance in the SARS outbreak, and it was not unreasonable for the sector to be 
furious about the manner by which the investigation was conducted. With the interest 
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of his constituency being severely deterred, Lo was no longer insulated from his 
electorate and had to respond to this sudden upsurge of sentiment. The extraordinarily 
strong pressure possibly drove Lo to temporarily abandon pro-government mentality 
and adopt a more responsive approach in the politics of SARS investigation. He even 
commented that Yeoh should resign for the grave human and economic loss due to the 
mishandling of SARS in a public occasion. (MingPao, 18 July 2003) 
In order to avoid a defeat of the motion, Yeung Sum eventually proposed a 
concession of the bill in an attempt to accommodate the concern of the DAB. The 
motion now asked the government to set up an independent commission of inquiry 
once the SARS Experts Committee had accomplished the investigation in September, 
failing which the House Committee would again decide whether to do so on their own. 
With DAB concurred and LP together with some independent members abstained, the 
motion was eventually passed. However, the concern for efficiency still triumphed 
over the yearning for accountability. People died. Economy tumbled. Still, no one was 
formally held responsible for the crisis. (For the sake of conceptual coherence, the 
situation after the release of the Investigation Report by the LegCo will be discussed 
in the epilogue after Chapter 8 instead of here.) 
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6.5 Conclusions 
The politics of political accountability is path dependent in a sense that the 
remnant of the Sino-British negotiation still left its imprint on the fight for a leading 
role in shaping the norms of accountability in Hong Kong. This also accords with the 
observation by historical institutionalists that political institution is seldom a 
conscious design but merely a reflection of the particular confluence of political 
interactions at the time of its formation (Thelen 1999). 
The design of POAS does not square with any contemporary notion of 
accountability in democratic theories or political debates. Accountability must be 
buttressed by a regime of free information, institutionalized means to demand 
accounts, as well as the power to impose sanctions, e.g. resignation, impeachment, in 
cases of political misjudgement or personal misconduct. If we study in greater details 
the whole POAS reform, it becomes more apparent that our government is still devoid 
of accountability. 
The POAS does not provide political actors with the least possible guidance in 
dealing with situations in which policy blunders and personal misconducts arise. 
Actors are thus fighting for the power to interpret this politically flexible and 
nebulous concept. The internal struggle for dominance was converted into the 
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contestation on the norms of accountability in the societal level. The politics of 
interpretation triggered even direr political struggles and competitions in shaping the 
norms of accountability. The CE, principal officials and the pro-govemment elites 
espoused a top-down approach of governance, in which conservatism, stability, 
efficiency and security of the power base were the dominant ethos. Opposing to the 
governing coalition we found the marginalized pro-democracy camp, which launched 
a bottom-up drive for openness, transparency, answerability and political 
responsibility to the public. 
The difference in expectation on what the POAS should deliver was so wide that 
it was unrealistic to crave for mediating initiatives. These two inherently conflicting 
principles culminated into two distinct forces in the fight for interpreting the proper 
norms of accountability. The confrontation was further reinforced by the structural 
partition of Hong Kong politics into elitism-based and mass-oriented ones. The 
division of mass and elitist politics in Hong Kong renders reconciliation difficult, if 
not impossible. 
The norms of accountability are normally and largely formed by political 
judgment. As shown above, the norm-formulating process under the POAS was 
ridded with rivalry between two camps of lawmakers. The imperative to protect the 
new cabinet on one hand, together with the need to canvass political, and also 
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electoral, support by appealing to public sentiment on the other, have greatly 
contributed to the diminishing room for constructive deliberation in formulating the 
norms. In modem politics, political stability is a matter of neat balance between 
confrontation and cooperation. When it comes to the politics of political 
accountability in Hong Kong, confrontation dominates and room for cooperation 
shrivels though. At the end of the day, political interactions did not lead to any 
consensus on norms of accountability, let alone long-coveted concrete constitutional 
conventions of public accountability. As stated in previous chapters, the operation of 
political accountability entails the delicate balance between the government's capacity 
to act and public participation. However, the three cases studied in this chapter reveal 
that administrative expediency always triumphed over the urge for accountability 
from the democrats in the politics of accountability. Such balance is far from attained. 
The wrong path has been chosen at the outset. The existing arrangement must 
therefore produce endless follies and conflicts. The combination of historical legacy 
(endogenous) and the ensuing strategies of the actors (exogenous) thus generating 
interminable contestation over the norms of accountability after the introduction of 
the POAS. A series of blunders and scandals also triggered the outburst of 
anti-government sentiments and gradually undermined the merit of the POAS reform. 
These events spawned the accumulation of widespread discontent as well as hostility 
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towards the government. It is indeed reasonable to conclude that the struggle on 
"political accountability" contributed significantly to the unprecedented July 1 
demonstration, in which 500,000 citizens came out to express by their feet their anger 
towards the government. 
Thus, if we examine clearly the political setting of Hong Kong, it would be 
sensible to predict that the POAS reform is doomed to failure. It is plagued by the 
lack of institutional guidance and the public approval, while embedding in the 
existing historical configuration and political-social context must send the 
development of the POAS into a wrong track. The debacle of the POAS indeed can be 
perceived as a miniature of the predicament of the Hong Kong politics as a whole. 
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Chapter 7 Reconstruction of conception: Interviews 
with Political Elites 
After analyzing the structural deficit of the POAS and the path-dependent nature 
of the politics of political accountability in Hong Kong, we turn to the last part of the 
trilogy. Chapter 7 intends to reconstruct the conception of political accountability held 
by the elites who are mostly involved in the POAS reform and present their potential 
relevance to the institutional design of the POAS as well as the ensuing political 
dynamics. 
7.1 The importance of political conception 
The actions of political actors are often guided by their understanding and values 
about the political world. In any event, unless all alternatives are filtered out by 
structural constraints, a political actor would have to pursue a particular course of 
action among the available choices according to his consciousness, internalized norms 
or rational calculation. He must ground the decisions on his aspired beliefs, values as 
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well as ideologies. These mental elements, which are roughly summarized as 
"political conception"*, are crucial and should not be taken lightly. 
The following quotation from Robert Dahl is particularly telling: “Political 
activists and leaders are more likely than most other people to have moderately 
elaborate systems of political beliefs, to be guided in their actions by their political 
beliefs, and to have more influence on political events, including events that affect the 
stability and transformation of the regimes." (Dahl 1989, 261) Beliefs and orientations 
often play a paramount role in transformations initiated and sustained by political 
elites. 
Once acquired, political cognition and conceptions are hardly to be changed. 
Since political arena is a murky environment that is characterized by high complexity 
and opacity (Moe 1990b), once a political orientation is briefly entrenched, actors are 
heavily biased in the filtering of information during the maturing process of such 
orientation (Arthur 1994). Therefore, actors tend to reinforce their particular political 
ideas and filter out information which may provide ground for refutation. In this light, 
Pierson (2000) forcefully argues that political conception is subject to “increasing 
return" — “basic outlooks on politics, ranging from ideologies to understandings of 
* It is imprudent if not impossible to provide an accurate and widely-accepted definition for the term 
"conception". Dictionary meaning - the sum of a person's ideas and beliefs concerning something 
(Merriam-Webster) - does not offer much recourse to us. Therefore, I adopt the listing offered by Dahl 
(1989) — "beliefs, ideas, ideologies, or culture" - as a loose definition of "conception". 
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particular aspects of governments or orientations toward political groups or parties, 
are generally tenacious" (260). An earlier empirical study even shows that this 
phenomenon is both applicable at individual and group level (Wuthnow 1989). If 
these propositions stand, studying the conception held by political actors can provide 
us with a reasonably reliable guide to study and speculate dynamics and interactions 
in political arena. This observation is particularly important to a political system that 
is in its fledgling stage. 
The initial framework of political order of post-colonial Hong Kong was 
determined by the interaction between Chinese and British governments. The general 
public of Hong Kong had no say in it (Kuan 1991). Mass participation is continuously 
shunned by the constitutional constraints imposed by the Basic Law. Election, which 
is the most direct means to channel public preferences to the government in Hong 
Kong, is also insignificant because of its inability to influence government formation 
and policy direction (Kuan 1999). As mentioned before, the evolution of political 
system in Hong Kong is largely a product of intra-elite dynamics. According to 
Anthony Cheung, the POAS reform is of no exception. It is largely motivated by the 
demands for change raised by elites who were discontented with the bureaucratic 
dominance. Popular demand or pressures from the legislature play just minimal part 
in this reform (Cheung 2002). 
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As argued in the preceding chapter, the whole POAS is still in its formative stage, 
while the norms of political accountability are far from clear and well defined. The 
whole system is susceptible to further modification and moulding. With the absence 
of vertical accountability mechanism, the public can only resort to weak horizontal 
mechanism as well as virtually ineffectual social sanctions to exercise their influence 
on the government. The continuous development of the system will still be largely 
driven by the elites being co-opted in the system. Since the elites are in the position to 
shape Hong Kong's political system, or in Dahl's parlance, are “mostly involved in 
politics."(Dahl 1971, 127), to understand their beliefs and conceptions would be 
extremely essential in the study of Hong Kong politics. 
Moreover, political-actor-oriented study is also an under-explored area in Hong 
Kong. It is equally true in the academic discourse on accountability in Hong Kong. 
The post-handover literature on political accountability in Hong Kong comes from 
two streams. One type falls into the category of public administration, which is 
mainly blunders-driven and aims at providing practical advices to improve the 
situation (See Lee 2000, Lo 2001, Cheung 2002). Another branch is a normative 
discussion on the design and implementation of the political accountability system. 
No empirical study has ever been conducted to study how the political elites who 
were involved in the POAS reform think and influence the whole process. 
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Reforms need to be initiated and put forward by agencies. By studying 
meticulously the conception attributes of these elites, one should be able to find 
additional clues why the POAS is so framed and designed. Thus, it is the researcher's 
belief that such perspective can provide complementary materials for the academic 
discourse on the politics of accountability in Hong Kong, and can enrich the political 
studies in Hong Kong. 
7.2 Methodological Issues of Elite Interview as a Research 
Method 
This Chapter thus serves as an ambiguous attempt to study to elicit the political 
conception of the people who are mostly involved in the POAS reform. The major 
research method adopted is elite interview. This study adopts the method of elite 
interview. Before delving into the discussion of the content of the interview, however, 
certain discussion must be first imparted to the issues arising from elite interview as a 
research method and potential criticism against this particular branch of research 
methodology. 
Elite interview differs from normal interviews in a sense that it requires a 
number of additional considerations and techniques. It is not an exaggeration to 
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regard interviewing political elites as "both an art and a craft" (Peabody et al 1990, 
451). 
Goldstein identifies three basic goals for conducting elite interviews in political 
studies. First, it can gather information from a sample of officials or political figures 
so that researchers can make generalizable claims about the characteristics or 
decisions of those people. Second, it may discover，for future enquiry, particular 
pieces of information, by deliberate questioning as well as by surprises or enable the 
researcher to get hold of particular important documents which are not accessible to 
others before. Last, it may guide or supplement other works that use alternative 
sources of information and data. (Goldstein, 2002) 
Elite interview particularly suits the purpose of studying the attitude, values and 
beliefs of a group of renowned figures in the society. Interviewing elite enables the 
researchers to formulate the contextual understanding on the targets' mindsets and 
reasoning behind their actions. By carefully studying, and deconstructing if necessary, 
the answers and dialogue, investigators can “gauge subtle aspects of elites views of 
the world" (Aberbach and Rockman 2002, 673) and figure out "the parameters that 
guide[d] their definition of problems and their response to them." (Aberbach and 
Rockman 2002, 674). In this specific type of study, researcher should examine 
carefully the contextual nuance of difference responses, and then dig deeper to sketch 
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the underpinning thinking paradigm and logic of reasoning. (Aberbach and Rockman 
2002). 
The merit of elite interviews lies in the ability to elicit the rich context from the 
interviewees' elaboration and argumentation on particular topics. Conventional 
beliefs suggest researcher to ask more open-end questions instead of closed ones in 
conducting the elite interviews. First, closed-end questions restrict the room for 
targets to elaborate their own ideas, while open-end ones enable the interviewees to 
speak more freely and provide more insight before the researchers decide to ask those 
more closed-end ones. Second, it can help enhance the validity of the answers. Instead 
of imposing the conceptualization of the researcher, open-end questions provide the 
chances for elites to organize and articulate their answers within their theoretical 
framework, so that interviewer bias can be reduced. Finally, elites normally prefer to 
articulate their views, sometimes with fervour, and present their thoughts clearly 
before the interviewers. Open-ended questions allow them to do so. (Aberbach and 
Rockman 2002) 
Moreover, as Dexter long reminds, political elites who are well-informed and 
influential in politics are seldom too willing to accept the assumptions by which the 
interviewers start with. They are probably keen in explaining to the researchers how 
they analyze the situation, and pointing out the real problems that are related to the 
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topic of study (Dexter 1970). To be more realistic, “the interviewers confronted with 
genuinely prominent people or the prestigious well-informed is unlikely to feel that he 
can insist on their hewing to a standardized line of discussion." (Dexter 1970, 6) 
On the other hand, nonetheless, researchers must be extremely cautious about the 
issue of validity and reliability when they obtain the raw materials from the interviews. 
Though qualitative interviews can transcend the obsession of statistical accuracy 
demonstrated by some discipline such as psychology, as Berry remarks, if the 
interviewers do not pay immense attention to this methodological issue, the "error 
term" in elite interviews can easily cross an unacceptable threshold" (Berry 2002, 
679). This issue is particularly noteworthy in elite interviews, as political elites 
normally have a stronger disposition to be loquacious, straying from the designated 
research focus, and ducking those harsh or difficult questions. Moreover, their 
eloquence may also affect the researchers' understanding of the matter, as we would, 
by instinct, give more weight to a more persuasive discourse on the subject matter. 
These dilemmas are summarized by Berry as “the paradox of elite interviewing"— 
“the valuable flexibility of open-ended questioning exacerbates the validity and 
reliability issues that are part and parcel of this approach. “ (2002, 679) 
The format of qualitative interviews can be briefly categorized into three types: 
fully structured, which is similar to survey method, semi-structured and unstructured, 
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or journalistic (Peabody et al 1990). The distinction between the first two was 
explained ably by the following quotation from Huitt and Peabody, “a structured 
interview is characterized by a carefully designed interview schedule, a set of 
questions that are always asked in a particular order, and often, a high proportion of 
questions that have a fixed or closed response", while “a semi-structured interview 
allows more opportunity for probing and gives the respondent considerable freedom 
to expand on a given question" (1969, 28-29) 
There are pros and cons for choosing among structured and semi-structured 
formats of interview, putting the researchers in dilemma. Structured interview benefits 
from the fixed ordering of questions and thus can ensure a great reliability in the 
research tools, i.e. the standardized questions. However, it diminishes the room for 
elaboration and flexibility to handle the interviews. Sometimes, it may not be possible 
or desirable for the researcher to ask every question in the same sequence. Elites are 
normally busy, and they value their time highly. Short interviewing period may not 
permit the interviewer to handle each interview with the same manner. Moreover, 
sometimes the elites will jump from topic to topic during the interview, and it would 
be more appropriate for the researcher to jump the ordering a bit and ask questions 
which would be more relevant at that moment. While unstructured approach may 
result in a lack of coherence and focus in the interview, semi-structured interview is 
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often believed to be the most desirable format in holding elite interviews. As Beth 
remarks, “if one can provide detail, depth, and an insider's perspective, while at the 
same time allowing hypothesis testing and the quantitative analysis of interview 
response, semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions may fit this course.” 
(Leech 2002, 665) 
Selective sampling and low response rate often pose another great problem to 
studies which involve elite interviews. Since it is difficult for ordinary researchers to 
get reach of prominent political figures, let alone conduct comprehensive interview, 
the response rate is normally very low. Therefore, selecting the appropriate sampling 
frame will be very essential, as generalized claims about a certain group can remain 
robust with a low response rate if only there will not be significant divergence 
between attitudes of respondents and non-respondents (Goldstein 2002). 
The attitude in conducting elite interviews should be fundamentally different 
from that of normal ones. For normal interviews, the researchers would define the 
questions, and then look for answers which would be within the confines framed by 
his presupposition. More flexibility is permitted for qualitative type of interviews, 
though researchers may somehow need to be guided by the logic behind the research. 
For elite interviews, though researchers still need to ground his observation in the 
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pre-condition theoretical framework, we also yearn to let the interviewees teach us 
about the issue in question (Dexter 1970) 
Elite interview is more difficult to be handled in a sense that you have to extract 
as much information as you can during the limited time. Of course, it is imperative to 
conduct extensive research on the background information of the interviewees before 
the interview. Moreover, similar to other interviews, the rule of thumb for elite 
interview is to gain the rapport first. Beth provides certain reminders and tips. The key 
point is to put the interviewees at ease. The researcher should look professional and 
sophisticated, but ‘‘less knowledgeable than the respondent on the particular topic of 
the interview (Leech 2002, 665). One should try to avoid threatening descriptions or 
unpleasant remarks at the outset, and can reiterate the confidentiality of the material 
and as well as protection of anonymity if necessary to forge the sense of security. As a 
conventional skill, one can address questions about personal background or daily life 
(Leech 2002). It is also helpful to observe the setting of the office, and search for 
some mementoes which may serve as a good starting point for the interview. 
Researcher should set the list of questions clearly and be versed in the logic and 
ordering of them. He must be prepared to change the ordering of the questions 
according to actual situation, but manage to get back to the temporarily skipped 
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enquiry. He must also allow the targets to fool around in his answers, but occasionally 
corral them back to prevent the discussion from going astray. (Berry 2002). 
Normal precautions in setting questions should be strictly bore in mind, such as 
avoiding double-barreled, loaded, and presuming questions (Newman 2000，Babbie 
2004). Researcher must be particularly precarious in asking leading questions, as it 
will risk losing the rapport or even drive the interviewees to the direction of 
researchers' presupposition (Newman 2000). It is also important to run pilot 
interviews, estimate the time for administering the interviews, and tinker the wordings 
so as to suit the particulars of the study. (Peabody et al 1990) 
Prompts form an integral part in qualitative interview. They are no less important 
in interviewing political elites. After formulating the semi-structured question set, 
researcher should anticipate at which point the need of follow-up questions would 
emerge, and write down the planned prompts in the interview protocol (Leech 2002). 
Sometimes, interviewers need to make improvised effort in prompting the targets to 
speak more or clarify something, for example, by making some short noise, simple 
indication, or just remaining silent. 
Whether to record the interview is another issue that needs to be addressed. 
Researchers are often confronted with the dilemma of whether to use recorder. One 
can obtain a complete transcript by recording the interviews, and it is particularly 
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important if the researcher wants to use some exact quotations of his arguments. Also, 
it enables the researcher to fully concentrate on the conversation without being 
distracted by the additional task of note-jotting. However, the presence of a recorder 
can be rather obtrusive, and it may not be helpful in building up the rapport. Moreover, 
interviewees may be reluctant to speak freely and frankly if they know that all their 
words would be on record. In this way, answers provided by them may be guarded or 
mediated, the interview itself may lose its spontaneity. (Peabody et al 1990) At the 
end of the day, it is up to the researchers to choose. 
After obtaining the information from interviews, researcher must deal with the 
issue of validity carefully. If the transcripts of interview are used for quantitative 
studies, the materials must be coded with careful attention to the issue of validity. 
Given the rich context of the materials, one can approach the materials by both 
manifest and latent codings (Newman 2000). For qualitative studies, researcher 
should check multiple sources to attain a higher degree of validity. The material 
should be analyzed with reference to the original conceptualization, while, instead of 
in a mere jumble of quotes, the outcome should be presented in a systematic way so 
that it can refine the framework of existing paradigm. (Kuhn 1962) 
7.3 The Interviews 
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In this study, all the issues, problems and potential limitations mentioned above 
are taken to heart. The materials for this chapter come from a set of in-depth 
interviews with various principal officials, non-official members and one senior civil 
servant who are mostly involved in the POAS reform. The sampling frame is selected 
according to the roles they played during the reform as well as their potential power to 
influence the subsequent evolution of the system. Therefore, I have tried to invite all 
public officials, non-official ExCo members as well as relevant civil servants who 
may shape the final appearance of the system according to their conception. 
Since these renowned political actors are widely sought in the community, the 
turnout rate is not satisfactory as expected. As a matter of practicality, it is also 
impossible for the researcher to interview all the principal officials or ExCo members 
who may have contributed significantly to the POAS reform. Fortunately, 
nevertheless, the researcher managed to secure the chance for interviews with the 
following political actors in Hong Kong, though attempts for further snowball 
sampling were proved failure. It is believed that high degree of representativeness of 
the targets has been attained. 
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The Sampling Frame: 
Date Interviewee Titles 
former ExCo member before the 
21 January 2004 Tam Yiu-chung introduction of the POAS, 
Democratic Alliance for the 
Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB) 
3 March 2004 Chow Leung Non-official ExCo member, Liberal 
Suk-yee Party (LP) 
Administrative Assistant to Secretary 
12 March 2004 Doris Ho Pui-ling for Constitutional Affairs (Responsible 
for the POAS reform) 
Stephen Lam Secretary for the Constitutional 
12 March 2004 ^ 
Shui-lun Affairs 
Professor T j^u 
23 March 2004 Head of the Central Policy Unit 
Siu-Kai 
25 March 2004 Tsang Yok-shing Non-official ExCo member (DAB) 
Non-official ExCo member, 
26 March 2004 Cheng Yiu-tong . ^ 
Federation of Trade Unions (FTU) 
Michael Suen Secretary for Housing, Planning and 
Lands (by-then Secretary for 
16 April 2004 Ming-yeung 
Constitutional Affairs when the POAS 
reform was initiated) 
19 May 2004 Anonymity assumed an Exco Members 
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Materials from the interviews form the basis of the analysis in this Chapter. They 
are conducted during the period of January to May 2004. These interviews last for an 
hour on average. All interviews were recorded and transcribed. And all the 
respondents have permitted the disclosure of their identity except one. After 
transcribing the interviews, the research also tried to identify internal contradictions 
within the answers. Answers from different political actors on the same issue will be 
compared to ensure consistency and consonance. 
Similar set of semi-structured questions are addressed to each respondent, though 
the nature of in-depth interview mandates the researcher to modify the ordering and 
particular phrasing of questions in different circumstances. Since the phrasing is not 
drastically different, the validity of these questions as the tool to elicit the views from 
these elites should only be minimally affected. 
Triangulation will be duly carried out, so that the first-hand interview materials 
can be verified and checked with the information gained with other sources. Whether 
the materials from the interviews reflect their true views and conception will be 
checked by documentary analysis on other speeches or interview reports of the same 
interviewees. This is to ensure the validity and ontological clarity of their articulation. 
Of course, political actors are often expected to be evasive and diplomatic in their 
answers, especially the ministers in offices at present. They may deliberately conceal 
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their real opinion on any issues and seriously affect the validity of the findings. This, 
in my view, is a limitation that cannot be completely overcome by any researcher. 
A train of enquiry will be made after every interview, while all ideas, opinions or 
concepts raised in the conversation will be thoroughly studied and challenged. The 
ultimate aim of this relatively subjective perspective is to filter the truly important 
issues from extraneous ones, and interpret the data correctly. The propriety of the 
researchers' interpretation on the interview materials is also tested rigorously by the 
prevailing guidelines for qualitative research (see Mason, 2002). 
7.4 POAS and the Conception of Political Accountability 
The material extracted from these elites will be assessed according to the standard laid 
down in Chapter 2 and 3. From a normative perspective, any conception of true 
political accountability would consist the illustration of a balance between 
administrative expediency and answerability to the public. None of them should be 
privileged over the other. From a organizational perspective, the elites must be able to 
devise some form of principal-agent relationship with the general public that is 
conducive to provide account for political decisions and subject themselves to 
potential sanctions in order to claim to have a genuine vision of political 
accountability. 
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7.4.1 Defining Political Responsibility 
The definition of political responsibility forms the underpinning of the operation 
of accountability system. It constitutes the scope and objects of accountability, 
determines what would the principal officials be accountable for, and would 
preponderantly influence the final organizational outlook of the POAS. It is therefore 
sensible to use this as the first focal point for elicitation. 
A clear definition of political responsibility is determining to the successful 
operation of political accountability. Accountability ensures the answerability of 
public officials for their actions and behaviour (Jabbra and Dwivedi 1988). For actors 
who assume the political roles of the government, political responsibility provides the 
scope of duties of which they are answerable for (Uhr 1993) and to whom they should 
provide account to (Caiden 1988). Employing the idea of principal-agent model, 
political leader, in the capacity of agent, is empowered to carry out the political 
responsibility by the power entrusted by the principal. However, he has to accept 
accountability (answerability and entailing sanction) when things go wrong or policy 
initiatives is widely challenged or suspected (Uhr 1993). 
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The political elites in the POAS indeed espouse a rather clear and coherent 
vision of political responsibility. In sum, two elements have been especially 
emphasized by them. 
The first element is the need to face sanction in case of policy failure. The best 
illustration has been given by Tsang Yok-shing. “Bearing political responsibility 
means that one needs to bear the final responsibility for the policy until it is 
successfully implemented. If this policy is proved to be undesirable or extremely 
faulty, that public official should bear the political responsibility. That means he 
should resign in extreme and serious situation." (Interview, March 2004) 
The second element is the need for the principal officials to maintain confidence 
of the public. This point is unequivocally articulated by Lau Siu-kai. In his conception, 
political responsibility in normal situation means that “In case an action or decision 
made by a public official led to a drastic loss of public confidence on him, even the 
action is not that series at all, he should consider whether to continue his office if the 
others do think so." (Interview, March 2004) Similar visions are indeed expressed by 
other interviewee. It is reasonable to conclude that, these two points are commonly 
shared among the political elites situated in the POAS. A fairly regular understanding 
of political responsibility has been reached. 
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However, these elites do not underestimate the difficulty in framing a clear 
definition of political responsibility. This leads Tsang to add a qualification to his 
definition. "However, politics does not like some precise quantitative science in a 
sense that no one can lay a ruler or standard. I believe people have a clear idea of 
political responsibility, but we cannot use a ruler to measure the severity of an 
incident and tell when reprimand or resignation is deserved" (Interview, March 2004). 
Lau further adds that, due to the inherent and inevitable ambiguity surrounding the 
concept of political responsibility, the ambit of responsibility can only be better 
defined in extreme cases or situations. Therefore, unless such cases arise, political 
responsibility is bound to be a "contested concept" (Interview, March 2004). 
The informational aspects of accountability are also covered by Stephen Lam 
Shui-lun and Michael Suen Ming-yuen. Lam particularly advocates for a version of 
political responsibility which gravitates towards the deliberative or informational 
aspect. “Shouldering responsibility does not necessarily mean apology or resignation. 
For example, appearing the Question Time session in the LegCo, participating in 
motion debates and submitting the bills are also part of the responsibilities borne by 
us People tend to link the accountability system to the issue of who should make 
apology by bowing or shouldering the blame. To me, this is only a small part of it." 
(Interview, March 2004) 
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7.4.2 Accountability Mechanisms 
However, when it comes to the means to actualize their lofty vision of political 
responsibility, the articulation provided by these elites are no longer that consistent. 
These elites show a discemable preference towards internal form of 
accountability over external one. Selina Chow Leung Shuk-yee, a legislative 
councilor elected from the wholesale functional constituency, quite rightly points out 
that "accountability can be institutional as well as attitudinal. Accountability can exist 
without the support of relevant institution." (Interview, February 2002). This 
attitudinal aspect of accountability, or the willingness of assume political 
responsibility for personal misconduct or blunder under their policy portfolio, was 
nearly affirmed by all the principal officials at the advent of the POAS. (MingPao 2-7 
July 2002) 
For accountability to sustain representation and responsiveness, appropriate 
sanction and awards must be provided. The operation of internal accountability is 
completely at odds with traditional mode of accountability because it does not entail 
any external force to provide both sanction and incentive. Agents are held accountable 
even in “an unsupervised context" by the drive of internalized norms and ethics 
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instead of monitoring, and by one's own sense of professional guilt or malfeasance 
instead of potential threat of sanction (Romzek and Dubnick 1987). 
However, the shortcoming of this approach lies in the lack of institutional 
guarantee. The attainment of accountability solely hinges on the goodwill of the 
political leaders. To foster voluntary subjection to accountability, a clear set of norms 
of accountability must be inculcated into and habitualized by the political actors. If 
the political leaders fail to do so, the public has indeed no institutional means to seek 
meaningful account and impose sanction as showed in Chapter 5. 
Yet, some interviewees believe that indeed the concept of political responsibility 
and accountability is not so well entrenched among the public officials. Bureaucrats 
may not have the necessary consciousness to uphold internal accountability. Tsang 
Yok-shing ascribes this phenomenon to the bureaucratic background of most of the 
public officials. "More than half of the principal officials come from the bureaucracy. 
Tell the former bureaucrats to accept political accountability is somehow difficult. 
Originally, civil servants are politically neutral, including the senior officials who 
formulate important policies. They never have the concept of political accountability." 
(Interview, March 2004). Under such conditions, it may be too optimistic to rely 
solely on the public officials' voluntary subjection to norms of accountability. 
Institutional arrangement still matters. 
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One obvious defect of the POAS is the unwillingness to institute a strong 
accountability relationship between the government and the citizens. This may find 
the root in two important features raised in the articulation of Stephen Lam and Doris 
Ho. First, they argue that only the Chief Executive has the authority to impose 
sanctions on the public officials. The cornerstone of such proposition is found in the 
Basic Law. "Appointment and removal of principal officials are proposed by the 
Chief Executive and determined by the Central Government. The power of the 
executive, legislature and judiciary is authorized by the Central Government. We 
should never deviate from the Basic Law.” (Stephen Lam, Interview March 2004) 
Second, they assert the importance of other institutional and non-institutional 
guarantees in Hong Kong constitutional system except full democracy. Doris Ho has 
made no pretension that the government has no intention to wait for full democracy 
before introducing the POAS (Interview March 2004). Stephen Lam reiterated the 
other software in achieving accountability. “Hong Kong enjoys the rule of law, 
freedom of the press and transparency of electoral and political systems. Checks and 
balances among different branches in Hong Kong are never inferior to those of other 
recognized democratic countries. They are quite effective and the government has 
indeed become more alert." (Interview, March 2004). This has somehow accorded 
with the reply from Donald Tsang Yam-kuen. In an occasion before the 
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implementation of the POAS, he emphasized the importance of the watchful mass 
media in ensuring accountability. “I admitted that citizens have no right to remove 
any ministers by electoral vote. However, they can have unreserved rights to phone to 
radio programs and speak whatever they think (about the ministers)". (Apple Daily, 
26 April 2002) 
Being the major staff of the Bureau of Constitutional Affairs, it is reasonable to 
claim that their conceptions are indicative to the consensus on accountability 
mechanism shared by the ruling cabinet. Their lack of commitment to democratic 
institutions may explain why the reformers demonstrate such apathy in entrenching 
electoral scheme or horizontal accountability mechanism to uphold public 
accountability. The combination of these two above-mentioned features would 
indubitably be an attenuated form of accountability framework. 
Indeed, no one would have expressed the deficiency of accountability as boldly 
as Lau Siu Kai. He frankly points out that there is never a constitutional，legal or 
conventional obligation for the government to be accountable to the public. "No 
matter what kinds of wrong, the constitution (the Basic Law) empowers neither the 
LegCo nor the citizens to seek accountability (from the Government). The LegCo and 
citizens cannot demand them (principal officials) to accept political responsibility and 
resign." The POAS eventually has to match with the special political environment 
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and constitutional arrangement of Hong Kong." Responsiveness to the public demand 
for resignation is at best, according to Lau, a moral obligation (Interview, March 
2004). Therefore, the duty to render account is thus applicable to the moral level only, 
and is again dependent on the voluntary subjection of political actors. 
Lau also laid a trenchant criticism on the reckless use of the vote of 
no-confidence. "The Central Government is discontent with the proposal of vote of 
no-confidence in the LegCo. They think that LegCo always want to set up a political 
precedent which stipulates that if the LegCo does not like a particular official, it can 
demand his resignation. By the establishment of this precedent, the LegCo will usurp 
the power of the Central Government. It forms an informal path to demand 
resignation ...if you refuse, the government will face a crisis." (Interview, March 
2004) 
Further, the political elites being interviewed went further to disapprove the use 
of social sanctions as the means to secure accountability. The illustration of Lau is 
particularly telling. "Many people in the opposition camp or even the mass media 
always keep the phrase “go down the stage" in their lips. If they continue such actions, 
I am afraid no one is willing to join the government (to pursue a political career). The 
lack of politically talented people will just further paralyze the government and deter 
those people who are interested in a political career." (Interview, March 2004). Cheng 
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also states that we should not be too demanding. He even questioned the “propriety of 
trial by public opinion or society". (Interview, March 2004) 
To sum up, a huge mismatch was found between the vision articulated by these 
elites and the actual accountability mechanisms proposed to materialize the vision. 
These interviewees are generally conservative towards the use of external apparatus to 
seek account from the government, while social sanctions and vote of no-confidence 
are also explicitly disapproved. This may explain why the formal organizational 
structure of POAS is so deficient in bringing out true accountability, as these elites 
show such a lack of commitment towards external means of control. 
7.4.3 Conflicts of Representation 
The researcher also decided to study the issue of representation here. As 
illustrated in Chapter 2, in the discourse of accountability, we concern the question 
how the representatives should act in the best interest of the principals in the capacity 
of agents. The conception of representation held by these political elites is thus 
extremely reflective in indicating what kind of accountability relationship they intend 
to install with the society. 
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The conflict of representation is an even more pressing issue in this study 
because the POAS has created a jumble of political actors who come from different 
sectors, functional groups and political parties. The intriguing question is whether 
they would give advices about public policies with reference to sectoral interest or the 
public interest. It is thus believed that the analysis and comparison of their response 
on the issue of representation is extremely worthwhile. The inquiry turns out to be 
very edifying also. 
The focus of this part is mainly on the three non-official members of the ExCo, 
Cheng Yiu-tong, Tsang Yok-shing and Selina Chow Leung Shuk-yee. All of them 
think that Tung Chee-hwa invited them to join the ExCo because of their particular 
backgrounds and bases of support. In declaring his reluctance to join the ExCo, Cheng 
has indeed laid some hints on the fact that sectoral interest is the main criteria for 
invitation. “Tung (the CE) said that if I did not promise (to join the ExCo), he will no 
longer to find people in the labour sector and would not find Tarn Yiu-chung (the 
former ExCo member who shares labour background) either ... if I do not accept the 
invitation, there will be no representative in the ExCo from the labour groups. If it is 
really the outcome, don't I become the ultimate sinister (千古罪人)？,，(Interview, 
March 2004) 
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It can be seen that the composition of the non-official members are intended to 
strive for a balance among the societal sectors. They were appointed mainly because 
of their sectoral background. The ExCo is thus a combination of representatives from 
major sectors instead of politicians that can gain cross-sectional appeal. The dominant 
role of sectoral backgrounds in making the invitations may explain why these 
non-official members expressed drastically divergent views on their roles in the ExCo 
as well as the group interests they vow to represent. 
The answer from Cheng Yiu-tong is particularly suggestive here. Being the 
Chairman of the FTU, a major pro-government labour organization in Hong Kong, he 
made no reservation that he will fight for labour interest in the ExCo. “Be frank, there 
is only one member who come from labour group in the ExCo. Naturally, I will stand 
on the ground of labour groups. Secondly, ...I told Mr. Tung that I do not believe in 
the idea of “ruling coalition" and its existence. Frankly speaking, when I joined the 
ExCo, the first reduction of civil servants' salary was passed. From the point of view 
of labour organization, I must oppose the reduction." (Interview, March 2004) 
Cheng's later answer also reveals the feebleness of the idea of collective 
responsibility. In recalling the proposal to reduce the price of the "Green Taxi", he 
said "putting myself in the shoes of those taxi-drivers, I must oppose such proposal. 
Therefore, when such proposal was discussed in the ExCo I urged Dr Sarah Liao not 
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to push it forward... one principal official asked whether the taxi drivers of FTU 
would launch a strike. My answer is that I won't initiate a strike. However, if there is 
one, I would surely participate." (Interview, March 2004). Protection of the labour 
interest is Cheng's guiding principle in giving advice and decides on public policy in 
the POAS. 
Selina Chow provides a relatively modest account on representation. In contrast 
to Cheng, she repeatedly reiterated the importance of "collective interest" over 
sectoral interest in giving policy advices to the government. However, she also 
conceded that because of her affiliation with the Liberal Party, a pro-business and 
conservative political party in Hong Kong, she will somehow base her judgement on 
the viewpoint of the LP. “I am I. I cannot say something that is not spoken by 
members from LP". “Although I join the ExCo in my personal capacity I hope to 
bring the voice of LP and the LegCo into the ExCo" (Interview, February 2004). 
The case of Tsang Yok-shing demonstrates another kind of conflict of 
representation. Before his resignation as the Chairman of the DAB, the government 
may finally push forward policies that are opposed by the DAB. Because of the 
constraint of collective responsibility, he was bound to vote for a bill which was 
rejected by the party he led. Football gambling and border departure tax are the 
examples provided by him. 
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Tsang tried to resolve these conflicts by making appropriate compromise with 
the government before a bill is introduced. “I hope to discuss with Mr. Tung about the 
method of policy formulation in order to minimize these kinds of conflicts... I hope 
that most of the conflicts can be resolved this way, so that DAB will support nearly 
every bill of the government. However, I already told Mr. Tung that I cannot ensure 
every DAB LegCo members will unconditionally support the government." 
Tarn Yiu-chung, a former ExCo member prior to the introduction of the POAS, 
rightly pinpointed this problem. "The non-official members...can only serve as 
supporting role. They do not need to promote and explain policy initiatives. The 
situation is more interesting for leaders of political parties. In giving comments about 
government polices, the identities of James Tien (leader of the LP) and Tsang 
Yok-shing are rather obscure. The public cannot recognize if he speaks for the parties 
or the ExCo. This dilemma is particularly great for leaders of political parties. 
Therefore, we witness one important and interesting phenomenon. When situated 
in a position where one can exercise the policy machine, the scope of representation 
of these non-official members is indeed rather constricted. Group interests prevail, in 
my opinion, largely because of the conducive environment for a corporatist-like 
political system (Kuan 1999). Even leaders of political parties cannot widen the scope 
of representation of the ExCo because of the restriction on non-official members as 
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shown by Tam Yiu-chung. Such arrangement is inimical to both party development 
and the channeling of wide public or cross-sectional concerns into the policy 
formulating process. 
Similar question is addressed to the new principal officials. Both Stephen Lam 
and Michael Suen replied that they would uphold the overall interest of Hong Kong in 
formulating the policies of their bureaus. Moreover, Suen added that traditional 
training of the civil service is influential in this aspect. He reiterated the desirability of 
such training in the maintenance of public interest. “The advantage of the training of 
civil service is that it emphasizes on consensus forging and balance of different 
interests. Political parties can of course transcend narrow sectoral or group interest. 
However, (unlike civil servants) they still have to concern about the support of 
voters." (Suen, Interview April 2004) 
As a side point, Suen also admitted that the Exco members are not so united in 
terms of political ideologies as well as representation. "We come together in Exco not 
because of the same political creed. We become colleagues merely because the CE 
appointed us. It is hard for us to be united in all issues." (Suen, Interview April 2004) 
It is difficult to regard the Exco as a governing cabinet with homogenous political 
beliefs as well as similar representation. 
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The picture of constricted representation has also somehow enhanced the 
persuasiveness of the claim that the institutional framework laid by the Basic Law 
indeed renders the government more vulnerable to the intervention to promote 
sectoral or functional interest through some covert forms of corporatism. The 
dominance of sectoral interest can also be regarded as a miniature of political 
quandary encountered by Hong Kong during the post-colonial era. The views of these 
3 out of 5 non-official members should have provided a solid foundation for making 
such generalization. The POAS would at best be a twisted principal-agent framework, 
in which only particular sector would be able to exert pressure for accountability in 
current structure. The “public accountability" is only available for a restrictive 
"public". Eventually, the representatives appear to be unable to transcend the confines 
of sectoral wellbeing and extend their representation to the general public. This is 
extremely unfavorable for the ExCo to forge a strong accountability linkage with the 
citizens. 
7.4.4 Criteria of Assessment 
Another good way to elicit the conception of accountability held by these elites 
is to ask them to assess the performance of the POAS. The enquiry does provide some 
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interesting hints and observation on their priority of different criteria in judging the 
situation. 
The most important discovery of such inquiry is that political elites in the POAS 
often attach huge instrumental concern in their assessment of the new reform. A 
preponderant emphasize has been placed on whether the POAS can enhance the 
efficiency of public governance and ensure a strong government. The concern 
about whether true accountability is achieved is glaringly absent from their 
assessment. No trace of the delicate balance mentioned in Chapter 2 can be found in 
their illustrations. This largely accords to the observation on how pro-government 
elites articulated the concept of accountability and shaped the political struggle with 
the democrats during every incident of accountability in Chapter 6. The political 
confrontation concerning the norms of accountability can partly be traced to this 
mindset. 
Such efficiency vision can be broken down into several threads. First, in 
evaluating the whole reform, most of these actors automatically focused on the lack of 
political support to the layer of political appointees in the system. Tsang and Cheng 
stressed the problem that political accountability and responsibility are only 
shouldered by the CE and the 14 principal officials. “You have given him (principal 
official) so great power. However, can he fully determine the policy direction? Does 
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he have the power to employ the manpower? ... If I need to bear political 
responsibility, the officials below me should also share some of it." (Cheng, Interview, 
March 2004). As we can see, strengthening the executive-led arrangement is their 
main concern, a verification of the claim raised in Chapter 6. 
Second, they regard whether the POAS reform can strengthen the support from 
the LegCo as another important criteria of assessment. The representative from the 
Bureau of Constitutional Affairs considers the lack of majority support in the LegCo 
as the major problem of the POAS. “Now many principal officials think that selling 
policy in the LegCo is difficult because they do not have a single vote in it. DAB and 
LP cannot be regarded as partners in the ruling coalition. This can be reflected from 
the fact that they do not support the government all the time. Besides the POAS, the 
executive-legislative relationship poses a more formidable problem to us." (Doris Ho, 
Interview, March 2004). The craving for legislative support sufficiently explains why 
the reformers introduced some kind of coalition politics and the cooptation of two 
leaders from local political parties in the ExCo. 
Third, the lack of team spirit and solidarity among the members of the ruling 
coalition is frequently raised in their assessment as well. The crucial issue, as Tsang 
pointed out, is how to keep these people from different background together to work 
as a team. Due to the lack of party politics, the only common ground for them to be 
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united is their aspiration to serve Hong Kong. To Tsang, this is absolutely insufficient. 
(Interview, March 2004). Cheng also affirmed this view (Interview, March 2004). 
Again, this is from the perspective of efficiency concern. 
Fourth, they would assess the POAS by whether the principal officials gain 
significant supports from the civil service. This criterion led many interviewees to 
criticize the fact that the principal officials have no control over the appointment of 
the staff under their deployment. The suggestion to extend the network of political 
appointment to two or three more tiers is incessantly proposed during the interviews. 
(Doris Ho, Tsang, Tarn, Cheng, Interview March 2004) Michael Suen even 
considered this as the major barrier for the maturing of the POAS. (Suen, Interview 
April 2004) 
Doris Ho and Tsang both pointed out that the principal officials have no time to 
deal with political work. “Their time are always encroached by office work ... these 
officials are not lazy. They just pay too much time in their office. They have no time 
to go out and meet the citizens. Another factor is that these officials are specialized in 
paperwork but not these sorts of political shows. If we combine these two factors, we 
can discover that actually their working style is not greatly different from that of 
bureaucratic governance. They do not have the charismatic quality of politicians." 
(Tsang, Interview 2004) Michael Suen affirmed such view from his own experience. 
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He admitted that there was no big difference between being a principal officials and a 
senior official before the introduction of the POAS. "Actually, after the POAS is 
implemented, principal officials should only be expected to tackle political works. But 
now...we have to handle administrative tasks, too." (Suen, Interview April 2004) 
Doris Ho further added that officials who came from outside the government 
needed much time to adapt to the new working environment. “The first and a half year 
of the implementation of the POAS is just the adaptation period. These principal 
officials need to tinker the mode of cooperation with their subordinates. It is hard for 
them to take care of so many tasks." (Interview, March 2004). 
All political elites affirmed the merit of this reform. They showed their approval 
because the POAS has put the development of Hong Kong politics in a correct 
direction. It has preserved the political neutrality of the civil service, while created a 
layer of political appointees who can devote their energy in political lobbying and 
policy formulation. Michael Suen stated it clearly also that introducing mechanism for 
the CE to remove particular ministers from office is only for eliminating the public 
pressure on the government to sack him/her, so that smooth governance can be 
preserved. None of them conceded public criticism of the system as a retrogression of 
political accountability. Overall, it is rather clear that the interviewees perceive the 
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ministerization under the POAS as a reform to solve the gridlock in governance 
instead of an answer to the public calls for more political accountability. 
7.5 Conclusions 
We should resist the temptation to make overly broad and general conclusions on 
the political conception of these elites only by a few in-depth interviews. However, 
their responses and some astonishing answers do indeed provide us with some clues 
to study their conception of roles and articulation of ideas. 
From a normative perspective, the instrumental concern was found to be 
dominant in the elites' appreciation of the whole POAS reform. They do not pay due 
consideration to the needs of public participation, responsiveness and answerability, 
let alone the balance between discretion and control that pertains to the operation of 
political accountability. The attachment of an efficient vision to the accountability 
system may be an indication that public officials do not truly regard political 
accountability and control as a normative value in public governance. 
From an organizational perspective, although the elites share a clear vision of 
political responsibility, the organizational framework to materialize their aspiration 
proposed by them is, at best, an attenuated form of accountability mechanism. What 
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they preached cannot be met by what they proposed. Political accountability cannot 
be truly meaningful in Hong Kong if such mismatch between vision and action is left 
unsolved. It may explain why political accountability is reduced to mere rhetoric and 
ethos in the actual operation of the POAS, and why the government still remains 
uncommitted to more fundamental political reform in spite of the escalating public 
sentiments for such reform. 
The weak accountability relation is further exacerbated by the characteristics of 
constricted representation in the network of co-optation in the ExCo. The reason to 
co-opt political elites from pro-government and business sector and to marginalize the 
democrats can be ascribed to various factors as discussed in Chapter 5 and 6. Such 
arrangement would fail to aggregate the diverse pocket of interests in society. The 
implication of such co-optation, as deduced from the materials from the interviews, is 
that conflicts between different sectors may only be heightened instead of relented. It 
lacks the representatives from cross-sectional background which can act as strong 
intermediaries to solve the increasing confrontation along the frontline of 
socio-economic orientations and political ideologies. 
When both the normative and organizational conceptions held by the political 
actors in the power center do not possess the necessary components of political 
accountability, it is surely naive to hope that accountability practice can be derived 
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from the transformation led by elites who have different perception in mind. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusions: Accountability System 
without Substance, Spirit and 
Opportunity to Maturate 
8.1 "Accountability Without Democracy，，？ Or Something More? 
Civic Exchange, a policy think-tank in Hong Kong, once commented the POAS 
by the phrase "accountability without democracy" (Civic Exchange, September 2002). 
Local academic and political communities often summarize the problems of this 
reform by this succinct phrase by then. It is commonly believed that meaningful 
public accountability must be underpinned by democratic institutions, by which 
citizens can impose sanctions, demand ministerial resignations and, in the ultimate 
cases, oust the principal officials by elections. Political accountability would be 
merely a Utopia without full democracy. 
While this belief cannot be agreed with more, it is submitted that something 
more is missing for a meaningful intellectual enquiry on the POAS reform. It is not 
hard to find analysts who were willing to point out that the POAS framework deviates 
greatly from the standard set by contemporary democratic accountability institutions. 
However, as this thesis hopes to demonstrate, solely focusing on institutional analysis 
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would lead to the neglect towards the importance of political dynamics and the 
conception of accountability held by political elites in contributing the ultimate 
calamity of the new accountability system. No single approach can alone enable us to 
grasp the intricacy of the politics of political accountability as prompted by this 
governmental reform. 
Driven by this conviction, this thesis serves as an ambitious attempt to overcome 
the inadequacy of the local academic discourse on political accountability and the 
POAS, which is mainly centred on pure institutional analysis. It deliberately adopts 
multiple perspectives in approaching the POAS reform, so that a more comprehensive 
picture on its pros and cons can be presented to the readers. Particularly, this thesis 
addresses to the inadequacy of the existing literature in appreciating the essence of the 
concept political accountability as to mange the tensions between administrative 
rationality and popular control on the government. 
8.2 Politics of Political Accountability 一 the Wilder Context 
To attain a more insightful analysis on the POAS, researcher must be able to put 
this reform in the broader context of political development in Hong Kong. It should 
be always reminded that the development of political accountability is firmed chained 
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in two conflicting trends of Hong Kong whose origins can be traced back to 
Sino-British negotiation during the colonial era. 
One salient trend is the preservation of depoliticized and efficient executive-led 
governance, which is largely a heritage of the benevolent authoritarianism during the 
colonial era. From a positive side, it is some kind of top-down paternalistic rule which 
is buttressed by the good wish of the public officials. The senior bureaucrats or 
political elites voluntarily bore the responsibility to protect public interest in the 
absence of external control or scrutiny. Their willingness to be responsible to the 
public sprang solely from their elites' vocation to serve or professionalism instilled by 
the civil service. However, the inevitable side effect is the insufficiency of external 
control in public governance. The administrative state led by civil service resembles 
some kind of guardianship or elitist rule, while political participation from the public 
was greatly limited in both the policy formulation process and formation of the 
government. 
While the Mainland government worried that a hasty democratization in Hong 
Kong would destroy the stability hardly attained in the past decade, the resumption of 
sovereignty to China also triggered the issue of maintaining the confidence of the 
Hong Kong people. Therefore, the avoidance of great democratic reform and the need 
to maintain the status quo, including the efficient executive-led governance in Hong 
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Kong (under the suit of soft authoritarianism), remains a high imperative both before 
and after the Handover. 
On the other hand, the bottom-up urge for a participatory style of politics is 
gathering momentum. The enactment of various legislations on human rights and the 
incorporation of relevant international conventions in the Basic Law turned the 
post-colonial political system into liberty- and right-based one. The guarantee of 
democracy in the Basic Law is taken into heart by the public. The introduction of 
indirect and later direct election before the Handover gradually awakened the political 
awareness of the issue of representation and responsiveness of the general public. The 
increasingly vigilant mass media enhances the transparency and openness of the 
public governance. The civil service reform towards the greater administrative 
responsibility also strengthened the sense of accountability of the colonial 
administration. The intrusion of these democratic elements in the soft authoritarian 
political framework influenced significantly to the constitutional making process 
during the early nineties, and its impact further amplifies in Hong Kong politics after 
the colonial rule. 
While the literature on colonial politics is mainly centred on political stability 
and transition, the academic discourse on the post-colonial Hong Kong politics is 
primarily about political instability. A main source of instability is, put in the simplest 
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terms, the struggle between the want to maintain the traditional elitist politics and the 
strong public urge for participatory politics. Quite clearly the depoliticized political 
framework, which is adopted from the colonial government, cannot solve these 
unprecedented political conflicts. Thus, the CE could not exert strong leadership over 
the civil service, while the legitimacy of the government was also put into serious 
doubt. In order to solve the dual problem of both capacity and legitimacy, the 
government encountered the ultimate puzzle in the next step of constitutional reform — 
how to centralize political power to enhance the efficiency of governance though, at 
the same time, respond to the conflicting demand for more democratic control over 
the government from the public ？ 
The birth of the POAS would therefore make sense if it is situated in such 
political backdrop. The project to ministerialize and politicize of the framework of 
administrative state can be readily perceived as a step to both strengthen executive 
leadership and somehow relent the public pressure for democratic accountability. 
Principal officials are now in a better position to deploy resources and carry out 
political tasks and lobbying. The POAS imposes new responsibility on the new layer 
of political appointees, but does not strengthen the external means to impose sanctions 
such as electoral reform or empowerment of the legislature. In short, 
ministerialization can be regarded as the surrogate of full democracy. 
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8.3 The POAS: Accountability System without Substance and 
Spirit 
The institutional content of the POAS is thus extremely critical to the 
development of Hong Kong politics, as it would construct a new "strategic field" in 
which political deliberation, interaction and struggles are positioned. No doubt the 
POAS has brought significant change in both the public administration and the 
political ecology in Hong Kong. However, as this thesis tries hard to indicate, the 
desire to assert executive dominance pervades the whole POAS restructuring, while 
the reformers have paid little attention to craft a structural context by which the 
government can institute a true accountability relationship with both the public and 
the legislature. As Chapter 5 shows, ministerialization alone cannot enhance 
government transparency, answerability as well as the possibility of being sanctioned, 
while the political neutrality of the civil service was also somehow jeopardized. Such 
"structural deficit" renders the whole POAS reform obsolete in matching the public 
expectation for more transparent governance and accountable government at the 
outset. Moreover, it has deepened the nature of personal rule, failed to introduce some 
kind of collective responsibility in the cabinet as well as provided a permanent 
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support base for the government in the existing minimally-integrated political system. 
Worst still, the system did not provide even slightest institutional guidance for 
political actors to deal with foreseeable incidents related to the issue of accountability. 
The changes of political system in Hong Kong are often driven by political elites. 
The POAS is of no exception. This thesis devotes significant coverage in studying 
in-depth indeed how the relevant actors perceives the concept of political 
accountability and the entailing organizational attributes. The inquiry indicates that 
although they have a rather clear concept of political accountability, the concern of 
efficiency in public administration dominates their conception of accountability, and 
hence the appreciation of the POAS reform. The principal officials emphasize the 
internal control and professionalism as the important means to achieve accountability 
and play down the importance of external democratic means (such as electoral 
sanctions) in this regard. In the same vein, close political allies in the ExCo do not 
require broad public support to gain their positions, they are not structurally 
compelled to transcend sectoral interest and pay heed to the preference beyond their 
electorate or function groups. Such "constricted representation" may account for their 
higher regard for sectoral interest over the public voice as exhibited during the 
interviews. 
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These two observations lead this thesis to conclude that the new accountability 
system is devoid of both substance and spirit of true public accountability. 
8.4 Politics of Accountability - Accountability System without the 
Opportunity to Maturate 
The subsequent politics of political accountability was largely shaped by the 
opposite camps of players - the ExCo together with the pro-government legislators on 
one side, and the democrats on the other. The political conception and values held by 
them perform a significant role in shaping the pattern of new political dynamism. 
Because of the lack of guidance provided by the POAS, in every situation when issues 
of accountability arise, the interaction between players of these two camps play a 
dominant role in shaping the subsequent norms of accountability. The formation of 
such norms has to resort to the sheer power politics which is conditioned in the 
executive-legislative relationship and the state-civil society relationship. 
As illustrated in Chapter 6, the politics of political accountability is locked in the 
developmental pathways which have been long ditched during the colonial era. The 
structural divide between elitist and mass politics and ideological confrontation 
between pro-government and pro-democracy camp has been entrenched and 
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reinforced progressively in tandem with the zigzag advances of democratization in 
Hong Kong. The struggle over the norms of political accountability is essentially a 
manifestation of such headlong clashes. 
The pattern of vested interest induces the pro-government and pro-democracy 
camp to play the "game" of political accountability by drastically different ideologies 
and approaches. The incongruity between the efficiency concern of the 
pro-government camp and populist vision of accountability held by the democrats led 
to never-ending conflicts in a series of subsequent political incidents, and the 
adversarial coalition politics introduced by the POAS further restrict the room for 
mediation. Public pressure continued to accumulate. It further increased the incentive 
for the democrats to manipulate public sentiments in the struggle and, consequently, 
the imperative for pro-government camp to harden the defensive walls. The dynamics 
would be incessantly channeled back to strengthen the rift between two camps, and 
the politics of political accountability was thus subject to increasing return. 
Before the unprecedented July 1 demonstration in 2003, the pro-government 
coalition triumphed in nearly every battle concerning political accountability. Their 
high regard for efficiency in governance could overwhelm over the public concern for 
accountability since the democrats were politically marginalized within the legislature. 
However, after the outburst of public sentiments in the demonstration, the civil 
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society becomes much more active in protesting against the defensive stance of the 
government. 
Thus, I would like to use the two top-level resignation after the July 1 
demonstration and aftermath of SARS investigation as an illuminating epilogue to our 
discussion. 
Two weeks after the march on July 1, the government announced the 
resignations of Secretary of Security Regina Ip Lau Suk-uee and Finanical Secretary 
Antony Leung Kam-chung. While Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa floundering under 
huge public pressure, the resignations came as a timely rescue. Although both Regina 
Ip and Antony Leung claimed that their resignations were prompted by personal 
reasons, the unrelenting public discontent must have contributed considerably to their 
decisions. Hong Kong had long expected Mrs Ip to resign for her mishandling of 
public sentiment, distortion of public opinion and her unreasonable belligerence in the 
saga of Article 23 Legislation. The public called for the exit of Mr Leung for his 
apparent personal misconduct. Top-level resignation was indeed a very uncommon 
phenomenon in the old bureaucratic rule in which civil servants can evade political 
responsibility under the misleading label of "political neutrality". Obviously, their 
departure helped the development of accountability in Hong Kong and they would 
mark the start of accountability practices if Tung is determined to entrench them. 
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Yet，the aftermath of SARS investigation showed an worrying trend of 
development of accountability in Hong Kong. The inquiry panel of the LegCo 
produced their SARS report pm 5 July 2004, putting the blame of the sloppiness of 
dealing with SARS on Yeoh and Margaret Chan. However, the panel did not suggest 
any punishment to the officials at fault. It somehow concurs with the conclusions of 
another SARS Experts Report which opines that the administrative faults exhibited 
are not as serious as to necessitate ministerial resignation. Yeoh offered apology 
afterwards, but refused to resign. 
However, the report triggered dismay and grievance among the already 
disgruntled victims of the SARS outbreak. They sternly criticized the leniency of the 
report and condemned the relevant officials for their unwillingness to step down 
through the mass media. Their complaints earned extensive front-page coverage in 
nearly all local newspaper in the next day. The comment from a resident of the Amoy 
Gardens Block E who still suffers from the grievance of the death of his wife after 
giving birth to their son is particularly striking. “It is like a show to me. And I have 
finally learned from Dr Yeoh the meaning of the word shameless" (South China 
Morning Post, 7 July 2004). 
Immediately, the government was besieged by the sudden upsurge of public 
sorrow as well as anger. The pressure was directed to both Yeoh and Leong Che-hung. 
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The pro-government legislators also did not stand by Yeoh in this time. Quite rarely 
did both the DAB and the Hong Kong Progressive Alliance (HKPA), the two stalwart 
pro-government parties, would be in line with the DP's motion in urging for Yeoh's 
resignation. Although LP did not intend to agree with the DP's motion, they did not 
intend to protect Yeoh as well. Eventually, Yeoh announced his resignation two days 
after the release of the report and became the first principal official who stepped down 
for shouldering political responsibility. 
Obviously, Yeoh's resignation was solely effected by the unexpected deluge of 
public pressure, and it was not based on any culpability attributed to him in the SARS 
report from the LegCo. His bowing out was solely effected by the unexpected deluge 
of public pressure. With the help of the opportunistic behaviour of pro-government 
legislators, public sentiment eventually earned the dominating role in determining the 
norms of political accountability. However, it was quite obvious that all the 
professional judgment and conclusion raised in the SARS reports were all neglected 
by politicians in reaching the decision to urge for Yeoh's resignation. 
Accountability is supposed to be a neat balance between executive autonomy and 
responsiveness to the public. However, such balance could not work out in Hong 
Kong. The operation of the political accountability system in Hong Kong has moved 
from one extreme to another extreme in the politics of SARS enquiry - unreasonable 
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conservatism has given way to complete adherence to populist demand. Its potential 
side effect would be the adoption of public sentiment as the only factor in determining 
how future incident of accountability should be resolved. Neither gravitating towards 
these two extremes would facilitate the evolution of convention of political 
accountability and the healthy development of the POAS. Indeed, there is a better way 
to comply with the spirit of political accountability and strive for a better balance in 
this case. Dr Yeoh could offer a resignation which took effect after a short period, so 
that he could be given enough time to kick-start the reform which improve the 
preventive measures of public healthcare system against SARS. Unfortunately, the 
political tussle and altercations close all the potential room for deliberation and 
meaningful dialectical interaction now for improving the whole system and filling up 
the proper institutional void. 
In sum, this thesis does not intend to negate the merit of the whole reform. 
Indeed, ministerialization of the colonial bureaucratic structure is an important and 
necessary step in developing political accountability in Hong Kong. The obvious 
change under the new POAS is that principal officials will now be less insulated to 
great pressure to resign in case of political misjudgment and grave personal 
misconduct. Yet, in order to effect genuine political accountability (in both normative 
and structural sense), the existing ministerialization project must go in tandem with 
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other fundamental political and administrative reforms, which would be inevitably 
linked with democratization. 
Hong Kong will fall short of full democratization at least in the near future due 
to the existing constitutional impediments and political opposition by Beijing and 
local conservative forces. Given existing political environment in Hong Kong, a 
realistic and workable blueprint for improving the accountability system must be on 
administrative instead of political reform. Indeed, there is a great room for reform in 
the civil service even under the constraint of democratization. The experience of 
OCED countries is particularly telling here. To put it briefly, as learned from the 
experience of OCED countries, when the civil service lags behind the development of 
the civil society and cannot respond effectively to the public demand, the bureaucracy 
would be under huge pressure and public expectation for a fundamental structural 
reform as well as a paradigmatic changes in value of governance. The restructuring 
normally works by facilitating the exchange of information, fostering consensus 
building with the civil society and finally institutionalizing public participation in the 
policy deliberation and making process. Once the stakeholders and general public are 
regarded as working partners with the government in the policy process, informational 
and explanatory accountability of the public administration will be significantly 
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enhanced. Doubtless to say, HKSAR government can work better in the three areas 
mentioned above. 
Here comes the final remark. The politics of political accountability in Hong 
Kong is actually politics of interpretation. The dynamics was formed by the political 
interaction and struggles between two structurally separate camps, whose political 
behaviours are driven by distinct sets of ideologies, values as well as mode of political 
participation. In my opinion, such visualization would be the starting point in forming 
the new theoretical framework or even academic paradigm which can better analyze 
the political instability of post-colonial Hong Kong. 
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